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Corporate governance broadly refers to the oversight activities undertaken by 
internal and external actors to assure a fair distribution of cash flows and wealth transfers 
among the contracting parties. One of the most important functions of corporate 
governance is to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process. A substantial body 
of work highlights the role of corporate governance mechanisms in curtailing earnings 
management that stems from managerial opportunism. Prior research has also found a 
direct link between weak corporate governance and financial misstatements and reporting 
frauds. While the effects of governance mechanisms on corporate reporting quality are well 
documented in the extant literature, little is known on the how temporary fluctuations in 
attention and/or monitoring intensity affect this relation. This dissertation contributes to 
this thread of literature by investigating the role of corporate governance mechanisms in 
ensuring the reliability of financial reporting in response to macroeconomic uncertainty 
and institutional investor inattention. 
 The first essay examines how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects 
accounting quality in a cross-country setting. We find that accounting quality, measured 
based on Nikolaev’s (2018) model, increases during periods of high policy uncertainty. 
This relation is confirmed by the negative association between EPU and performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals in a multivariate setting, and it extends to various 




EPU and accounting quality is more pronounced for government-dependent firms and 
firms with higher political risk. Additional analyses based on institutional investors’ 
trading behavior, media freedom, and press circulation suggest that market participants’ 
attention is a mechanism through which EPU affects accounting quality. Further, we find 
that the positive relation between policy uncertainty and earnings quality is more 
pronounced for firms in countries with strong institutions, where market participants can 
monitor management more effectively, and for firms with a greater need for external 
capital, which increases managers’ incentives to meet investors’ demand for transparency.  
The second essay examines the impact of institutional investor distraction on the 
costs of debt capital. Using a new measure of shareholder inattention based on exogenous 
industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we document that firms with distracted 
shareholders are associated with a higher cost of debt financing. This effect is stronger for 
firms with more powerful CEOs, firms with higher information asymmetry, and those 
operating in less competitive product markets. Bond covenants, as a mechanism designed 
to reduce the agency problems inherent in lending, attenuate the increase in bond yield 
spreads resulting from shareholder distraction. Further testing suggests that the distraction–
cost of debt relation is driven by dual holder and non-dual holders. The results are robust 
to controlling for inattention at the retail investor level and for other external monitors such 
as credit rating agencies, financial analysts, and Big 4 auditors. Overall, our evidence 
suggests that shareholder inattention has an incrementally negative effect on bond pricing.  
The third essay examines whether and how board cultural diversity affects bond 
pricing during bad times. Using a novel approach to identify directors’ cultural 




the board membership and cultural distance between the board—especially the audit 
committee—and the CEO attenuate the adverse effect of economic policy uncertainty on 
yield spreads. Further testing shows that the effect of board cultural diversity and cultural 
distance extends above and beyond the presence of other external monitors such as Big 4 
auditors, financial analysts, and long-term institutional investors. I also find corroborative 
evidence that boards with greater proportion of independent directors, higher female 
participation and director engagements, and less busy directors moderate the adverse 
impact of economic policy uncertainty. The results suggest that change in bondholders’ 
assessment of firm performance during periods of high policy uncertainty is a function of 
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POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT:  
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE1 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Although practitioners identify industry- and economy-wide factors as important 
determinants of accounting quality (Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2013), few 
studies to date have examined how economy-wide factors affect accounting quality. We 
attempt to fill this gap by examining the relation between policy-induced economic 
uncertainty and accounting quality in a cross-country setting. Policy-induced economic 
uncertainty (or economic policy uncertainty, hereafter, EPU) refers broadly to uncertainty 
about government actions that affect the economic environment. EPU is uncertainty about 
“who will make economic policy decisions, what economic policy actions will be 
undertaken and when, and the economic effects of policy actions (or inaction)” (Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis 2016, 1598). 
The likelihood and nature of policy changes depend on the demands of (competing) 
constituents, as well as the policymaker’s ideological preferences and re-election concerns 
(Alesina 1987, 1988; Wright 1996; Keim 2001). To the extent that investors cannot fully 
 
1 El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Kim, Y., and Yoon, H.J. A modified version has been 




anticipate the effect of these competing forces on policy outcomes, they face uncertainty over 
which policies the government will implement, and ultimately over how they will impact 
profitability (Pástor and Veronesi 2012, 2013). This is a macro-, or aggregate-level, risk 
thatapplies to all firms in the economy. Thus, EPU differs from firm-level uncertainty that 
arises from factors unique to a firm, such as new product development, merger and 
acquisition activity, or management turnover. Firm-level uncertainty can be influenced by 
actions taken by managers or investors. In contrast, uncertainty about government economic 
policy stems largely from regulatory decisions beyond managers’ control, and that are 
therefore unlikely to be influenced by most managers and investors (Nagar, Schoenfeld, and 
Wellman 2019). 
We argue that policy uncertainty affects accounting quality through its effect on 
investors’ attention to firm-specific information. Because of the cost of paying attention, 
not all investors opt to observe the information signal and be informed (Hirshleifer and 
Teoh 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2011). Uninformed investors infer some firm-
specific information from the equilibrium price at no cost. As the variance of future returns 
increases under high uncertainty, the informativeness of the stock price decreases in 
economy-wide uncertainty. An increase in economy-wide uncertainty has two conflicting 
effects on investors’ incentives to obtain firm-specific information (Andrei, Friedman, and 
Ozel 2019). On the one hand, it decreases these incentives by reducing the quality of 
information signals that informed investors observe. On the other hand, it strengthens these 
incentives by increasing the value of information as uninformed investors cannot easily 
infer information from the equilibrium price under high uncertainty. Andrei et al. (2019) 
argue that the second effect likely dominates the first, resulting in greater investor attention 




Prior studies (e.g., Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998a, 1998b) show that limited 
investor attention often provides earnings management opportunities. Studies also find that 
investor inattention loosens monitoring constraints on corporate actions (e.g., Kempf, 
Manconi, and Spalt 2017; Garel, Martin-Flores, Petit-Romec, and Scott 2019; Abramova, 
Core, and Sutherland 2019; Basu, Pierce, and Stephan 2019), and weakens corporate 
governance oversight (Liu, Low, Masulis, and Zhang 2020). Thus, we predict that an 
increase in investors’ attention to firm-specific information during higher-EPU periods 
motivates managers to improve accounting quality. 
We test our prediction on the relation between EPU and accounting quality with data 
from 19 countries over the 1990–2015 period. We capture EPU with the policy uncertainty 
index developed by Baker et al. (2016) (hereafter, BBD). Considering that real firm activities 
that arise in response to EPU (Gulen and Ion 2016; Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion 2018) may 
affect accruals, separating its effect on accounting quality from its effect on performance is 
important in our setting. Thus, in the first set of tests, we measure accounting quality based 
on Nikolaev’s (2018) model, which builds on the insights that earnings and cash flows are 
noisy measures of a firm’s true economic performance, and measurement errors reverse over 
time. Nikolaev (2018) explicitly introduces true performance into the model, which helps 
better separate the error component of accruals and the performance component of accruals 
(i.e., adjustments made to reflect economic performance).  
We find that the standard deviation of true economic performance is lower during 
periods of high EPU. We also find that the standard deviations of both the performance 
and error components of accruals are lower during high-EPU periods. More importantly, 
the results show that accounting quality is higher under elevated policy uncertainty. 




accruals, these results suggest that managers limit their accounting discretion during high-
EPU periods. As a result, the accounting system measures performance more accurately 
during higher- than lower-EPU periods. We also find that accounting quality is higher for 
periods with longer-duration uncertainty, where EPU duration is defined as the number of 
consecutive months during the fiscal year in which a country’s policy uncertainty index is 
above the 80th percentile. The fraction of the variance in accruals that is explained by the 
managed error component is lower when EPU is higher, suggesting that reduced incentives 
to manage earnings during times of elevated policy uncertainty contribute to an 
improvement in accounting quality.  
Next, we investigate cross-sectional variation in the relation between EPU and 
accounting quality. Because policy uncertainty, unlike other macro uncertainty, is 
influenced by the political process, its effect may vary across firms depending on their level 
of political risk. Exploiting this unique feature of EPU, we examine whether the extent of 
investors’ attention to firm-specific information during periods of high policy uncertainty 
differs depending on the firm’s exposure to political risk. During high-EPU periods, 
investors are more likely to scrutinize financial information of firms with higher political 
risk, and such scrutiny would motivate managers to improve accounting quality. Consistent 
with this prediction, we find that the effect of EPU on accounting quality is more 
pronounced for firms that are more government-dependent.  
In the second set of tests, we complement the analyses based on Nikolaev’s (2018) 
model by examining the effect of EPU on discretionary accruals, a popular measure of 
earnings management, in a multivariate setting. Nikolaev’s (2018) model enables us to 
control for true economic performance and evaluate the accounting system’s ability to 




quality and accruals components at the firm-year level. We are thus limited in our ability 
to evaluate changes in accounting quality over time, to control for other time-varying 
factors that may affect accounting quality, and to explore the underlying mechanism 
driving the EPU-accounting quality relation. Considering that earnings management 
increases noise in accruals, and thus lowers accounting quality, we expect a negative 
relation between EPU and discretionary accruals. To control for the effect of policy 
uncertainty on economic performance, we estimate discretionary accruals adjusted for the 
effect of performance on accruals. The regressions include both firm- and year-fixed effects 
to control for unobservable heterogeneity across firms and over time. Controlling for 
factors previously shown to affect earnings management, we find that firms reduce 
earnings management as policy uncertainty rises. 
Then, to address potential endogeneity concerns arising from omitted correlated 
variables, we conduct an instrumental variables analysis and a placebo test. We use 
political fractionalization and the exclusion of veto players from the government as 
instruments. Political fractionalization leaves more room for disagreement in policy 
decisions (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2014), resulting in higher policy uncertainty. Henisz and 
Delios (2004) argue that the presence of multiple veto players makes it harder to change 
the existing policies, and it is thus associated with a lower level of policy uncertainty. The 
instrumented policy uncertainty variable is significantly and negatively associated with the 
level of earnings management. Although our results are robust to controlling for 
endogeneity using an instrumental variables approach, it can be difficult to prove that our 





Next, we examine whether the relation between EPU and accounting quality 
extends to other measures of earnings properties. Reinforcing our main inferences, we find 
that an elevated EPU is associated with a lower level of income smoothing, higher earnings 
predictability, higher earnings persistence, higher accruals quality, and a lower degree of 
real earnings management. We also examine the role of firm-level political risk in a 
multivariate setting. In addition to a firm’s government dependence, we use a firm-level 
political risk measure developed by Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2019). We 
show that the negative relation between EPU and earnings management is more 
pronounced for more government-dependent firms and firms with higher firm-level 
political risk.  
In the third set of tests, we examine the mechanism underlying the effects of EPU 
on accounting quality. If firms are closely and continuously monitored by long-term 
institutional investors, they are likely to maintain high accounting quality, and there is little 
room for improvement during high-EPU periods. In addition, changes in EPU may not 
affect these firms because long-term investors rely less on firm disclosures (Bushee and 
Noe 2000). In contrast, short-term institutional investors, who tend to engage in frequent 
information-based trading (Yan and Zhang 2009), are likely to pay more attention to 
corporate disclosures when evaluating firm performance. Consistent with the increased 
investor attention during high-EPU periods, we find significantly higher investor turnover 
rates (churn rates) during periods of higher policy uncertainty. We also find that the relation 
between EPU and earnings management is more pronounced for firms with higher churn 
rates, and when short-term institutional ownership is higher than long-term institutional 




increased demand for transparency during periods of high EPU, driven by the presence of 
short-term institutional investors, induces managers to improve accounting quality. 
Additional analyses show that the effect of EPU on earnings management is more 
pronounced for firms in countries with greater media freedom and circulation. This 
reinforces the idea that market participants’ attention is a mechanism through which EPU 
affects accounting quality.  
In our final investigation, we find that the legal institutions and the financial 
reporting environment at the country level, as well as growth opportunities and external 
financing needs at the industry level, affect the relation between earnings management and 
policy uncertainty. These findings are consistent with the view that as policy uncertainty 
increases, market participants become more prudent and in countries with stronger legal 
institutions and reporting environment, it is easier for outside stakeholders to demand 
greater transparency. This evidence further supports the idea that firms are motivated to 
meet investors’ demand for higher reporting quality under elevated policy uncertainty 
when they need external financing and thus have incentives to lower the cost of capital. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the 
burgeoning research that examines the effects of policy uncertainty. Prior studies find that, 
at a macro level, policy uncertainty influences capital flows, the business cycle, and the 
speed of economic recovery (BBD 2016; Julio and Yook 2016; Bloom, Floetotto, 
Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry 2018). Research on how policy uncertainty impacts 
firm-level decisions, however, is still in its infancy. Gulen and Ion (2016) estimate the 
effect of policy uncertainty on corporate investment, and Bonaime et al. (2018) relate 




effects of various sources of uncertainty on a firm’s information environment (e.g., Bird, 
Karolyi, and Ruchti 2017; Boone, Kim, and White 2018; Jiang, Pittman, and Saffar 2020; 
Drake, Mayberry, and Wilde 2018). These studies focus largely on the role of election 
uncertainty in a U.S. context.  
Bird et al. (2017) and Boone et al. (2020), for example, examine managers’ 
disclosure decisions in response to transitory uncertainty around U.S. gubernatorial 
elections. They find that firms respond to election uncertainty by providing more frequent 
and informative voluntary disclosures over the pre-election period. Similarly, Dai and Ngo 
(2018) show that the policy uncertainty induced by U.S. gubernatorial elections increases 
accounting conservatism. Elections can lead to elevated uncertainty, but policy uncertainty 
can also rise during non-election years (Gulen and Ion 2016).  
We focus on the effect of policy uncertainty beyond election period outcomes and 
in a broader cross-country setting. Using a continuous measure of policy-induced economic 
uncertainty, and controlling for the impact of political elections, we provide comprehensive 
evidence on the effect of policy uncertainty on accounting quality above and beyond that 
associated with elections. 
Second, unlike prior studies that focus on voluntary disclosure choices in response 
to policy uncertainty, we study mandatory disclosure channels. Nagar et al. (2019), for 
example, examine how managers make voluntary disclosure decisions in response to an 
increase in information asymmetry due to EPU. In contrast, we examine how managers 
make financial reporting decisions in a mandatory disclosure environment, and explore 
investors’ attention to firm-specific information during high-EPU periods as a channel. 




(e.g., Hassan et al. 2019), we show that a firm’s exposure to political risk strengthens the 
relation between EPU and accounting quality. In addition, our comprehensive analysis of 
accounting quality and economic outcomes suggests that improving accounting quality 
during periods of heightened uncertainty mitigates the adverse consequences of EPU on 
corporate investment and valuation.  
Third, we contribute to the literature by empirically implementing Nikolaev’s (2018) 
accounting quality model. Nikolaev explicitly introduces true performance into his model, 
which helps better identify the error and performance components of accruals. Thus, 
Nikolaev’s (2018) model enables us to examine the effect of EPU on various components 
of accruals and to measure accounting quality by focusing on the performance 
measurement role of accruals. We add to the literature by providing an important example 
where Nikolaev’s model is useful in undertaking a comprehensive analysis of accounting 
quality.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop our 
main hypothesis. Section III presents our results based on Nikolaev’s (2018) model, and, 
in Section IV, we present results based on discretionary accruals. Section V concludes. 
1.2. BACKGROUND, RELATED LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Policy-induced Economic Uncertainty 
Building on BBD, we focus on policy-induced economic uncertainty, which 
broadly refers to uncertainty about government actions that affect the economic 
environment. While policy uncertainty is unobservable and difficult to quantify, BBD use 
newspaper coverage frequency to capture uncertainty about “who will make economic 




economic effects of policy actions (or inaction)” (p. 1598). Their measure requires that a 
newspaper article contain terms related to the three categories of uncertainty, the economy, 
and policy, and captures both near- and longer-term concerns. As such, the measure of 
policy uncertainty that we employ includes events that both involve government policy and 
affect market conditions. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of BBD’s index. 
Policy-induced economic uncertainty, as captured by BBD’s index (the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty index or EPU index), differs from other common sources of economic 
uncertainty, including general economic uncertainty and market-induced uncertainty, as 
well as uncertainty related to events, such as financial crises. First, measures of general 
macroeconomic uncertainty focus on economic fundamentals, whereas the EPU index 
accounts for uncertainty “directly related to the political situation without explicitly 
referring to macroeconomic fundamentals” (Beckmann and Czudaj 2017, 155). Moreover, 
the news-based component of the EPU index—the focus of our analysis—is consistent with 
the news shocks that drive policy uncertainty affecting stock prices above and beyond other 
economic state variables (Pástor and Veronesi 2013). Second, while policy uncertainty 
focuses on the political and regulatory system as a source of aggregate uncertainty that 
potentially affects all economic actors, market-induced uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty 
reflected in the VIX) is related to volatility in financial markets and thus reflects the 
perceptions of participants in these markets. Third, unlike other indicators of economic 
uncertainty, BBD’s index captures distinct sources of variation in policy uncertainty, which 
BBD attribute to differences in scope between policy uncertainty and other indicators of 
uncertainty. In particular, BBD argue that their index contains information about policy-




policy uncertainty is more persistent than uncertainty-driven events, such as political 
elections and financial crises. While policy uncertainty correlates with such events, it 
allows for the continuous tracking of uncertainty by accounting for effects outside the 
timeframe in which these events take place (e.g., Brogaard and Detzel 2015).2 
Policy-induced economic uncertainty also differs from firm-level uncertainty. 
Firm-specific uncertainty arises from factors unique to a firm, such as new product 
development, merger and acquisition activity, or management turnover, and thus it is 
diversifiable. Policy uncertainty, in contrast, stems largely from regulatory decisions 
beyond managers’ control that affect a broad range of firms and hence is more difficult to 
diversify. 
To help isolate the effects of policy uncertainty, in our multivariate analyses, we 
control for other micro- and macro-economic sources of uncertainty previously shown to 
affect accounting quality. 
Related Literature 
Our study is closely related to that of Nagar et al. (2019), who find that in the US, 
policy-induced economic uncertainty increases information asymmetry among investors and 
hence leads to higher stock illiquidity. While managers attempt to reduce information 
asymmetry through more frequent management forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings, these 
disclosures only partly mitigate the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on information 
asymmetry. Also focusing on the US, Jiang et al. (2020) examine the impact of policy 
 
2 For example, while the level of general economic uncertainty has decreased significantly 
compared to its high levels during the recent financial crisis, policy uncertainty has 
remained high. Prior research on policy-induced economic uncertainty shows that its 
effects on firms and stock markets extend beyond other measures of uncertainty (Brogaard 




uncertainty on three dimensions of textual disclosure and find that managers increase the 
disclosure length in response to elevated policy uncertainty but do not provide more readable 
or informative financial statements. Taken together, these studies suggest that while 
managers attempt to improve disclosures during periods of high policy uncertainty, such 
attempts fall short; that is, a substantial degree of information asymmetry continues to exist 
in periods of higher policy uncertainty. Our study complements these studies by focusing on 
managers’ incentives with respect to accounting quality and its components. We also extend 
these studies by examining the effect of policy uncertainty in an international context. The 
effect of policy uncertainty on accounting quality cannot be easily inferred from the 
association between policy-induced economic uncertainty and firms’ disclosure choices, 
because managers face mixed incentives in making financial reporting and voluntary 
disclosure choices. On the one hand, managers have incentives to reduce information 
asymmetry, as it is detrimental to stock liquidity. On the other hand, increased information 
asymmetry provides managers an opportunity to extract economic rents by obscuring 
accounting quality (Jo and Kim 2007). Our cross-country setting also allows us to examine 
the effect of country-level institutions on the relation between policy uncertainty and 
accounting quality. 
Several studies on the role of election-induced uncertainty are also relevant to our 
paper. Bird et al. (2017) and Boone et al. (2020) examine managers’ disclosure behavior 
in response to uncertainty related to U.S. gubernatorial elections. Consistent with Nagar et 
al. (2019), they show that by improving disclosure, managers can moderate the increase in 
information asymmetry during high uncertainty periods. Similarly, Dai and Ngo (2018) 




conservatism. Focusing on the impact of U.S. presidential elections on the pricing of 
earnings information, Drake et al. (2018) find that during presidential election years, 
current prices reflect less information about future earnings because of the market’s 
inability to form accurate forecasts. In our paper, we focus on the effect of policy 
uncertainty beyond election-period outcomes (Gulen and Ion 2016). Using a continuous 
measure of policy-induced economic uncertainty and controlling for the impact of political 
elections, we provide evidence on the effect of policy uncertainty on accounting quality 
above and beyond that associated with political elections. 
Finally, our study is related to but differs from that of Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang 
(2018), who examine the effect of election uncertainty on mutual fund managers’ 
investment decisions and find that fund managers shift their equity holdings to stocks with 
higher financial reporting quality when political uncertainty is high. While Chen et al. 
(2018) focus on mutual fund managers’ investment strategies during periods of high 
election uncertainty, we examine the financial reporting choice from a managerial 
perspective. We also provide insights on the mechanisms through which policy-induced 
economic uncertainty affects accounting quality by examining how firms’ growth 
opportunities and need for external financing affect the relation between policy uncertainty 
and accounting quality. Furthermore, by leveraging Nikolaev’s (2018) model, we 
disentangle the performance measurement and error components of accruals and thereby 
provide insights on the effects of policy uncertainty on the components of accruals. 
Hypothesis 
A growing literature documents the economic consequences of policy-induced 




(Bloom 2014); at the industry level, it affects return volatility (Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, 
and Molchanov 2012). At the firm level, policy uncertainty is associated with a higher cost 
of debt capital (Kaviani, Kryzanowski, Maleki, and Savor 2020), lower stock prices (Pástor 
and Veronesi 2012), and reduced investment-cost of capital sensitivity (Drobetz, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, and Janzen 2018). In response to these negative consequences, economic agents 
make more cautious decisions during periods of heightened uncertainty. For example, 
managers reduce investment expenditures and increase cash holdings (Julio and Yook 
2012), decrease capital investment (Gulen and Ion 2016), avoid mergers and acquisitions 
(Bonaime et al. 2018), and cut back on hiring (Ilut and Schneider 2014). Similarly, 
consumers increase their precautionary savings during periods of increased uncertainty 
(Bansal and Yaron 2004), while investors rely more on analysts and analysts exert more 
effort (Loh and Stulz 2018).  
Uncertainty may also lead market participants to evaluate firms’ disclosure quality 
and performance more closely. Andrei et al. (2019) show analytically and empirically that 
higher economic uncertainty leads investors to be more attentive to firm-specific 
information. As the literature on limited attention suggests (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh 
2003; Hirshleifer et al. 2011), paying attention to information is a costly activity, which 
leads only a fraction of investors to observe information signals. For an uninformed 
investor who does not pay attention to firm-specific information, stock prices may still 
reveal some firm-specific information at no cost. In short, while investors decide to become 
informed or uninformed, uninformed investors are still able to infer firm-specific 
information from the equilibrium price (Andrei et al. 2019). The stock price 




decreases when the variance of future returns is high (Andrei et al. 2019). As the variance 
of future returns increases in economy-wide uncertainty, price informativeness decreases 
with economic uncertainty (Drobetz et al. 2018). Because uninformed investors cannot 
easily infer information from the equilibrium price under high uncertainty, the value of 
firm-specific information increases, leading to a greater incentive to collect firm-specific 
information. Although high uncertainty also reduces the quality of informed investors’ 
information, Andrei et al. (2019) argue that the information value effect likely dominates 
the information quality effect, resulting in greater investor attention to firm-specific 
information during periods of higher uncertainty.  
Investors’ attention to and acquisition of firm-specific information will limit 
earnings management opportunities. Prior studies show that limited investor attention often 
provides earnings management opportunities. Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b), for example, 
show that managers use their accounting discretion to exploit investors’ neglect of accruals 
information. Kempf et al. (2017), Garel et al. (2019), Abramova et al. (2019), and Basu et 
al. (2019) find evidence that investor inattention leads to a loosening of monitoring 
constraints on corporate action. In addition, Liu et al. (2020) show that investor inattention 
weakens corporate governance (board oversight). To the extent that limited investor 
attention leads to earnings management opportunities (Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998b), and better 
alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder interests can improve accounting 
quality (e.g., Klein 2002), we expect the increased investor attention to firm-specific 
information during high-EPU periods to improve earnings quality.  
Recent research also suggests that firms have incentives to improve their 




increase in EPU is associated with an increase in information asymmetry, as measured by 
the bid-ask spread and Amihud illiquidity. They also find that managers respond by 
increasing voluntary disclosures (measured by earnings guidance and 8-K filings in the 
following quarter). In other words, managers attempt to mitigate the adverse effect of EPU 
on information asymmetry through voluntary disclosure, which helps investors better 
assess firm prospects. Although managers may exploit an increase in information 
asymmetry during periods of high EPU to extract rents at the expense of better accounting 
quality, evidence in Nagar et al. (2019) suggests they respond by improving the information 
environment, rather than by exploiting information asymmetry. Thus, we expect to observe 
higher accounting quality during periods of higher EPU. We present our hypothesis in an 
alternative form, as follows: 
H1: Accounting quality is positively associated with economic policy uncertainty. 
1.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON NIKOLAEV’S (2018) MODEL 
Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty 
We use the policy uncertainty index developed by BBD (2016) to capture EPU. 
BBD (2016) use newspaper coverage frequency to measure uncertainty about government 
policy that affects the economic environment. They require that a newspaper article 
contains terms related to the three categories of uncertainty: the economy, policy, and both 
near- and longer-term concerns. As such, the measure we use includes events that involve 
government policy and affect market conditions.  
Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of BBD’s (2016) index. In our empirical 
tests, the variable of interest, EPU, is defined as the natural logarithm of the average of the 




the month of the fiscal year-end. We also examine whether EPU persistence affects 
accounting quality. We measure EPU duration (EPU_DURATION) by the number of 
consecutive months during the fiscal year in which the country’s policy uncertainty index 
is above the 80th percentile. 
Modeling Accounting Quality 
By adjusting cash flows for timing errors, accrual accounting provides more 
information on firm performance than cash accounting (Dechow 1994; Dechow and 
Dichev 2002). However, accruals are imperfect measures of a firm’s true performance for 
two reasons. First, accrual-based measures suffer from estimation errors (McNichols 2002; 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005; Hribar and Nichols 2007). Second, accruals quality is 
endogenously related to firm characteristics because financial reporting reflects contracting 
and accounting choices that are influenced by a firm’s idiosyncratic fundamentals. It is thus 
difficult to isolate underlying performance from noise and accurately assess accruals 
quality. 
As we noted earlier, Nikolaev (2018) explicitly introduces true performance into 
his model, which helps better disentangle the error and performance components of 
accruals. The key intuition is that earnings and cash flows 1) measure the same underlying 
performance (𝜋), and 2) contain different measurement errors that reverse over time. It 
follows that different moment conditions of earnings, cash flows, and accruals can be 
modeled and solved to retrieve both the performance and error components of accruals.  
Nikolaev (2018) characterizes accounting quality as “the degree to which accruals 
fulfill their performance measurement objective” (i.e., providing information about a 
firm’s underlying performance), while minimizing accounting errors. Given this 




component introduced to capture true economic performance with the part that captures 
errors associated with measuring performance. Three variables estimated from the model 
are useful in measuring accounting quality: the variance of a firm’s true economic 
performance (𝜎𝜋
2); the variance of the performance component of accruals (𝜎𝑤
2 ), which 
reflects the incremental informativeness of accrual accounting relative to cash accounting; 
and the variance of the accounting error component of accruals (𝜎𝑣
2), which reflects the 
noise that accruals introduce into earnings. 
Given the processes for cash flows, earnings, and accruals, Nikolaev (2018) 
generates moment conditions to identify the three variance terms, 𝜎𝑤
2 , 𝜎𝑣
2, and 𝜎𝜋
2, in a 
levels specification. As an alternative, he considers a changes specification, in which he 
examines changes in the time series of earnings, cash flows, and accruals. Following 
Nikolaev (2018), we measure accounting quality, which is the bounded version of the 
signal-to-noise ratio, as:  







Modeling Earnings Management 
The accounting error component can be further separated into intentionally 
“managed” and unmanaged errors (i.e., pure noise). Specifically, Nikolaev (2018) defines 
the accounting error component (𝑣𝑡) as the sum of a managed error component (𝑚𝑡) and 
an unmanaged random error component (?̃?𝑡). Discriminating between the two components 
requires information about managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings. Nikolaev (2018) 
suggests two approaches to capturing earnings management. The first is based on Gerakos 
and Kovrijnykh (2013), who model earnings management as income smoothing. The 
second allows for a more general form of earnings management but requires more 





 Following Gerakos and Kovrijnykh (2013), Nikolaev (2018) models earnings 
management reflected in earnings via income smoothing as follows: 𝐸𝑡 =  𝜋𝑡 − γϵ𝑡 +
γϵ𝑡−1. This specification allows the accounting error component to be decomposed into an 
income-smoothing component and random noise: 𝑣𝑡 =  −γϵ𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 . Under no earnings 
management (γ = 0), the accounting error perfectly reflects the random noise (𝑣𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡). 
Building on the approach used to evaluate accounting quality in the previous section, we 
capture the fraction of accruals’ variance that is explained by the managed component, as 
follows: 









An alternative way to measure earnings management in Nikolaev’s (2018) 
framework is to directly incorporate managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and 
accruals into the model. To this end, we use the indicator variable 𝑥𝑡 to capture information 
about incentives to manage earnings. Adding this term to the model, we can decompose 
accounting error into the managed component (θ𝑣𝑥𝑡) and random noise (?̃?𝑡), which is 
orthogonal to the managed portion: 𝑣𝑡 = θ𝑣𝑥𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡.  
Following prior literature, we use two earnings management incentives: meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008; Kim, Park, and Wier 2012), and 
earnings management incentives arising from external financing needs (Teoh et al. 1998b). 
Under the baseline assumptions of the accruals quality model, we can derive a set of 




capture the degree of earnings management as the fraction of accruals variance explained 
by the managed error component: 









We first obtain financial data for all firms from Compustat North America and 
Compustat Global. Next, we merge the Compustat data with BBD’s (2016) EPU index, 
which covers 19 countries.3 We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) because 
their operating decisions differ significantly from those of nonfinancial firms, and the 
nature of their accruals differs from that of industrial firms. We also omit firm-years for 
which SIC codes or other necessary data are missing. To mitigate the influence of outliers, 
we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Our full sample 
consists of 27,888 unique firms from 19 countries over the 1990–2015 period.4 
Results 
Table 1.1 presents results for the key parameters of interest for both the levels and 
changes specifications. The variables in all tables are defined in Appendix B and the table 
notes. We derive the parameters by using time series estimation of moment conditions in 
the Nikolaev (2018) model.5 Panel A reports the results using median EPU to define high- 
and low-policy uncertainty subsamples. We report the differences in means between firms 
 
3 These countries are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, India, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., 
and the U.S. Our core findings are not sensitive to sequentially excluding these countries 
one at a time. 
4 Depending on the model, the number of observations differs because different model 
specifications require different variables be non-missing. 




in the low- and high-EPU subsamples. Despite the fact that our estimates are based on a 
cross-country sample, they are comparable to those in Nikolaev (2018).  
We find that the standard deviation of true economic performance (𝜎𝜋 or 𝜎𝛥𝜋) is 
lower during periods of high policy uncertainty, which perhaps reflects depressed 
economic activity. If performance itself is depressed, then the role of accruals in adjusting 
cash flows to make accounting numbers better reflect performance could weaken. Our 
results are consistent with this expectation, as is evident from the lower standard deviation 
of the performance component (𝜎𝑤) in the high-EPU subsample. We also find that the 
standard deviation of the error component of accruals (𝜎𝑣) is lower during periods of high 




2) ) are significantly higher for the high-EPU subsample. The mean 
accounting quality ratio is 2.7% to 3.5% higher for the high-EPU subsample. These 
differences, which are statistically significant at the 1% level, suggest that policy 
uncertainty is conducive to firms providing more informative earnings figures. In the levels 
(changes) specification, this difference represents the 5.04% (6.42%) improvement from 
the mean accounting quality ratio in the low-EPU subsample, which is economically 
meaningful to investors and not so large as to be implausible. Although the performance 
component is lower during periods of high EPU, these results imply that the decrease in 
the error component is more substantial, and contributes to the observed improvements in 
accounting quality.  
However, it takes time for firms to adjust to an uncertain environment, and to alter 
investment, financing, and financial reporting strategies. Thus, they may not respond to 




duration on accounting quality. We define high- and low-policy uncertainty subsamples 
using median EPU duration. The results suggest that the standard deviations of true 
economic performance, the performance component of accruals, and the error component 
of accruals are all lower when firms are exposed to longer-duration uncertainty. We also 
find higher accounting quality during periods of longer-duration uncertainty. Thus, the 
results for EPU and EPU duration provide similar insights.  
In Table 1.2, we examine the managed error component of accruals to identify the 
source of the difference in accounting quality between the high- and low-EPU periods. Our 
measures of earnings management capture the fraction of the variance of accruals that is 
explained by the managed error component. Through these analyses, we provide evidence 
on the source of improvements in accounting quality. We identify the parameters using the 
time series estimation of moment conditions from Nikolaev (2018).6 
Panel A reports the results from the income-smoothing specification, and Panels B 
and C report results based on earnings management incentives to meet/beat benchmarks or 
issue securities, respectively. Consistent with Table 1.1, we find that accounting quality in 
all specifications is significantly higher for firms in a high-EPU environment. More 
importantly, we find that the degree of income-smoothing or earnings management is 
significantly lower for the high-EPU subsample, suggesting that reduced incentives to 
manage earnings during periods of high policy uncertainty contribute to an improvement 
in accounting quality. 
 
 





Although EPU differs from firm-level uncertainty, policy changes are influenced by 
the political process (Alesina 1987, 1988; Wright 1996; Keim 2001). Policy uncertainty may 
affect firms differently based on their political risk. Thus, we also investigate the cross-
sectional variation of the relation between EPU and accounting quality based on firm-level 
political risk. Our focus here is motivated by the findings of Hassan et al. (2019) that the 
dispersion of this risk increases significantly with high aggregate political risk. We expect 
the effect of uncertainty to be more pronounced for firms with higher political risk.7 
Following Gulen and Ion (2016) and Drobetz et al. (2018), we also focus on the 
role of government dependence. As policy uncertainty increases, firms that are more 
dependent on government consumption may face higher demand uncertainty. We partition 
our sample into four subsamples, splitting at the highest and lowest quintile values of our 
Government dependence measure and median value EPU. We then estimate the necessary 
parameters using the moment conditions for each subsample. Government dependence is 
constructed at the industry level using the 2005 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Structural Analysis Input-Output tables, which provide 
information on purchases of a given industry’s production by other industries, households, 
and the government. We calculate the government’s share of purchases of an industry’s 
production to measure its dependence on government. 
We report the results in Table 1.3. Similarly to Table 1.1, in Panel A, we present 
results for the individual components of accruals and the accounting quality ratio. Similarly 
 
7 We also consider firm-level political risk, PRISK, which was developed by Hassan et al. 
(2019). It is not feasible to use this in Nikolaev’s (2018) framework, however, because 
PRISK is a firm-year specific measure. The Nikolaev (2018) model does not allow 
estimation of firm-year measures of accounting quality. Instead, we turn to an analysis of 




to Table 1.2, in Panel B, we present results for the earnings management models. In both 
panels, for each subsample of high- and low-government dependence firms, we compare 
the means between the high- and low-EPU periods.  
Consistent with the evidence in Table 1.1, we find in Panel A that the standard 
deviation of true economic performance is lower during high- than low-EPU periods, but 
the differences are generally insignificant. The standard deviation of the performance 
component is also lower during periods of high policy uncertainty. We do not find strong 
evidence that the differences across the high- and low-EPU subsamples are influenced by 
a firm’s government dependence. The error component of accruals is significantly reduced 
during high-EPU periods, especially for high-government dependence firms.  
Importantly, accounting quality is higher during high-EPU periods than during low-
EPU periods in Panel B, but only in firms with higher government dependence. Consistent 
with the results in Table 1.2, the degree of earnings management is lower during high-EPU 
periods, especially for firms with higher government dependence. Taken together, the 
results in Table 1.3 indicate that the effect of policy uncertainty on accounting quality is 
more pronounced for firms that are more government-dependent. 
The Nikolaev (2018) framework helps disentangle the performance and error 
components of accruals, enabling us to evaluate the accounting system’s ability to measure 
performance more accurately. However, the model also imposes limitations on our 
analysis. In particular, we cannot estimate accounting quality and its components at the 
firm-year level, which makes it difficult to examine how changes in policy uncertainty 
impact accounting quality over time. It is also not possible to control for other factors 




In the next section, we complement the analysis based on Nikolaev’s (2018) model 
by examining performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, a popular measure of earnings 
management, in a multivariate setting. We use this measure because our results suggest 
that the difference in accounting quality between high- and low-EPU periods can be 
attributed to the managed error component of accruals. Nevertheless, we also consider 
various alternative measures of accounting quality. 
1.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON THE PERFORMANCE-AUGMENTED DISCRETIONARY 
ACCRUALS MODEL 
We use discretionary accruals to confirm and extend the results from Nikolaev’s 
(2018) framework. As in Kothari et al. (2005), we augment the modified Jones model 
(Jones 1991, as modified by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) with contemporaneous 
return on assets (ROA) to avoid potential misspecifications from the impact of profitability 
on accruals. Because earnings management can involve both income-increasing and -
decreasing accruals (Healy and Wahlen 1999), we use the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (AbsDA), where higher values indicate higher levels of earnings management. 
To isolate the impact of policy uncertainty on earnings management, in our 
multivariate analysis, we control for a set of variables previously shown to affect the quality 
of accounting information. Given prior evidence that aggregate economic conditions 
influence corporate decisions, we first include real GDP growth (GDP_GR) from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database to control for the effect of 
the general economic cycle. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), we also control for 
firm size (SIZE) and operating cycle (OPT_CYCLE). Hribar and Nichols (2007) further 




accruals quality. Thus, we control for cash flow volatility (CF_VOL), sales volatility 
(SALES _VOL), and sales growth volatility (SG_VOL). We also control for leverage (LEV) 
because Sweeney (1994) shows that debt covenant provisions increase incentives for 
earnings management; annual sales growth (SALES_GR), as per Chaney, Faccio, and 
Parsley (2011); and both days payable (DAY_PAYABLE) and an indicator for whether a 
firm reported a net loss (LOSS), as in Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012). Finally, we control 
for financial performance using return on assets (ROA), as suggested by McNichols (2002) 
and Kothari et al. (2005). Appendix B provides variable definitions and data sources. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Appendix C reports descriptive statistics for our key variables by country. On 
average, firms in our sample engage in a considerable degree of earnings management: The 
sample mean of AbsDA is 0.18. Australia has the highest mean AbsDA at 0.27, followed by 
Canada (0.22) and India (0.22), while Chile and Italy have the lowest at 0.13. The level of 
EPU (the natural logarithm of the BBD index) is highest in France (5.03), followed by the 
U.K. (5.00) and Russia (4.91), and is lowest in Sweden (4.49). We do not discuss the other 
variables for brevity. 
Implementation and Results 
To test the effect of EPU on earnings management, we estimate the following model: 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,            (1) 
where 𝑋 is a vector that contains the firm-level control variables and real GDP growth 
(GDP_GR), and EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD (2016) index over the 
12 months of a firm’s fiscal year. 
Because accrual decisions tend to be made toward the end of the fiscal year, or even 




managers make after observing economic policy uncertainty for the fiscal year. To address 
concerns about potential unobservable heterogeneity, we include firm- (𝛼𝑖) and year- (𝜇𝑡)  
fixed effects in all the regressions. We cluster standard errors by firm in all regression 
models.8 
Table 1.4 reports the results without control variables in column (1) and with control 
variables in column (2). We find that AbsDA is negatively associated with policy 
uncertainty in both columns, which suggests that heightened policy uncertainty induces 
firms to engage in less earnings management. In particular, in column (2), we find that a 
100% increase in EPU leads, on average, to a 0.044 reduction in AbsDA, or a reduction of 
24.4% (=0.044/0.18) from the sample mean. 9  Considering that earnings management 
increases the noise in accruals, and lowers the accounting system’s ability to measure 
performance accurately, Table 1.4’s results are consistent with those based on Nikolaev’s 
(2018) model. 
Robustness Tests 
Table 1.5 presents the results from several robustness tests. To test the effect of 
uncertainty duration, we replace the EPU index in column (1) of Table 1.5 with the duration 
of the uncertainty episode (EPU_DURATION). We find a significantly negative coefficient 
on EPU_DURATION, which suggests that the negative relation between policy uncertainty 
 
8 EPU is a country level measure and therefore adjusting standard errors for clustering at 
the country level would be ideal. However, because of the relatively few countries in our 
sample (19) and the low number of observations for some countries, this could cause a small 
cluster problem, which would lead to biased standard errors (Cameron and Miller 2015; 
Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge 2017). Thus, we tabulate the results based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. The results are qualitatively similar when we 
cluster standard errors at higher levels (e.g., by country).  
9 As noted earlier, EPU is the natural logarithm of the BBD (2016) index. Accordingly, we 





and earnings management is stronger when firms are exposed to longer-duration 
uncertainty. 
We also test for robustness to controlling for election years. We obtain data on 
elections and a government’s political orientation from the World Bank’s Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI). We focus on timed elections because they are exogenously 
recurring events, which helps mitigate the concern that the results may reflect confounding 
macroeconomic trends that coincide with elections not fixed in time (Julio and Yook 2012). 
Column (2) of Table 1.5 shows that the coefficient on the election indicator is statistically 
insignificant. More importantly, we find that our main evidence is not driven by uncertainty 
during election years. 
Although our results are robust to controlling for GDP growth and additional fixed 
effects, other macroeconomic uncertainty unrelated to economic policy uncertainty may 
still be driving our results. To further mitigate this concern and to distinguish the effect of 
EPU on earnings management from that of other macroeconomic uncertainty, we test the 
robustness of our results to controlling for the World Uncertainty Index (WUI). This index 
is a comprehensive measure of economic uncertainty developed by Ahir, Bloom, and 
Furceri (2018). As column (3) of Table 1.5 shows, the inclusion of WUI does not affect the 
relation between policy uncertainty and earnings management. This suggests that the effect 
of EPU is distinct from the effect of general macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Next, we address the concern that different reporting frequencies across countries 
may affect the relation between policy uncertainty and earnings management. Firms may 
have different reporting incentives if they are only required to submit semi-annual reports 




over the years, we construct a firm-level frequency measure (REPORTING_FREQ) that 
equals 1 if the firm reports quarterly, and 0 if it reports semiannually in any given year. 
The results are in column (4) of Table 1.5 and show that our findings remain unaffected 
after accounting for the potential effect of reporting frequency. The positive coefficient on 
reporting frequency may suggest that quarterly reporting motivates managers to engage in 
earnings management to meet or beat short-term benchmarks. 
Prior research suggests that different types of uncertainty may influence financial 
reporting quality (e.g., Kim, Pandit, and Wasley 2016). To address the concern that the 
negative relation between policy uncertainty and earnings management may reflect 
different sources of uncertainty, we include additional controls—both sequentially and 
together—for firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic-level uncertainty. Following Kim et al. 
(2016), we capture firm-level uncertainty using earnings volatility (EARN_VOL) and return 
volatility (RET_VOL). Following Harford (2005), we capture industry-level uncertainty 
using the first principal component from the industry-year medians of seven industry-level 
economic shock variables (INDUSTRY_SHOCK). Finally, following Bonaime et al. 
(2018), we capture macroeconomic uncertainty using the cross-sectional standard 
deviations of sales growth (SD_SALES_GR) and cumulative returns (SD_RET) over the 
past 12 months. The results, reported in columns (5) of Table 1.5 10 , show that the 
coefficient on EPU remains negative and significant at the 1% level. They suggest that the 
effect of policy uncertainty on earnings management is distinct from the effects of other 
types of uncertainty. 
 




Prior research shows that the adoption of IFRS affects managers’ propensity to 
engage in earnings management (e.g., Houqe, van Zijl, Dunstan, and Karim 2012). If 
different constellations of policy uncertainty coincide with changes in accounting policies 
caused by IFRS adoption, the relation between policy uncertainty and earnings 
management could reflect the effect of IFRS adoption. To address this concern, in column 
(6) of Table 1.5, we include an IFRS adoption indicator (IFRS_DUMMY) as an additional 
control, which equals 1 for post-IFRS adoption years, and 0 otherwise. Our results are 
robust to controlling for this effect. 
We also address concerns related to the fact that uncertainty is countercyclical 
(Bloom et al. 2018), which could affect both our proxy for earnings management and our 
measure of policy uncertainty. Our results may be reflecting managers’ reluctance to 
deviate from normal operating levels given a poor economic outlook or changes in 
investment behavior in response to policy uncertainty. To address these issues, in column 
(7) of Table 1.5, we control for several proxies for macroeconomic conditions.  
Following Gulen and Ion (2016), we control for forecasted real GDP growth rate 
(R_GDP_F), the consumer confidence index (CCI), and composite leading indicators 
(CLI), which all come from the OECD database. These macroeconomic variables capture 
market participants’ expectations regarding economic outlook, with higher values denoting 
more favorable prospects. In addition, we control for capital investment (CAPITAL_INV) 
and research and development intensity (R&D), as well as an indicator for missing R&D 
(R&D DUMMY). This is to mitigate concerns that the negative relation between investment 
and policy uncertainty (Gulen and Ion 2016) could be driving our results. Both lower 




risk. Finally, we include controls for financing activities in order to further mitigate 
concerns that changes in earnings management may be merely an artifact of changes in real 
activities induced by policy uncertainty. Specifically, we control for firm-level equity and 
debt issuance (SECURITIES_ISSUE) and country-level IPO activity (IPOs).11 The results 
show that the effect of policy uncertainty on earnings management remains significant after 
including these controls, suggesting that policy uncertainty has a distinct and persistent 
negative effect.12  
Endogeneity 
Potential bias may arise from omitted explanatory variables and measurement 
errors. Our analyses control for unobserved heterogeneity by including firm- and year-
fixed effects, an extensive set of control variables, and various proxies for the effects of 
economic cycles. But additional analysis is warranted to ensure our results are not driven 
by endogeneity. To address any remaining endogeneity in our analyses, we employ an 
instrumental variables approach. The instruments include the Political Fractionalization 
and Veto Player Drop % indices.  
A suitable instrument should satisfy both the relevance and exclusion restrictions. 
That is, it should be strongly correlated with our policy uncertainty index, and it should 
impact earnings quality only through its effect on the policy uncertainty index. Political 
fractionalization is defined as the probability that two deputies picked from the legislature 
 
11 The results are not sensitive to including the number of common share issues (SEOs) or 
the sum of the number of IPOs and SEOs. 
12 Interestingly, all of the additional macroeconomic control variables load negatively, 
implying that firms engage in less earnings management as economic prospects improve. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that firms anticipate better financial 
performance as macroeconomic conditions improve, which leads to weaker incentives to 




at random will be of different parties. Higher values of this measure indicate greater policy 
uncertainty (relevance restriction), as deputies from different parties have conflicting views 
on policy and hence tend to breed political uncertainty (Mian et al. 2014). This measure is 
unlikely to be directly related to any of our firm-level variables (exclusion restriction) 
because firm policies and the partisan distribution of legislative deputies are not linked. 
Veto Player Drop % is defined as the percent of veto players who drop out of the 
government in any given year. Our choice of this instrument is motivated by the work of 
Henisz and Delios (2004), who argue that the presence of multiple veto players makes it 
harder to reach an agreement to change existing policies and is thus associated with a lower 
level of policy uncertainty. It follows that a higher percentage drop in veto players in a 
given year would indicate greater policy uncertainty (relevance restriction). However, a 
percentage drop in veto players is unlikely to have firm-level policy implications 
(exclusion restriction).  
To implement the instrumental variables analysis, we first regress EPU on the 
instrumental variable and control variables in vector X from Equation (1). We include the 
instruments sequentially and altogether to ensure our results are robust to controlling for 
different sources of political apparatus variations. Columns (1)−(3) of Table 1.6 report the 
first-stage regression results. We find that a higher level of political fractionalization and 
veto player drop is associated with greater policy uncertainty. The F-test rejects the null 
that our instruments do not capture changes in policy uncertainty at the 1% significance 
level. This suggests that the relevance condition of our instruments is satisfied. When we 
perform the Kleibergen–Paap rk LM test to check whether our regression is 
underidentified, the chi-square value rejects the null at the 1% significance level. This 




In particular, the Hansen J-statistics from combining the two instruments in column (3) 
allow us to evaluate the exclusion condition. We fail to reject the null (p-value = 0.7212), 
which indicates that the use of our instruments is empirically valid. Next, we use the fitted 
value from the first-stage regressions to replace the original value of EPU in Equation (1). 
The regression results, reported in columns (4)–(6) of Table 1.6, confirm the negative effect 
of policy uncertainty on earnings management. 
To provide further evidence that this relation is not driven by spurious correlation, 
we conduct a placebo (falsification) test. Specifically, we randomly assign a placebo EPU 
index (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃ ) that follows the sample distribution of the true EPU measure. We 
then re-estimate our baseline regression by replacing the policy uncertainty variable with 
(𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃ ). We repeat this process 100 times and report the average coefficient 
estimates. The results are in column (7) of Table 1.6 and show that the coefficient on 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  is neither statistically nor economically significant. This helps further 
alleviate any concerns that our findings are driven by a random correlation. 
Alternative Accounting Quality Measures 
Although discretionary accruals are widely used as an inverse measure of 
accounting quality, prior studies also use other earnings properties to capture accounting 
quality. In Table 1.7, we draw on some of these alternatives. We examine income 
smoothing (Tucker and Zarowin 2006), earnings predictability (Lipe 1990), persistence 
(Ali and Zarowin 1992; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2004), accruals quality 
(Dechow and Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002), and real earnings management (Kim, Kim, 
and Zhou 2017). Appendix B presents detailed definitions of these measures.  
Reinforcing our main evidence, we find that an increase in policy uncertainty is 




predictability (column (2)), higher earnings persistence (column (3)), higher accruals 
quality (column (4)), and a lower degree of real earnings management (column (5)). In 
columns (6) and (7), we also separately estimate the relation between EPU and 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals for income-increasing and -decreasing 
samples. Because the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals and 
higher values indicate higher levels of earnings management even in the income-decreasing 
sample, we expect a negative coefficient on EPU in both samples. Consistent with this 
prediction, we find that both income-increasing and -decreasing earnings management 
decline during periods of high policy uncertainty. 
Role of Government Dependence and Firm-level Political Risk 
In Panel A of Table 1.8, we revisit the analysis of Table 1.3 in a multivariate setting. 
Specifically, we re-estimate our baseline model in Equation (1) with the decile or quintile 
ranks of EPU, the decile or quintile ranks of the government dependence, and an interaction 
between the two. The decile or quintile ranks are normalized to range between 0 and 1. We 
replace EPU with normalized decile or quintile ranks to make interpreting the coefficient 
on the interaction term easier. 
Reinforcing the results of Table 1.3, we find that the negative relation between EPU 
and earnings management is more pronounced for more government-dependent firms. The 
standalone measure of government dependence, Normalized decile ranks or quintile ranks 
of Government Dependence, is subsumed by firm fixed effects. The coefficient on the 
interaction between EPU and government dependence is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms with higher political risk are more likely 




In Panel B of Table 1.8, we use a more direct measure of firm-level political risk. 
Our investigation is motivated by Hassan et al. (2019), who suggest a strong firm-level 
component to political risk. Government dependence captures firm-level political risk 
indirectly because it measures the firm’s exposure to political risk. In contrast, Hassan et 
al.’s (2019) measure is a direct measure of the firm-level component of political risk. We 
follow the same approach as in Panel A and re-estimate our baseline regression after adding 
Hassan et al.’s (2019) firm-level political risk measure and its interaction with the EPU 
measures. Because this measure is available for U.S. firms only, we limit our analysis to 
U.S. firms. 
The results are in Table 1.8, Panel B, and show that the coefficients on the 
interaction of EPU measures and political risk are negative and statistically significant. 
Overall, the results suggest an interplay of (aggregate) policy uncertainty and (firm-level) 
variations in political risk. 
Mechanism: Institutional Investors’ Attention and Monitoring 
We argue that investors’ attention during periods of high EPU motivates managers 
to maintain high accounting quality. Strong external monitoring by institutional investors, 
however, is associated with better accounting quality even during normal times, leaving 
less room for improvement during high-EPU periods. In other words, firms with higher 
levels of long-term institutional investors may already be responding to strong external 
demand for high-quality information. In contrast, firms that lack strong monitoring by 
long-term institutional investors may respond to investors’ attention and scrutiny more 
during high-EPU periods. Furthermore, long-term institutional investors do not generally 




term relationships with the firm. For short-term investors, who tend to trade more 
frequently based on information (Yan and Zhang 2009), corporate disclosures are useful in 
understanding firm performance (Bushee and Noe 2000). Thus, we expect the relation 
between EPU and earnings management to be more (less) pronounced for firms with high 
levels of short-term (long-term) institutional ownership.  
To test this prediction, we collect institutional ownership data from FactSet 
LionShare and construct the institutional investor horizon following Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos (2005). Specifically, we compute the churn rate, which is the fraction of portfolio 
holdings traded over a half-year period by each institutional investor. Higher values 
indicate more frequent trading. We then classify institutional investors as long- (short-) 
term if their average churn rate is in the bottom (top) tercile of all institutional investors. 
As a final step, we construct long- (short-) term institutional ownership as the fraction of a 
firm’s market capitalization held by long- (short-) term institutions.  
To document an increase in investor attention during high-EPU periods, we first 
examine the impact of EPU on institutional investors’ churn rates. The result is presented 
in Table 1.9, Panel A. Following Döring, Drobetz, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Schröder 
(2020), we include GDP growth, firm size, lagged market-to-book ratio, dividend yield, 
firm age, stock return volatility, stock returns, lagged stock returns, stock turnover, stock 
price, and an indicator for the inclusion in the MSCI index as control variables. We omit 
the coefficients on the control variables from the table for the sake of brevity. Consistent 
with the idea of increased attention from investors during high-EPU periods, we find a 
positive and statistically significant relation between EPU and churn rates. In Table 1.9, 




long- and short-horizon subsamples. In columns (1) and (2), we divide the sample based 
on the median churn rate. In column (3) (column (4)), we have firm-year observations 
where short-term institutional ownership is lower (higher) than long-term institutional 
ownership. We find that the relation between EPU and earnings management is more 
pronounced in the high-churn rate subsample than in the low-churn rate sub-sample. 
Similarly, we find that the relation between EPU and earnings management is more 
pronounced when short-term institutional ownership is higher than long-term institutional 
ownership. Thus, increased attention to firm-specific information and increased demand 
for transparency during periods of high-EPU, driven by the presence of short-term 
institutional investors, can motivate managers to improve accounting quality. 
Role of Media 
 Investors’ information demand is positively associated with media attention and 
news (Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock 2012). Thus, country-level institutions that foster 
media freedom and press circulation increase investor attention. To the extent that policy 
uncertainty increases attention, which in turn motivates managers to improve accounting 
quality, we expect the effect of EPU to be more pronounced for firms from countries with 
greater media freedom and press circulation. 
To test this prediction, we use four measures related to the freedom and circulation 
of the media. Our measures encompass both the newspaper press as an older form of media 
and the Internet as a relatively newer form. Media freedom measures include the Freedom 
of the Press Index (FPI) and the Freedom on the Net Index (FNI) from Freedom House. 
The FPI measures degree of print, broadcast, and digital media freedom in terms of legal, 




online freedom in terms of access to the Internet, content limitations, and violations of user 
rights. To proxy for media circulation, we employ the percentage of Internet users obtained 
from WDI, and Dyck and Zingales’ (2004) newspaper circulation index.  
The results are in Appendix D and are consistent with our prediction. In particular, 
the negative relation between policy uncertainty and earnings management is more 
pronounced for firms in countries with more media freedom and press circulation than for 
those in countries with less media freedom and press circulation. These results provide 
additional support for the view that firms limit accounting discretion and improve 
accounting quality during periods of high policy uncertainty because of increased attention. 
Role of Institutions and External Financing Needs 
We also examine whether legal institutions and the financial reporting environment 
at the country level, or growth opportunities and external financing needs at the industry 
level, affect the relation between earnings management and policy uncertainty. In the 
absence of strong institutions and legal protections, a firm’s stakeholders have a limited 
ability to monitor and enforce a firm’s information quality. We therefore expect the relation 
between policy uncertainty and earnings management to be more pronounced in countries 
with stronger institutions and a more transparent reporting environment. We test these 
predictions using proxies for the quality of the legal and reporting environments motivated 
by Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). Appendix E 
reports the results. Across all proxies, we find a consistent evidence that the negative relation 
between policy uncertainty and earnings management is more pronounced in countries with 
stronger legal institutions (Panel A) and financial reporting environment (Panel B). These 




participants become more prudent and in countries with stronger legal institutions, it is 
easier for outside stakeholders to demand greater transparency. This evidence also supports 
the idea that where the reporting environment is strong, increased public scrutiny arising 
from policy uncertainty reduces managerial opportunism in financial reporting, thus 
improving accounting quality. 
In addition, we examine whether firms’ need for external capital affects the relation 
between policy uncertainty and financial reporting quality. Firms with more growth 
opportunities need more external capital (Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012) and thus have 
incentives to improve transparency to lower their cost of capital. If policy uncertainty 
increases investor scrutiny, then firms with a greater need for external capital are more 
likely to respond to investors’ demand for higher accounting quality. We test this prediction 
using an industry-level measure of growth opportunities from Gopalan and Jayaraman 
(2012) and a measure of external finance dependence from Rajan and Zingales (1998). The 
results, reported in Panel C of Appendix E, show that the negative relation between policy 
uncertainty and earnings management is more pronounced for firms with a greater need for 
external financing. These results are consistent with the idea that firms are motivated to meet 
investors’ demand for higher quality financial reporting under elevated policy uncertainty 
when they need external financing and thus have incentives to lower the cost of capital. 
1.5. CONCLUSION 
 An increase in policy uncertainty calls for greater prudence. Thus, in response to 
an increase in policy-induced economic uncertainty, investors tend to increase their 




and tightened monitoring of corporate actions, managers reduce earnings management and 
report more informative earnings.  
We use Nikolaev’s (2018) accounting quality model, which explicitly considers the 
performance measurement role of accruals. We find that the ability of the accounting 
system to measure performance more accurately is significantly higher under higher policy 
uncertainty. We confirm these results using performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
in a multivariate setting, in which we control for known determinants of earnings 
management and firm- and year-fixed effects. Furthermore, we show that our results are 
robust to controlling for endogeneity, the effects of elections, other sources of uncertainty, 
IFRS adoption, macroeconomic conditions, the level of investment, securities issuance, 
and country-level IPO activity. Our results are also robust to various earnings properties as 
alternative measures of accounting quality. Consistent with policy uncertainty being 
shaped by the political process, we find that the effect of EPU on accounting quality is 
more pronounced for firms that are more government-dependent and firms with higher 
firm-level political risk. 
In additional analyses, we show that the relation between EPU and earnings 
management is more pronounced when short-term investors, who tend to trade more 
frequently on information, dominate long-term institutional investors and for firms in 
countries with greater media freedom and circulation. Together with our evidence of 
increased investor turnover rates during higher-EPU periods, these findings reinforce the 
idea that market participants’ attention is a mechanism through which EPU affects 
accounting quality. We also find that that the negative relation between policy uncertainty 




institutions, a better reporting environment, and greater press freedom. The negative 
relation between policy uncertainty and earnings management is also more pronounced 
for firms with more growth opportunities and for firms with a greater need for external 
capital. These results are consistent with the idea that as policy-induced economic 
uncertainty rises, investors demand greater transparency and, in turn, managers reduce 








Table 1.1 Policy Uncertainty and Performance vs. Error Component of Accruals 
Panel A. Specifications based on EPU       
  Levels  Changes 
Variable  Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 
H0: Diff=0 
(t-stat) 




𝜎𝜋 or 𝜎𝛥𝜋 
High 0.045 0.020 0.034 0.055 -0.003*** 2,786 0.046 0.020 0.034 0.059 -0.002* 2,789 
Low 0.048 0.021 0.036 0.062 (-3.23) 3,903 0.048 0.021 0.035 0.063 (-1.90) 3,891 
𝜎𝑤 
High 0.017 0.005 0.013 0.025 -0.001** 2,786 0.017 0.006 0.013 0.024 -0.001 2,789 
Low 0.018 0.005 0.013 0.025 (-2.02) 3,903 0.017 0.005 0.013 0.024 (-1.40) 3,891 
𝜎𝑣 
High 0.015 0.004 0.011 0.021 -0.003*** 2,786 0.013 0.003 0.010 0.019 -0.002*** 2,789 
Low 0.018 0.004 0.012 0.026 (-6.82) 3,903 0.016 0.004 0.010 0.022 (-6.24) 3,891 
𝜎𝑤 − 𝜎𝑣 
High 0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.013 0.002*** 2,786 0.004 -0.006 0.004 0.013 0.002*** 2,789 





High 0.542 0.150 0.603 0.925 0.027*** 2,786 0.580 0.246 0.661 0.944 0.035*** 2,789 
Low 0.516 0.129 0.536 0.896 (2.86) 3,903 0.545 0.191 0.595 0.907 (3.83) 3,891 
 
Panel B. Specifications based on EPU Duration 
      
  Levels Changes 
Variable  Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 
H0: Diff=0 
(t-stat) 




𝜎𝜋 or 𝜎𝛥𝜋 
High 0.045 0.02 0.033 0.056 -0.003*** 2,589 0.046 0.020 0.034 0.059 -0.003** 2,590 
Low 0.048 0.021 0.037 0.062 (-2.73) 4,244 0.049 0.021 0.036 0.064 (-2.56) 4,229 
𝜎𝑤 
High 0.017 0.005 0.013 0.025 -0.001* 2,589 0.017 0.006 0.013 0.024 -0.001** 2,590 
Low 0.018 0.005 0.013 0.026 (-1.92) 4,244 0.018 0.005 0.013 0.025 (-1.99) 4,229 
𝜎𝑣 
High 0.015 0.004 0.011 0.021 -0.004*** 2,589 0.013 0.003 0.010 0.018 -0.003*** 2,590 
Low 0.019 0.005 0.013 0.027 (-9.88) 4,244 0.017 0.004 0.011 0.023 (-8.89) 4,229 
𝜎𝑤 − 𝜎𝑣 
High 0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.013 0.003*** 2,589 0.004 -0.007  0.003 0.013 0.003*** 2,590 





High 0.543 0.152 0.598 0.923 0.040*** 2,589 0.577 0.228 0.658 0.944 0.041*** 2,590 
Low 0.503 0.113 0.513 0.887 (4.24) 4,244 0.536 0.177 0.579 0.899 (4.47) 4,229 
 
Notes: This table reports results of subsample analyses based on the Nikolaev (2018) model. We examine the relation between 







years as belonging to the high- (low-) EPU subsample if the EPU of a given firm-year is above (below) the median for each country. 
Panel B uses median EPU duration for each country to classify firm-years into high- and low- EPU subsamples. 𝜎𝜋
2 (𝜎𝛥𝜋
2 ) is the variance 
of economic performance estimated from the levels (changes) specification. 𝜎𝑤
2  and 𝜎𝑣
2  measure the variance of the performance 
component and the accounting error component of accruals, respectively. 𝜎𝑤
2 /(𝜎𝑤
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2) is the measure of accounting quality that 
captures the fraction of accruals’ variance explained by the performance component relative to the error component. For each parameter, 
we provide the difference in means between the high and low subsamples. EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD policy 
uncertainty index over the 12-month period ending in the month of the firm’s fiscal year-end. EPU duration is the number of consecutive 
months in a given fiscal year that are above the 80th percentile EPU level of each country during the full sample period. We winsorize 
all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 







Table 1.2 Policy Uncertainty, Accounting Quality, and Managed Error Component 
of Accruals  
Panel A. Income Smoothing 








High 0.422 0.006 0.368 0.779 0.033*** 1,429 







High 0.480 0.131 0.444 0.831 -0.073*** 1,429 
Low 0.554 0.200 0.576 0.949 (-6.15) 2,465 
 
Panel B. Earnings Management Incentives: Meeting/Beating Benchmark  








High 0.614 0.312 0.718 0.987 0.096*** 1,784 






High 0.228 0.000 0.055 0.366 -0.044*** 1,784 
Low 0.273 0.001 0.091 0.484 (-4.60) 3,153 
 
Panel C. Earnings Management Incentives: Debt/Equity Issuance 








High 0.612 0.322 0.710 0.973 0.092*** 1,733 






High 0.317 0.032 0.176 0.537 -0.035*** 1,733 
Low 0.352 0.031 0.227 0.620 (-3.40) 3,126 
 
Notes: This table reports results of subsample analyses based on the managed portion of 
accounting error from the Nikolaev (2018) model. Firm-years are identified as belonging 
to the high- (low-) EPU subsample if the EPU of a given firm-year is above (below) the 
median EPU for each country. In Panel A, we report results using the income-smoothing 
model. Panels B and C report results using external information that reflect incentives to 
manage earnings. 𝜎𝜋
2 is the variance of economic performance. 𝜎𝑤
2  and 𝜎𝑣
2  measure the 
variance of the performance component and the accounting error component of accruals, 
respectively. 𝛾2𝜎𝜖
2 is the variance of the managed portion of accounting error attributable 
to income smoothing, 𝜃𝑣
2  is the variance of the managed portion of accounting error 
attributable to external information, and 𝜎?̃?
2 is the variance of the random noise portion of 
the accounting error. For each parameter, we provide the difference in means between the 
high and low subsamples. EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD policy 
uncertainty index over the 12-month period ending in the month of the firm’s fiscal year-
end. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 








Table 1.3 Government Dependence, Policy Uncertainty, and Accounting Quality 
Panel A. Performance and Error Components of Accruals 














𝜎𝜋 or 𝜎𝛥𝜋 
































𝜎𝑤 − 𝜎𝑣 

























Panel B. Accounting Quality and Managed Error Components of Accruals 












































































(-2.050) (0.783) (-0.016) 
Notes: This table reports the results of subsample analyses based on the Nikolaev (2018) model. We divide the subsamples based on 
two sorts using the median EPU of each country and top and bottom quartiles of government dependence. Panel A reports results from 
estimating the levels and changes models. Panel B presents the managed portion of accounting error from estimating the Nikolaev (2018) 
earnings management models. For each parameter, we provide the difference in means between the high and low subsamples. EPU is 
the natural logarithm of the average BBD policy uncertainty index over the 12-month period ending in the month of the firm’s fiscal 
year-end. Government dependence is the industry-level share of production consumed by each firm’s government. 𝜎𝜋
2 (𝜎𝛥𝜋
2 ) is the 
variance of economic performance estimated from the levels (changes) specification. 𝜎𝑤
2  and 𝜎𝑣
2  measure the variance of the 
performance component and accounting error component of accruals, respectively. 𝛾2𝜎𝜖
2 is the variance of the managed portion of 
accounting error attributable to income smoothing, 𝜃𝑣
2 is the variance of the managed portion of accounting error attributable to external 
information, and 𝜎?̃?
2 is the variance of the random noise portion of the accounting error. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 
1% level in both tails of the distribution. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 






Table 1.4 Policy Uncertainty and Earnings Management 
Dependent variable = AbsDA 
 (1) (2) 
EPU -0.047*** -0.044*** 
 (-9.77) (-8.89) 
GDP_GR  -0.371*** 
  (-6.32) 
SIZE  0.002 
  (1.11) 
OPT_CYCLE  -0.012 
  (-0.60) 
CF_VOL  0.230*** 
  (16.99) 
SALES_VOL  0.074*** 
  (9.94) 
SG_VOL  0.000 
  (0.06) 
LEV  0.011 
  (1.13) 
SALES_GR  0.062*** 
  (20.10) 
DAY_PAYABLE  0.006** 
  (2.45) 
LOSS  0.008** 
  (1.97) 
ROA  -0.050*** 
  (-3.83) 
Constant 0.399*** 0.333*** 
 (17.66) (12.90) 
   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 243,554 243,554 
Adjusted R2 17.3% 18.3% 
 
Notes: This table reports regression results relating earnings management to policy 
uncertainty. The dependent variable is accrual-based earnings management, AbsDA, 
calculated from the performance-augmented modified Jones model as in Kothari et al. 
(2005). EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD policy uncertainty index over the 
12-month period ending in the month of the firm’s fiscal year-end. We winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Appendix B provides 
variable definitions and data sources. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. t-
statistics from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. 







Table 1.5 Robustness Check 
 
Dependent variable = AbsDA 
AbsDA  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EPU  -0.029*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.039*** 
   (-5.90) (-9.88) (-9.17) (-9.00) (-8.88) (-6.34) 
DURATION -0.004***       
 (-6.27)       
TIMED ELECTION  0.001      
  (0.47)      
WUI   0.018     
   (0.59)     
REP FREQ    0.020***    
    (3.80)    
EARN_VOL     -0.000   
     (-0.37)   
RET_VOL     0.054**   
     (2.33)   
IND_SHOCK     0.025***   
     (8.21)   
SD SALESGR     0.000***   
     (5.03)   
SD_RET     -0.005   
     (-0.87)   
IFRS      -0.002  
      (-0.42)  
R_GDP_F       -2.038*** 
       (-4.87) 
CCI       -0.268* 
       (-1.73) 
CLI       -0.300 







CAP_INV       0.078*** 
       (6.50) 
R&D       0.064*** 
       (2.89) 
R&D_DUMMY       0.001 
       (0.23) 
ISSUANCE       0.011*** 
       (5.62) 
IPOs       0.009*** 
       (3.81) 
        
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 243,554 217,993 214,153 237,200 199,949 243,554 173,694 
 
Adjusted R2 18.3% 18.6% 17.8% 18.3% 16.0% 18.3% 19.0% 
 
 
Notes: This table reports regression results relating earnings management to policy uncertainty using additional controls. The dependent 
variable is accrual-based earnings management, AbsDA, calculated from the performance-augmented modified Jones model as in Kothari et 
al. (2005). EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD policy uncertainty index over the 12-month period ending in the month of the 
firm’s fiscal year-end. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Appendix B provides variable 
definitions and data sources. Firm and year fixed effects are included but not reported. t-statistics from robust standard errors clustered at the 








Table 1.6 Endogeneity 
  Instrumental Variables Analysis 
Placebo Test 
 First-Stage Second-Stage 
Dependent variable = EPU AbsDA AbsDA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Political Fractionalization 0.128***  0.121***     
 (8.95)  (8.43)     
Veto Player Drop %  0.032*** 0.031***     
  (23.30) (22.62)     
Predicted EPU    -0.340** -0.265*** -0.288***  
    (-2.02) (-2.71) (-3.70)  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃        -0.002 
       (-0.13) 
        
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 243,541 243,554 243,541 243,541 243,554 243,541 243,554 
F-statistic 80.15*** 542.89*** 336.24***     
Hansen J-statistic (p-value)   0.127 (0.721)     
 
Notes: This table reports the results of regressions addressing the endogeneity of policy uncertainty using instrumental variables analysis 
and a placebo test. In columns (1)–(3), we report results of the first-stage regressions using Political Fractionalization and Veto Player 
Drop % as instruments. Specifically, we regress EPU on the instruments, all of the control variables, and on- firm and year fixed effects. 
Columns (4)–(6) report results of the second-stage regression, which uses the Predicted EPU estimates from the first-stage regression. 
Political Fractionalization is the probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties, and 
Veto Player Drop % is the percentage of veto players who drop from the government. Column (7) reports results from implementing 
the placebo test, where we present average coefficients from 100 estimations of coefficients from replacing EPU with Placebo EPU. z-
statistics from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 







Table 1.7 Alternative Accruals Quality Measures 
 








 DA >0 DA<0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EPU -0.027*** 0.004*** 0.011* -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.012** -0.054*** 
  (-2.91) (4.13) (1.96) (-4.98) (-3.23) (-2.44) (-5.87) 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 162,796 147,105 147,105 195,653 243,554 97,863 145,691 
Adjusted R2 40.8% 85.8% 44.5% 60.4% 23.6% 32.2% 19.1% 
 
Notes: This table reports regression results relating earnings management to policy uncertainty using alternative dependent variables. In 
column (1), income smoothing is the negative value of the correlation between changes in discretionary accruals and pre-discretionary 
income over the current year and the past four years. In column (2), earnings predictability is estimated as the negative value of the 
square root of variance from an auto-regressive model of order 1 (AR1) for annual ROA, using rolling ten-year windows. In column 
(3), earnings persistence is the slope coefficient estimate from an auto-regressive model of order 1 (AR1) for annual ROA, using rolling 
ten-year windows. In column (4), AQ is the standard deviation of residuals over the past five years, as in Francis et al. (2005). In column (5), 
AbsAbnCFO is a measure of real earnings management based on abnormal cash flows from operations, as in Kim et al. (2017). The dependent 
variable in columns (6) and (7) is the income-increasing and -decreasing portion of accrual-based earnings management, AbsDA, respectively, 
calculated from the performance-augmented modified Jones model as in Kothari et al. (2005). EPU is the natural logarithm of the average 
BBD policy uncertainty index over the 12-month period ending in the month of the firm’s fiscal year-end. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Appendix B provides variable definitions of the control variables and data sources. 
Firm and year fixed effects are included but not reported. t-statistics from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in 




Table 1.8 Role of Government Dependence and Firm-level Political Risk 
Panel A. Government Dependence   
   
Dependent variable = AbsDA  (1) (2) 
Normalized decile ranks of EPU -0.001  
 (-0.10)  
Norm.decile(EPU) × Norm.decile(Govnt Dependence) -0.042***  
 (-3.94)  
Normalized quintile ranks of EPU  -0.003 
  (-0.49) 
Norm.quintile(EPU) × Norm.quintile(Govnt Dependence)  -0.043*** 
  (-5.07) 
   
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 131,871 131,871 
Adjusted R2 18.1% 18.1% 
 
Panel B. Firm-level Political Risk   
    
Dependent variable = AbsDA (1) (2) 
Normalized decile ranks of EPU -0.020   
 (-0.67)   
Normalized decile ranks of Political Risk 0.040**   
 (2.20)   
Norm.decile(EPU) × Norm.decile(Political Risk) -0.068**   
 (-2.45)   
Normalized quintile ranks of EPU   -0.014 
   (-0.57) 
Normalized quintile ranks of Political Risk   0.026* 
   (1.75) 
Norm.quintile(EPU) × Norm.quintile(Political Risk)   -0.046** 
   (-2.16) 
   
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 22,572 22,572 
Adjusted R2 14.4% 14.4% 
Notes: This table reports regression results based on a firm’s heterogeneous exposure to 
government dependence and firm-level political risk. In Panel A, we examine how the 
interaction of EPU and Government Dependence relates to earnings management using 
normalized decile and quintile ranks of the two variables. The standalone measure of 
government dependence, Normalized decile ranks of Government Dependence, is subsumed 
by firm fixed effects. In Panel B, we examine how the interaction of EPU and firm-level 




of the two variables. The dependent variable is the accrual-based earnings management, 
AbsDA, calculated from the performance-augmented modified Jones model as in Kothari 
et al. (2005). EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD policy uncertainty index 
over the 12-month period ending in the month of the firm’s fiscal year-end. Government 
Dependence is the industry-level share of production consumed by the government. Firm-
level Political Risk is the share of the quarterly earnings conference calls of individual 
firms devoted to political risks, obtained from Hassan et al. (2019). We winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Appendix B provides 
variable definitions and data sources. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. t-
statistics from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. 





Table 1.9 Institutional Investors’ Attention and Monitoring 
Panel A. EPU loadings on Churn Rate  
 (1) 




Control variables Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 94,341 
Adjusted R2 65.3% 
Panel B. EPU and Institutional Investor Horizon 
 Churn Rate STIO versus LTIO 
 Low High LTIO > STIO STIO > LTIO 
Dependent Variable = AbsDA     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPU -0.044*** -0.093*** -0.037*** -0.122*** 
 (-4.68) (-7.60) (-4.84) (-6.77) 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60,924 60,918 88,142 33,700 
Adjusted R2 17.9% 17.4% 16.7% 19.3% 
     
Difference in the 
coefficients on EPU 
-0.049*** -0.084*** 
(High – Low) (-3.14) (-4.33) 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of analyses examining how different institutional 
investor horizons affect the relation between EPU and earnings management. In Panel A, 
we show the results from regressing Churn Rate on EPU. Following Döring et al. (2020), 
we include GDP growth, firm size, lagged market-to-book ratio, dividend yield, firm age, 
stock return volatility, stock returns, lagged stock returns, stock turnover, stock price, and 
an indicator for the inclusion in the MSCI index as control variables. The coefficients on 
the control variables are omitted for brevity. In Panel B, we divide the sample into long- 
and short-horizon subsamples using median values of Churn Rate, and by comparing short- 
and long-term institutional ownership. We then examine the relation between earnings 
management and policy uncertainty in each subsample. Column (1) reports results using 
firm-year observations in the high Churn Rate subsample; Column (2) reports results for 
the low Churn Rate subsample. Columns (3) and (4) report results using firm-year 
observations where short-term institutional ownership is lower (higher) than long-term 
institutional ownership. Differences in the coefficients on EPU between the subsamples 
are provided in the last row of the table. The dependent variable is accrual-based earnings 
management, AbsDA, calculated from the performance-augmented modified Jones model 
as in Kothari et al. (2005). EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD policy 




end. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
Appendix B provides variable definitions and data sources. All regressions include firm 
and year fixed effects. t-statistics from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 







INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ATTENTION, AGENCY CONFLICTS, 
AND THE COST OF DEBT13 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 A large literature shows that shareholder inattention is an important determinant of 
asset prices.14 Much of this work examines inattention at the retail investor level using a 
variety of proxies including extreme returns, trading volume, news and headlines, 
advertising spending, and price limits. Because the majority of these studies use indirect 
proxies to measure investor attention, such events are often associated with 
contemporaneous changes in firm fundamentals. This makes it difficult to separate the 
effect of heightened investor attention from the effect of changes in firm fundamentals 
(Madsen and Niessner 2019). Da et al. (2011) propose a more direct measure of investor 
inattention using aggregate search frequency in Google and re-examine the effect of retail 
investor attention on asset prices. In addition to endogeneity, the main limitation of this 
literature is that using retail investors as a proxy for market participants may not accurately 
capture attention because retail investors do not represent an economically significant 
group of shareholders: they hold a small percentage of the aggregate value of all traded   
 
13 El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Mansi, S., and Yoon, H.J. Submitted to Management 
Science, 07/08/2020. 
14 See, for example, Drake et al. (2012), Choi and Varian (2012), Da et al. (2011), 
Ginsberg et al. (2009), Teoh et al. (1998a,b), and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for evidence 




stocks, they are not required to report their shareholdings to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and they are relatively uninformed due to their informational disadvantages 
and psychological biases (Barber and Odean 2008). 
 More recently, Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2017, KMS hereafter) focus on 
institutional rather than retail investors to address the small-shareholder inattention 
problem.15 Institutional investors represent a special class of large shareholder that has 
unique incentives to monitor firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). These investors, 
however, may not have sufficient cognitive ability to process all of the information 
available in the market. KMS posit that institutional shareholders have only limited 
attention in the sense that they cannot constantly monitor all of the companies in their 
portfolios. As a result, they are likely to focus on certain firms while neglecting others. This 
argument suggests that, at the firm level, monitoring intensity is likely to vary over time. 
Consistent with such variation in firm-level monitoring intensity, KMS find that, when 
institutional shareholders are distracted, managers are less likely to be terminated for bad 
performance and are more likely to pursue privately optimal decisions that are detrimental 
to minority shareholders including making value-destroying acquisitions, granting timely 
CEO stock options, and curtailing dividends. 
 In this paper, we study the effect of shareholder inattention on bond pricing. From 
a bondholder perspective16, it is theoretically unclear whether distraction should have a 
 
15 For the purpose of this research, the terms inattention, investor inattention, shareholder 
distraction, and investor distraction mean the same thing, namely the loosening of 
monitoring constraint by shareholders and potential investors. 
16 We focus on the bond market rather than the loan market because the former is less 
informationally efficient than the latter in terms of corporate defaults and bankruptcies 




positive or negative effect on bond valuation. On the one hand, distraction adversely affects 
bond pricing by intensifying the agency conflicts associated with loosening monitoring 
constraints, which influences the likelihood of default. KMS show that inattention can 
exacerbate managerial agency problems and information asymmetry, which can lead firms 
to deviate from value maximization. Liu et al. (2020) study voting behavior of institutional 
investors in annual director elections and document that distracted shareholders weaken 
board oversight. Abramova et al. (2020) and Basu et al. (2019) find that investor inattention 
has negative consequences for firms’ disclosure decisions. On the other hand, inattention 
implies that management faces less pressure to act in the interests of shareholders, which 
can potentially reduce bondholder-shareholder conflicts. For instance, KMS find that when 
institutional shareholders are distracted, managers are more likely to curtail dividends and 
make diversifying acquisitions, both of which could be beneficial to bondholders. Chu 
(2018) further shows that mergers between shareholders and creditors of the same firms 
reduce corporate payouts. Thus, whether shareholder distraction has a positive or negative 
effect on the cost of debt is an open empirical question.  
 We begin our analysis by examining the distraction–cost of debt relation in an 
institutional shareholder setting. To do so, we rely on KMS’ firm-level proxy for 
institutional investor distraction. Their measure assumes that investor attention declines 
when a firm’s institutional investors experience a shock to parts of their portfolio that are 
unrelated to the focal firm, i.e., when the firm’s institutional investors experience large 
positive or negative returns in industries unrelated to the firm. Importantly, distraction 
 
debt covenants as “trip wires” for borrowers, that private debt covenants are set tightly, 




events arising in other industries are, by construction, exogenous to the firm and thus firms 
within an industry are differentially exposed due to variations in their investor base. KMS 
argue that their measure captures periods in which shareholders are likely to direct their 
attention to the parts of their portfolios that are affected by a shock and as a result away 
from the firm. This relaxation of monitoring constraints allows managers to actively pursue 
their own private benefits. 
 Using a sample of publicly traded bonds for 21,403 firm-quarter observations from 
1,097 firms over the 1993–2015 period, we find evidence consistent with the distracted 
shareholder (i.e., variation in monitoring intensity) hypothesis. Specifically, we find a 
persistent and positive relation between institutional shareholder distraction and yield 
spreads that is incremental to the effect of institutional ownership. This result holds when 
we re-estimate the distraction measure separately for positive and negative extreme 
industry returns, and when we split the sample based on investment- and non-investment-
grade debt categories. Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in institutional 
shareholder distraction across all models is associated with an increase in yield spreads in 
the range of 11 to 27 basis points annually. 
 To validate our institutional shareholder setting, we examine the relation between 
inattention and the cost of debt financing at the retail investor level. Da et al. (2011) argue 
that the demand for public information via Google searches captures retail investors’ 
attention. Drake et al. (2012), however, suggest that internet searches may also capture the 
attention of sophisticated traders. We expect retail-level investing in the equity market to 
be of little consequence for bond valuations because participants in the bond market are 




data for a large sample of search frequencies in Google, we do not find evidence of 
differences in yield spreads associated with retail investor inattention. For completeness, 
we re-run the distraction–cost of debt specification at the institutional level while 
controlling for retail investor inattention and continue to find insignificant results at the 
retail investor level. Our finding of a positive and significant relation between institutional 
shareholder distraction and yield spreads suggest that institutional shareholders play a more 
influential role than retail investors in the bond market. 
 Next, we investigate possible cross-sectional heterogeneity underlying our main 
finding. KMS show that CEOs who are more powerful than their boards may find it easier 
to exploit shareholder distraction to make privately optimal decisions that destroy firm 
value. Following Abernethy et al. (2015), we use a multidimensional measure of CEO 
power based on four agency variables known to influence the cost of debt: board co-option 
(Sandvik 2020), CEO pay slice (Bebchuk et al. 2011, Chen et al. 2013), CEO tenure 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, Harford and Li 2007, Graham et al. 2020), and CEO duality 
(Aktas et al. 2019). Using the interaction between CEO power and distraction, we find that 
the effect of institutional shareholder inattention on yield spreads is more pronounced in 
firms with more powerful CEOs. 
 A large theoretical literature examines how information asymmetry affects the cost 
of capital (e.g., Leland and Pyle 1977, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Diamond 1985). 
Empirically, Cohen and Lou (2012) show that firms with higher levels of information 
asymmetry are more difficult to monitor and value. Han and Zhou (2014) show that 
measures of information asymmetry capture adverse selection in corporate bond trading, 




Derrien et al. (2016) use exogenous increases in information asymmetry to show that the 
cost of debt increases for firms that lose an analyst due to a broker closure or a merger. 
Accordingly, we also consider the role of several widely used proxies for information 
asymmetry including asset intangibility (Berger et al. 1996, Almeida and Campello 2007), 
analyst forecast dispersion (Mansi et al. 2011, Gao et al. 2020), and organizational 
complexity as captured by the number of business segments in which the firm operates 
(Mansi and Reeb 2002). Using interactions between the information asymmetry proxies 
and distraction, we find that the effect of institutional investor inattention on yield spreads 
is more pronounced in firms with relatively high levels of information asymmetry.  
 We further investigate whether the extent of product market competition impacts 
the effect of shareholder distraction on the cost of debt. Prior research suggests that a 
competitive product market serves as a powerful corporate governance mechanism that 
incentivizes management not to engage in value-reducing expropriation (Alchian 1950, 
Stigler 1958, Giroud and Mueller 2010, Chhaochharia et al. 2017). In our context, we 
predict that managers are more likely to exploit institutional shareholder distraction under 
weak product market competition. Using interactions between distraction and two 
commonly used measures of product competition, namely, the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index and a measure of market concentration based on the four largest firms’ sales, we find 
that the effect of investor distraction on bond yield spreads is greater in firms operating in 
product markets with a relatively low degree of competition.17 Collectively, the cross-
 
17 Alternatively, competition can influence the cost of debt through default risk and the 
loss given default. Because greater competition reduces future income, increases cash flow 
risk, and increases business risk (Bolton and Scharfstein 1990), it can increase firms’ 




sectional results support our finding of a negative and significant relation between 
distracted institutional shareholders and yield spreads, and show that this effect is stronger 
in firms with a more powerful CEO, firms with greater information asymmetry, and those 
operating in less competitive product markets. 
 The results above suggest that conflicts of interests between management and all 
external stakeholders can exacerbate the distraction–cost of debt relation. In our next set of 
tests, we investigate whether bond covenants as a mechanism designed to limit bondholder-
shareholder conflicts also help mitigate the increase in bond yield spreads resulting from 
shareholder distraction. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that when contracting is costly, 
debt covenants involve a trade-off between a reduction in the agency problems associated 
with debt and the costs of negotiating and enforcing covenants. This implies that debt with 
more covenants is associated with a lower probability of default and in turn lower financing 
costs. Therefore, we examine whether the use of bond covenants, as a governance 
mechanism, can attenuate the positive relation between institutional shareholder distraction 
and the cost of debt. 
 Using a large dataset on bond covenants over the 1993–2015 period, we construct 
three covenant indices that are appropriate in a bond contract setting: Payment Covenants 
Index, Asset Sales Covenants Index, and Borrowing Covenants Index (Billett et al. 2007, 
Mansi et al. 2021). These indices are based on 14 individual covenants that are directly 
related to the agency costs of debt, namely, asset substitution, dividend payment, 
underinvestment, and claim dilution (Myers 1977, Smith and Warner 1979, Kalay 1982). 
When we interact each covenant category with the shareholder distraction measure, we 




yield spreads. More importantly, we find negative interaction terms for all three covenant 
indices as well as for the overall covenant index. These results indicate that while bond 
covenants weaken the positive relation between distraction and the cost of debt, they do 
not eliminate it. 
 Our analysis on the relation between distraction and the cost of debt does not 
distinguish between dual holders and non-dual holders. Recent research, however, suggests 
that dual holders, who represent a non-trivial part of institutional equity ownership and at 
the same time are creditors, play an important role in reducing shareholder-creditor 
conflicts. By holding both equity and debt claims on a firm, dual holders have stronger 
incentives to monitor managerial actions that would not be beneficial to creditors (e.g., 
risk-shifting). Moreover, dual holders are well positioned to exert monitoring on behalf of 
creditors for two main reasons. First, dual holders can obtain more information about the 
firm at a lower cost relative to pure shareholders or creditors (Peyravan, 2019, Auh and Bai 
2020, Bodnaruk and Rossi 2021), which reduces the costs of monitoring. Second, dual 
holders are effectively creditors with voting rights (Bodnaruk and Rossi 2016), which 
facilitates engagement with managers. Consistent with dual holders acting as monitors on 
behalf of creditors, firms with dual holders have better access to bond markets (Bodnaruk 
and Rossi 2021), higher investment efficiency (Anton and Lin 2020), lower costs of 
financial distress (Chu et al. 2020), lower CEO compensation sensitivity to risk (Chen et 
al. 2019), and lower payouts (Chu 2018). Thus, we investigate whether the effect of 
distraction on the cost of debt is driven by distracted dual and non-dual holders. Because 
dual holders have greater incentives and ability to protect creditors from managerial 




 We find a positive and significant relation between shareholder distraction and yield 
spreads, with this relation driven by both dual holders and non-dual holders. Economically, 
a one-standard-deviation increase in distraction is associated with an increase in yield 
spreads of about 21 and 14 basis points annually for distracted dual holders and distracted 
non-dual holders, respectively. The larger economic effect of distracted dual holders is 
consistent with the monitoring function of these overlapping investors. These results add 
further support to the notion that shareholder distraction has an incrementally negative 
effect on bond pricing, and suggest that the impact of distraction on the cost of debt reflects 
the inattention of dual holders as well as a spillover effect between non-overlapping equity 
and bond markets (i.e., distraction of non-dual holders). 
 In our final set of analyses, we investigate the channels through which distraction 
affects the cost of debt. Motivated by prior research, we focus on corporate outcomes that 
matter to bondholders. Specifically, we examine the effects of distraction on measures 
capturing firm credit risk (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, 
Harford et al. 2018). We find that shareholder distraction is associated with lower credit 
ratings, a higher probability of default, and increased firm-level risk. These results support 
the view that creditors price the change in management behavior in response to the 
temporary relaxation of monitoring constraints due to shareholder distraction. 
 Our research contributes to recent work on limited attention and asset prices. While 
a large strand of the literature explores the effect of investor inattention on stock prices and 




attention at the retail and institutional levels on bond pricing.18 The bond market provides 
an ideal laboratory to study inattention because a relaxation of monitoring constraints by 
shareholders is easier to infer in this setting. For one, the bond market is dominated by its 
own institutional investors who possess superior monitoring ability, and thus shareholder 
inattention in the equity market should be inconsequential to investors in the bond market.19 
In addition, the main sources of information in the bond market are the credit rating 
agencies that constantly monitor based on their access to insider information when 
performing independent appraisals. The information contained in credit ratings is, therefore, 
likely to include and/or subsume the data available in institutional filings. The bond market 
therefore provides a setting in which the pricing model is well specified and the effects of 
other important information variables are known. Our finding of a positive and significant 
relation between shareholder inattention and bond yield spreads suggests that distraction 
contains information beyond the previously identified determinants of debt pricing. Our 
results also allows us to better understand the effects of inattention by both dual and non-
dual holders on debt pricing. As such, our paper relates to growing research on the 
consequence of dual holders on corporate outcomes (e.g., Jiang et al. 2010, Bodnaruk and 
Rossi 2016, 2021, Chu et al. 2020).  
 Our study also contributes to the literature on the importance of information flow 
from the stock market to the bond market (Li 2020). Existing studies examine the timing 
 
18 In a sample of non-M&A bidders, KMS find that institutional distraction is costly to 
shareholders as it reduces future stock returns. 
19 Another reason shareholder inattention may not affect the cost of debt is the illiquid 
nature of the bond market. Li (2020) documents that differences in liquidity cannot explain 
the relation between sophisticated investor attention allocation, as proxied by trading 




of information efficiency in the stock and bond markets, with the majority of research 
documenting that stock prices lead bond prices. Kwan (1996), for example, finds that 
individual stocks tend to lead individual bonds when incorporating firm-specific 
information. Gebhardt et al. (2005) find no momentum spillover from corporate bonds to 
stocks, suggesting that past corporate bond return information is not useful for predicting 
stock returns in the cross-section. Downing et al. (2009) find that stock returns predict 
returns on non-investment-grade bonds at daily and hourly frequencies, which suggests 
that information in the stock market is valuable to traders in the bond market. More recently, 
Kecskés et al. (2013) provide evidence that equity short sellers are skilled information 
processors who supply predictive information to the bond market. Our research builds on 
this work by showing that a loosening of monitoring constraints by institutional 
shareholders provides predictive information to the bond market.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses our 
motivation. Section 3 describes the data, variables, and summary statistics. Section 4 
presents our main evidence on the relation between inattention and the cost of debt and 
reports results of cross-sectional heterogeneity tests. Section 4 also examines the use of 
bond covenants in mitigating agency problems associated with distraction and the role of 
distracted dual and non-dual holders. Section 5 concludes. 
2.2. DISTRACTION, AGENCY CONFLICTS, AND THE COST OF DEBT 
 Financial institutions such as banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and other 
entities that trade in large share quantities own close to 70% of all equity shares invested 
in the US market. Together these institutions provide various stakeholders a valuable 




short-term profits, and by regularly engaging with management to achieve this objective 
(e.g., Monks and Minow 1995, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Bushee 1998, Harford et al. 
2018). However, recent research argues that institutional investors do not have the 
cognitive ability to monitor all firms in their portfolio (KMS). As a result, they are likely 
to focus on certain firms while neglecting others. Managers that are aware of a relaxation 
of monitoring constraints can pursue private benefits at the expense of firms’ stakeholders. 
For example, KMS show that when shareholders are distracted, managers are more likely 
to make value-destroying acquisitions, grant timely CEO stock options, force fewer CEO 
turnovers for bad performance, and curtail dividends. Distracted shareholders are also less 
likely to engage with corporations, as evidenced by fewer conference calls and proposals 
in general meetings. Liu et al. (2020) find that shareholder distraction weakens board 
oversight. Abramova et al. (2020) and Basu et al. (2019) similarly document that 
shareholder distraction negatively affects firms’ disclosure decisions. Overall, the literature 
suggests that a reduction in monitoring is associated with increased agency costs to all 
stakeholders.  
 From a bondholder perspective, however, it is theoretically unclear whether 
distraction has a positive or negative effect on debt valuation. On the one hand, managers 
can exploit a lack of institutional shareholder attention by pursuing activities that are 
privately optimal but deviate from value maximization (KMS). In this case, distraction can 
intensify agency conflicts and in turn the information asymmetry associated with 
managerial decision-making. These conflicts arise between management and all external 
stakeholders (both bondholders and shareholders) and between shareholders and 




between ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976), while the latter is due to the 
different incentives of bondholders and shareholders (Smith and Warner 1979). Both of 
these agency costs tend to decrease the expected value of the cash flows and increase the 
inability of firms to meet their debt obligations, leading to an increase in the cost of debt.  
 On the other hand, a lack of shareholder attention implies that management faces 
less pressure to act in shareholders’ interests, which can reduce conflicts between debt and 
equity claimants. For instance, KMS find that when institutional shareholders are 
distracted, managers are more likely to curtail dividends (increase future cash flow) and 
make diversifying acquisitions (co-insurance), both of which could be beneficial to 
bondholders. Therefore, while the lack of shareholder monitoring allows managers to make 
more privately optimal decisions that are detrimental to shareholders, these decisions can 
be advantageous to bondholders and as a result lead to a decrease in the cost of debt capital. 
Existing empirical evidence on the effects of institutional shareholder distraction appears 
to provide support for both arguments (KMS).   
 Our empirical analysis on the role of dual holders sheds new light on this debate. 
Specifically, because dual holders hold both equity and debt claims on the same firm, they 
internalize the conflicts between shareholders and creditors. Dual holders’ distraction 
therefore has unambiguous adverse effects on both shareholders and debtholders. 
2.3. DATA, VARIABLES, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Data Sources and Sample Construction 
 The data come from several sources. Our main tests are based on the intersection 




Securities Database (FISD), the Compustat Industrial quarterly and annual databases, and 
the Thomson Reuters Financial (13F) database. Data for the institutional shareholder 
distraction measure are provided by Professor Elisabeth Kempf at the University of 
Chicago. 
 We use the LBFI database to obtain firms’ cost of debt for the period 1993–2006, 
and the TRACE database to obtain firms’ cost of debt in 2007 and thereafter. Both the 
LBFI and the TRACE databases cover the majority of publicly traded debt in the over-the-
counter market and are representative of the sample of traded bonds (see, e.g., Klock et al. 
2005, Kecskés et al. 2013, Billet et al. 2007). The final dataset contains month-end security-
specific information such as bid price, coupon, yield to maturity, Moody’s and S&P credit 
ratings, issue date, and maturity date on non-convertible bonds contained in the Lehman 
Brothers bond indices and traded on the Nasdaq exchange. Securities are included in the 
Lehman Brothers bond indices based on credit rating, liquidity, maturity, size, and trading 
frequency. Because the TRACE dataset only includes pricing and yield information, we 
merge it with the FISD to obtain debt-specific characteristics. All variables are lagged with 
respect to price and yield information. 
 Balance sheet and income statement data come from Compustat, and institutional 
ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Financial (13F) database. We exclude heavily 
regulated firms (SIC codes from 4900 to 4999) and financial firms (SIC codes from 6000 
to 6999) because they are subject to different accounting rules and regulations. Our final 







Measuring the Cost of Debt Financing 
 We use the dependent variable, the log of the yield spread or the bond risk premium, 
to measure the cost of debt. Yield Spread is defined as the difference between the yield to 
maturity on a corporate bond and the yield to maturity on its equivalent duration-matched 
Treasury security. For firms with multiple observations in the sample, we compute a 
weighted-average yield spread, where the weight is equal to the amount outstanding for 
each security, divided by the total amount outstanding for all available publicly traded 
bonds (e.g., Mansi et al. 2009). In cases in which there is no corresponding Treasury yield 
available for a given maturity, we calculate the Treasury yield spread by using interpolation 
based on the Svensson (1994) exponential functional form model. 
Measuring Shareholder Inattention 
 We capture institutional shareholder distraction at the firm level using KMS’s 
aggregate measure of inattention. Although we cannot directly observe distraction, KMS 
use an identification strategy based on a firm’s pool of institutional investors and its stock 
holdings in firms other than the focal firm. Specifically, to identify time-varying shifts in 
investor attention, KMS use exogenous shocks to unrelated industries held by a firm’s 
institutional investors. The rationale is that, under the constraint of bounded attention, 
investors tend to shift their attention away from the focal firm to segments of their portfolio 
that are subject to industry shocks. In identifying distraction (i.e., attention-grabbing) 
events, KMS use “extreme” positive and negative industry returns in a given quarter. 




limited attention capacity for an extended period, leading to a temporary relaxation of the 
monitoring constraints faced by the focal firm’s managers.20  
 We obtain firm-level proxy for distraction (Distraction) by weighing the level of 
inattention for each institutional investor in a given firm and then aggregating the scores 
across all the institutional investors of the firm. In addition, we separately compute firm-
level proxies for distraction for both positive (Distraction Positive Shock) and negative 
(Distraction Negative Shock) events by weighing the level of inattention for each 
institutional investor in a given firm driven by extreme positive and negative returns in 
unrelated industries, and then aggregating the scores across the firm’s institutional 
investors. A higher value of these measures indicates that a representative investor 
experiences greater distraction, and therefore temporarily relaxes monitoring of a given 
firm.  
 By construction, these measures of shareholder distraction are affected by whether 
a shock occurs in an industry unrelated to the firm, whether the industry experiencing the 
shock is important to an investor’s portfolio, and whether an investor that experienced an 
unrelated industry shock has incentives to monitor the focal firm. These measures thus 
have two main advantages for our purposes. First, they avoid endogeneity problems as they 
distinguish between exogenous changes in monitoring and attention-grabbing events that 
occur in other industries. Second, because these measures are time-varying, we can 
 
20 KMS provide several examples of attention-grabbing events, such as the recent global 
financial crisis (2007Q4 industry return: -10.1%), the tech bubble (2000Q1 industry return: 




examine whether the time-variation in firm-level distraction explains the time-variation in 
bond yield spreads.  
 Turning to the retail investor inattention, we follow Da et al. (2011) and use 
Google’s search volume index (SVI). The SVI is a relative search popularity score, defined 
on a scale of 0 to 100, based on the number of searches for a term relative to the total 
number of searches for a specific geography and for a given time period. We download 
weekly SVI information for the period 2004–2014 using a stock’s ticker symbol and 
construct monthly SVI by averaging the weekly SVI for each stock. Similar to Da et al. 
(2011), we exclude ambiguous ticker symbols such as A, AUTO, ALL, B, BABY, BED, 
DNA, GPS, GAS, and GOLF, as they may not be related to equity. In instances in which 
weekly SVI data near the end of a calendar month include the first few days of the next 
month, we prorate the weekly SVI based on the number of days in that month. We then 
compute a stock’s abnormal SVI as the log ratio of SVI to its SVI lagged value (Retail 
Inattention). 
Control Variables 
 The remaining variables are firm- and security-specific controls. Firm-specific 
controls include size, leverage, profitability, market-to-book, sales growth, and cash flow 
volatility. Specifically, Firm Size, a proxy for economies of scale and a takeover deterrent, 
is measured as the natural log of total assets. Leverage, a proxy for financial health, is 
measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. Performance, a proxy for financial 
profitability, is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization scaled by total assets. Sales Growth is the firm’s annual growth in revenue. 




assets (measured as the number of shares outstanding times the share price, plus the book 
value of debt) scaled by the book value of assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of firm performance over the past 10 years. We further control for shareholder 
monitoring using institutional ownership, which is given as the ratio of common shares 
owned by institutions divided by the total number of common shares outstanding. 
 Security-specific control variables include credit rating, maturity, age, liquidity, 
callability, and a high-yield dummy. Firm credit rating is the average of Moody’s and S&P 
bond ratings and represents the average credit rating at the date of the yield observation. 
Bond ratings are computed using a conversion process, whereby AAA-rated bonds are 
assigned a value of 22 and D-rated bonds a value of 1 (see Appendix F for the full list of 
the bond rating numerical conversions). We follow the literature and allow for the fact that 
the credit rating variable may incorporate part or all of the information from investor 
inattention (Klock et al. 2005). Specifically, to estimate the effect of credit rating excluding 
the effect of distracted shareholders, we regress the rating variable on the distraction 
variable. The error term from this specification, Credit Rating, incorporates credit rating 
information without the influence of distraction. This is our primary measure of credit 
ratings in our multivariate analysis.   
 We control for term structure effects using debt maturity, and for liquidity effects 
using bond age. For an individual security, Bond Maturity is the number of years remaining 
until the bond matures, and Bond Age is the length of time (in years) that a bond has been 
outstanding. For firms with multiple bonds, we compute weighted-average maturity, bond 
age, and credit rating using the sum of the weighted measures of all bonds for each firm, 




amount outstanding for all publicly traded debt for the firm (Mansi et al. 2009). We also 
control for Callability, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is callable, and for High 
Yield, a dummy variable that equals 1 when the debt is non-investment grade, to account 
for the non-linear relation between bond yield spreads and credit ratings. We winsorize all 
variables at the 1% level to mitigate the influence of outliers. Table 2.1 provides a 
description and data sources of the main variables used in the analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A of Table 2.2 presents sample summary statistics. Specifically, we report 
the mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile for the main 
variables used in our analyses. In the cost of debt analysis, the variable of interest is the 
yield spread, which has a mean, median, and standard deviation of 289, 192, and 304 basis 
points, respectively. Because the mean and median values differ substantially from each 
other, the yield spread is highly skewed. We therefore use the log of the yield spread in our 
multivariate analysis to provide a better fit, and to ensure that any fitted values remain 
positive. Looking at the firm-specific control variables, sample firms have a mean, median, 
and standard deviation of total assets of $11 billion, $4.4 billion, and $18 billion, 
respectively. The median leverage ratio is 30%, with a standard deviation of 16.7%, which 
implies that a large portion of the sample firms have significant liabilities in their capital 
structure. Sample firms are profitable with a mean profitability ratio of 3.6%, a market-to-
book ratio of 3.12, and cash flow volatility of 4.3%. On average, institutions owned 71.4% 
of shares outstanding, with a standard deviation of 18.8%.  
 With respect to the bond-specific controls, the mean and median numerical bond 




implies ratings at or slightly below investment-grade debt. On average, traded debt has a 
maturity of 9.1 years, with a standard deviation of 5.4 years, and has been outstanding for 
3.4 years. The sample is tilted toward investment-grade debt, at 57.8%, with the remaining 
42.2% consisting of non-investment-grade debt. 
 Panel B of Table 2.2 shows the full-sample distribution across industries using the 
Fama–French 12-industry classification. The firms in our sample are mainly concentrated 
in manufacturing (24.6%), wholesale and retail trade (15.1%), consumer non-durables 
(9.7%), business equipment (9.1%), chemicals and allied products (7.2%), healthcare (7%), 
energy (6.5%), telecommunications (4.3%), and other industries, which includes mines, 
construction, building material, transportation, hotels, business services, and entertainment 
(14.8%). The smallest concentrations of firms are is in utilities, money and finance, and 
consumer durables.   
 Panel C of Table 2.2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
shareholder distraction, cost of debt, and select controls. In general, the yield spread is 
positively correlated with the distraction measure, leverage, cash flow volatility, and 
analyst forecast dispersion, while it is negatively correlated with size, performance, 
market-to-book, credit ratings, bond maturity, and bond age. The correlation coefficients 
provide initial evidence that firms with distracted shareholders have a higher cost of debt.  
2.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Inattention and the Cost of Debt 
 In our main analyses, we examine the relation between the log of yield spreads and 




Shock), and Retail Inattention―while controlling for firm- and security-specific factors 
known to influence the cost of debt. We perform multivariate regressions using various 
specifications. All models include firm fixed effects to control for unobservable firm-
specific time-invariant factors and industry × quarter fixed effects to eliminate the effect 
of any factors that are invariant within industry-date. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. Our primary regression model is as follows:  
Log(Spreadi,t) = α + β1 Inattentioni,t-1 + β2-7 Firm Controlsi,t -1+ β8-12 Debt Controlsi,t     
+ Firm FE + Industry × Quarter FE + εi,t , (1*)  
where Spread is the bond yield spread and Inattention is one of our four measures of 
distraction. A positive and significant coefficient on inattention, β1, would support the 
hypothesis that looser monitoring constraints are value-decreasing for bondholders. 
 Firm controls include size, leverage, profitability, market-to-book, and sales 
growth. We expect firm size to be negatively related to the log of the yield spread because 
larger firms enjoy greater economies of scale and stability. Leverage should be positively 
related to yield spreads because higher debt capacity is associated with a higher probability 
of default, while market-to-book should be negatively associated with yield spreads 
because firms with higher growth opportunities use less debt and hence have a lower 
probability of default. We further expect sales growth and firm profitability to be 
negatively related to the cost of debt financing because more profitable firms have a lower 
probability of default. Security-specific controls include credit ratings, bond maturity, and 
bond age. We expect credit ratings to be negatively associated with yield spreads because 
firms with better ratings have a lower probability of default, and therefore a lower cost of 




because bonds that are less liquid and those with higher maturities require a higher rate of 
return. Lastly, we also control for firm institutional ownership to account for firm 
governance structure. We expect this variable to be associated with a lower cost of debt 
due to the monitoring effects of institutional ownership.  
 Table 2.3 reports the results of our regressions on the effect of the inattention 
measures on the cost of debt. Model 1, our primary specification, employs KMS 
institutional distraction measure. Models 2 and 3 focus on distraction when industry returns 
are extreme (positive or negative). Models 4 and 5 are similar to Model 1 but segment the 
sample into investment-grade debt (greater than or equal to credit ratings of BBB-) and 
non-investment-grade debt (below credit ratings of BBB-). Model 6 is similar to Model 1 
but replaces institutional shareholder distraction with the retail investor inattention based 
on Google’s SVI. 
 In Models 1–5, we find a positive and significant (at the 1% level) relation between 
shareholder distraction and bond yield spreads. Across models, the coefficient varies from 
0.159 for the extreme positive industry returns sample to 0.284 for the non-investment-
grade sample. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
shareholder distraction is associated with an increase in yield spreads of about 11 to 27 
basis points annually. Models 2 and 3 show that the observed effect of distraction on the 
cost of debt comes from both extreme positive and extreme negative industry returns. 
Models 4 and 5 report that distraction is positively related to the cost of debt in both the 
investment and non-investment grade samples, but is slightly larger for the high-yield bond 
sample. A t-test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients between the two 




the cost of debt, consistent with the uninformed nature of retail investors and the dominance 
of institutional investors in the bond market. Collectively, the results suggest that a 
relaxation of monitoring constraints by institutional investors is detrimental to 
bondholders. 
 The control variables take their theoretically predicted signs in all models, and in 
general are statistically significant. More specifically, at the firm level, our proxies for firm 
size, performance, and growth opportunities are negatively related to yield spreads, while 
firm leverage and cash flow volatility are positively related to yield spreads. At the bond 
level, bond maturity, bond age, and callability, are all positively related to spreads, while 
credit rating is negatively related to yield spreads. Institutional ownership is negatively 
related to yield spreads, evidence consistent with the monitoring effectiveness of 
institutional shareholders (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003). 
 To check the generalizability of our main results, we conduct several robustness 
tests. Appendix G reports the estimation results. Model 1 controls for retail investor 
attention using Advertising Intensity, or the change in log advertising spending. Lou (2014) 
documents that managers adjust firm advertising to attract investor attention and influence 
short-term stock returns. The results are similar to those obtained in our primary 
specification (Model 1 in Table 2.3). Models 2 and 3 control for analyst following and Big 
4 auditor as alternative external firm monitors. Gao et al. (2020) document that analyst 
following can constrain managerial opportunism. Mansi et al. (2004) show that auditor 
quality provides both insurance and information roles that can be beneficial to security 
claimants. We compute Analyst Following as the log of the number of analysts following 




accounting firms is the firm’s auditor. In both specifications, we continue to find a positive 
and significant relation between institutional shareholder distraction and yield spreads. 
However, only the coefficient on analyst following in Model 2 is negative and significant 
(Mansi et al. 2011).  
 We next control for two governance factors that are known to influence the cost of 
debt: Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) entrenchment index (EIndex), and CEO compensation pay 
mix (CEO Pay Mix). Prior literature documents that bondholders are interested in 
governance mechanisms that constrain managerial incentives. Klock et al. (2005), for 
example, find that takeover defenses that limit shareholders’ interests relative to those of 
managers are beneficial to bondholders. Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct an entrenchment 
index using a subset of 24 antitakeover provisions, namely classified boards, golden 
parachutes, limits to amend charter, limits to amend bylaws, supermajority, and poison pill, 
and find that these provisions are associated with lower firm value. Accordingly, in Model 
4 of Table A2 we control for managerial entrenchment using the EIndex. In addition, Ortiz-
Molina (2006) finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and the cost of debt, 
albeit only for smaller ownership. In Model 5 we control for CEO compensation pay mix, 
CEO Pay Mix, which is the pay of the top five managers in the form of stock option grants 
(SOG), divided by the sum of SOG, salary, and bonus compensation. In both specifications, 
we continue to find a positive and significant relation between shareholder distraction and 
yield spreads. In Model 6, we also control for a firm’s relatedness to the shock industries 
using the measure by Hoberg and Phillips’s (2010) 10-K text-based 50 industry 




 For completeness, we conduct two additional but unreported tests. First, we control 
for two significant crisis events including the internet technology bubble in 2000 and the 
global financial crisis in 2009. The rationale is that while KMS distraction measure is based 
on “extreme” industry return periods, it is not necessary for the distraction event to stretch 
over a longer term for it to have an impact on monitoring capacity. The results corroborate 
our main findings and are not sensitive to excluding either of these crisis event periods. 
Second, we investigate whether the relation between shareholder distraction and the cost 
of debt differs when we control for the different types of institutional investors. Using 
Bushee’s (1998) classification of institutional investors into transient, quasi-indexers, and 
dedicated investors, we find that our main evidence continues to hold. We also segment 
institutional investors based on their horizons (short- and long-term) following Harford et 
al. (2018) and find similar results. Overall, these results provide additional support for the 
view that distracted institutional shareholders are costly to bondholders. 
Distraction, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Cost of Debt 
 The results so far suggest that firm-level temporal variation in monitoring intensity 
driven by shareholder distraction affects bond pricing. In this section, we investigate how 
firm heterogeneity affects the association between distraction and the cost of debt. In 
particular, we are interested in whether certain firm characteristics including CEO power, 
information asymmetry, and product market competition exacerbate the adverse 
consequences of distraction. We expect the costs of distraction to be higher under firm 
characteristics that are more conducive to managerial opportunism. For ease of exposition, 
we standardize the interaction variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 




 We begin this analysis by examining the effect of managerial opportunism, proxied 
by CEO Power, on the relation between institutional shareholder distraction and the cost 
of debt. KMS argue that, in the absence of shareholder monitoring, CEOs have an incentive 
to maximize private benefits at the expense of shareholder value. KMS further show that 
more powerful CEOs can exploit an increase in shareholder distraction by engaging in 
privately optimal corporate actions, such as value-destroying acquisitions. Accordingly, 
we expect distraction to have a stronger effect on firms with more powerful CEOs. We 
measure CEO Power as a function of four firm-related variables: co-optionality of 
independent directors, CEO pay slice, CEO tenure, and CEO-chairman duality (Coles et 
al. 2014, KMS). Board Co-Option, a proxy for lax monitoring, is computed as the fraction 
of independent directors appointed after the CEO assumed office in a given year. CEO Pay 
Slice, a proxy for CEO influence, is computed as the fraction of the aggregate 
compensation of the top five executives that is captured by the CEO. CEO Tenure, a proxy 
for entrenchment, is computed as the number of years the CEO has been in office. CEO-
Chairman Duality, a proxy for CEO control power, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the CEO also assumes the chair of the board in a given year. In the spirit of Abernethy et 
al. (2015), we aggregate these four factors using principal component analysis to obtain 
our proxy for CEO Power.  Data on board co-option come from the website of Coles et al. 
(2014), CEO pay slice comes from ExecuComp, and CEO tenure, CEO age, and director 
variables come from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).   
 To test our prediction, we add the proxy for CEO power and its interaction with the 
shareholder distraction to our main regression. Model 1 of Table 2.4 reports the results. We 




coefficient on CEO power, and a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction 
between distraction and CEO power. Economically, moving CEO power from the first to 
the third quartile augments the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in shareholder 
distraction on yield spreads by about 17 basis points annually. This suggests that more 
powerful CEOs pursue private benefits when institutional investors are distracted. 
Recognizing the increased potential for expropriation, bondholders react to the weakening 
of monitoring by increasing the cost of debt.  
 We next examine whether the effect of shareholder distraction is heterogeneous 
with respect to various measures of information asymmetry. Recent research shows that 
effective governance lowers firms’ cost of debt by increasing monitoring of management 
and reducing information asymmetry (Derrien et al. 2016, Gao et al. 2020). To the extent 
that institutional ownership can provide effective oversight from a bondholder perspective, 
the value of monitoring should be greater for firms that are more difficult to monitor and 
price. Accordingly, we expect the positive relation between institutional investor 
distraction and yield spreads to be stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry.  
 To test this prediction, we measure information asymmetry using asset 
intangibility, analyst forecast dispersion, and organizational complexity (Kang et al. 2018). 
Asset Intangibility is (-1) × [(0.715 × Receivables + 0.547 × Inventory + 0.535 × Capital) 
+ Cash] scaled by total assets. A higher value indicates greater intangibility. Analyst 
Forecast Dispersion is the standard deviation in analysts’ quarterly earnings per share 
forecasts, deflated by stock price (Mansi et al. 2011). Organizational Complexity is the 
number of segments in which the firm operates. In Models 2–4 of Table 2.4 we re-run our 




asymmetry and its interaction with distraction. The results are in line with our prediction. 
Across all proxies for information asymmetry, the coefficients on the interaction terms are 
positive and significant at either the 5% or 10% levels. Economically, moving the 
information asymmetry proxies from the first to the third quartile augments the effect of a 
one-standard-deviation increase in shareholder distraction on yield spreads by about 2 to 
16 basis points annually. These findings are largely consistent with our prediction that 
distraction is costlier for firms that suffer greater information asymmetry problems, and 
hence are more difficult for bondholders to value.  
 We also consider firm heterogeneity with respect to industry competition. Prior 
research has argued that a high level of product market competition can induce 
management to avoid wasting corporate resources (Alchian 1950, Stigler 1958, Hart 1983, 
Schmidt 1997, Aghion et al. 1999). The idea is that, in a competitive market, if management 
inefficiently uses firm resources, companies will be unable to compete and will ultimately 
become insolvent (Chhaochharia et al. 2017). 21  Several empirical studies show that 
industry competition plays an important role in aligning incentives within firms (Karuna 
2007). However, Chhaochharia et al. (2017) also find that corporate governance is more 
important when firms face weak product market competition. Accordingly, we expect 
managers to be more likely to exploit shareholder distraction, and investor inattention to 
have a more pronounced effect on the cost of debt, in firms in less competitive industries.  
 
21  Prior theoretical studies do not uniformly agree that product market competition 
increases efficiency. For example, Scharfstein (1988) argues that managers’ incentives to 
exert effort will be lower because profits are lower in competitive industries. Raith (2003) 
helps reconcile the conflicting results by endogenizing entry into the product market. He 





 We capture market structure by using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), 
computed as the sum of squared market shares within a 3-digit SIC industry (Giroud and 
Mueller 2010). A higher index indicates that an industry is more concentrated or less 
competitive. Similar results are obtained when we use HHI based on assets (unreported). 
We also compute a measure of market concentration (C4) by summing the market shares 
of the largest four firms in a given 3-digit SIC industry (Hou and Robinson 2006). In 
Models 5 and 6 of Table 2.4 we re-run our main regression after controlling for industry 
competition and its interaction with our investor distraction measure using two proxies for 
industry competition. Consistent with the disciplinary role of product market competition, 
we find that the positive relation between distraction and the cost of debt is more 
pronounced for firms operating in a weaker product market environment. Economically, 
moving the product competition proxies from the first to the third quartile augments the 
effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in shareholder distraction on yield spreads by 
about 7 to 20 basis points annually. Overall, the results suggest that weaker monitoring by 
institutional shareholders is costly for bondholders when firms have more powerful CEOs, 
lower information asymmetry, and weaker product market competition. 
Do Bond Covenants Mitigate the Effect of Inattention?  
 The results above demonstrate that firms with distracted shareholders have a higher 
cost of debt. It also shows that the findings remain robust when we control for the agency 
conflicts associated with the manager-stakeholder conflicts. In our next set of tests, we 
examine whether mechanisms designed to reduce the bondholder-shareholder conflicts, in 
particular, bond covenants, attenuate the relation between distraction and the cost of debt. 




bond covenants can help reduce the effect of agency conflicts of debt on yield spreads. 
Therefore, we examine whether covenants can help mitigate the relation between 
distraction and yield spreads. Our primary data source for information on covenants is the 
FISD. For each bond issue, the FISD reports over 50 variables on bondholder protection, 
issuer restriction, and subsidiary restriction–related covenants. Because multiple covenants 
often restrict the same activity, we group the covenant variables into 22 dummies that 
indicate whether a specific type of activity is restricted. The construction of these covenant 
dummies is similar to that in Mansi et al. (2021).  
 We focus our attention on the covenant indicators that limit the agency costs of 
debt, in particular those related to asset sales and investment, borrowing, and payment. 
Asset sales and investment restrictions include dummies for covenants that limit asset sales, 
restrict the issuer in certain business dealings with its subsidiaries, and restrict subsidiaries’ 
investments. Borrowing restrictions include dummies for different types of covenants that 
restrict the firm from additional debt activities. Payment restrictions include covenant 
dummies for dividend-related payments and other restricted payments. We create indices 
for each category by summing the covenant dummy variables within each category. A 
higher index score indicates stronger creditor protection with respect to the given type of 
activity. In addition to the three covenant categories, we create an overall covenant index 
of bondholder protection by summing the 14 covenant indicators for each bond. Appendix 
H provides definitions for all bond covenants and lists the categories to which they are 
assigned. 
  Table 2.5 presents the results for the overall covenant index and the different 




to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. All models include firm fixed 
effects and industry × quarter fixed effects. Model 1 examines the relation between 
shareholder distraction and the cost of debt while controlling for the overall covenant 
index. Models 2–4 are similar to Model 1, but control for each of the three broad covenant 
sub-indices separately. Focusing on Model 1, we find that the effect of overall covenant 
use on yield spreads is positive and significant when evaluated at the sample mean of 
distracted shareholders. This is consistent with the presence of bond covenants signaling a 
response to agency conflicts (Bradley and Roberts 2015). The negative interaction between 
distraction and total covenants indicates that the effect of distraction on yield spreads is 
decreasing in the number of covenants. The direct effect of distraction on yield spreads is 
positive, which suggests that, with zero covenants, greater distraction can intensify agency 
problems, and is thus associated with higher yield spreads. Setting the overall index to zero, 
a one-standard-deviation increase in shareholder distraction is associated with an increase 
in yield spreads of about 24 basis points annually. However, the incremental effect of 
distraction is reduced by covenants, as indicated by the negative interaction term. Setting 
the overall index to 1, a one-standard-deviation increase in shareholder distraction is 
associated with an increase in bond yield spreads of about 10 basis points annually. Thus, 
for the average firm, moving the overall index by just one covenant lowers the effect of a 
one-standard-deviation increase in shareholder distraction on yield spreads by about 14 
basis points annually.  
  In general, the results for the sub-indices are similar to those in Model 1. 
Specifically, we find that the covenant sub-indices related to payment (Model 2), 




interaction terms with distracted shareholders. The economic significance varies from 7 to 
17 basis points annually. Overall, our evidence implies that covenants designed to reduce 
the bondholder-shareholder conflicts help mitigate the effect of intensified agency conflicts 
associated with increasing distraction on yield spreads but do not completely eliminate it. 
Distraction, Dual Holders, and the Cost of Debt 
 Our findings suggest that distracted shareholders have an adverse effect on the cost 
of debt.  Prior literature documents that institutional dual (equity and debt) ownership is a 
widespread phenomenon (Bodnaruk and Rossi, 2016). These dual holders play an 
important role in mitigating shareholder-creditor conflicts. Jiang et al. (2010), for example, 
examine the effect of dual holder participation on the cost of syndicated loans for 
commercial and non-commercial financial institutions and find that syndicated loans with 
dual holder participation have lower yield spreads. Chu (2018) finds that mergers between 
shareholders and creditors of the same firms reduces corporate payout. More recently, 
Bodnaruk and Rossi (2021) show that dual holders have higher demand for firms’ initial 
bond IPOs. Accordingly, we investigate whether distraction by dual versus non-dual 
holders has a differential effect on the cost of debt. To the extent that dual holders have 
greater incentives and better ability to monitor managers and protect creditors’ interests, 
we expect distracted dual holders to matter more for the cost of debt compared to distracted 
non-dual holders.  
 To empirically test this conjecture, we separately examine the inattention-cost of 
debt relation for distracted dual and non-dual holders. Following Jiang et al. (2010) and 
Chu (2018), we identify firms with dual holders using data from the Thomson Reuters 




2015. Similar to Jiang et al. (2010) we further classify dual holders as either commercial 
banking institutions or non-commercial financial institutions. We identify a commercial 
banking institution dual holder if the financial institution type in the Thomson Reuters data 
set is classified as a bank (type code=1), or the primary SIC code in DealScan is 6712 or 
6011 to 6082. In either case, the dual holder is classified as a commercial bank or as a non-
commercial financial institution. To measure distraction for dual and non-dual holders, we 
compute dual holder ownership as the fraction of firm total shares outstanding held by dual 
holders, commercial bank dual holder ownership as the fraction of firm total shares 
outstanding held by commercial dual holders, and non-commercial bank dual holder 
ownership as the fraction of firm total shares outstanding held by non-commercial dual 
holders.  
 Table 2.6 reports the results. Model 1 examines the relation between distracted dual 
holders and the cost of debt. Models 2 and 3 are similar to Model 1 but considers 
commercial and non-commercial dual holders, respectively. Model 4 tests the inattention-
cost of debt relation for distracted non-dual holders only. All models include firm fixed 
effects and industry × quarter fixed effects. We find that the effect of distracted dual 
holders, and especially that of distracted commercial dual holders, is associated with an 
increase in the cost of debt. The effect is similar albeit weaker when we consider distracted 
non-dual holders. A one-standard-deviation increase in distracted dual holders (non-dual 
holders) increases the yield spreads by about 21 (14) basis points annually. Overall, we 
find that firms facing institutional shareholder distraction are associated with higher cost 
of debt regardless of whether the institution is a dual holder or not. Moreover, consistent 




for non-dual holders, reflecting the role that dual holders play in reducing shareholder-
creditor conflicts. 
Distraction and the Cost of Debt: Channels 
 Our findings suggest that bondholders price shareholder distraction. To ensure that 
our results reflect a loosening monitoring constraint caused by inattention instead of bad 
management behavior unrelated to distraction, we provide evidence on the channels 
through which shareholder distraction could lead to a higher cost of debt.22 Building on the 
debt pricing literature (see e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003, Mansi et al. 2004, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006, El Ghoul et al. 2016, Harford et al. 2018), we examine the effect of 
distraction on corporate outcome variables relevant to bondholders. Prior literature 
suggests that shareholders can expropriate creditors by increasing firm risk (Myers 1977, 
Smith and Warner 1979). Accordingly, we consider the effects of distraction on three 
relevant proxies related to firm risk, namely credit ratings, firm default risk, and firm-
specific risk.  
 Table 2.7 reports the results. All models include firm fixed effects and industry × 
quarter fixed effects. Panel A tests the effect of distraction on credit ratings. The rating 
agencies play a pivotal role in assessing firm credit risk and in providing information to 
investors, and are also used to regulate institutional investors (Opp et al. 2013). These firms 
must update, in a timely manner, their forecasts using a myriad of financial information 
related to firm performance and management behavior. Thus, we expect the rating agencies 
to update their prior predictions about a firm’s credit ratings for those with distracted 
 




institutional shareholders. We find a negative and significant coefficient on distraction, 
indicating that higher shareholder inattention is associated with lower credit ratings. 
 Panel B captures default risk using Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) commonly used 
measure of expected default frequency (EDF). This measure provides better out-of-sample 
performance at forecasting bankruptcies. We find an inverse relation between distraction 
and the EDF measure, suggesting that higher inattention is associated with a higher 
probability of financial distress. The results are also robust to using alternative measures 
of default risk derived from the competing models of Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Vassalou 
and Xing (2004). Panel C examines the effect of distraction on firm-level risk (Mansi et al. 
2011), computed using the standard deviation of the residual from the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model estimated over the quarter. 23  We find that distracted shareholders are 
associated with higher firm-level idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, these findings indicate 
that firms increase risk when shareholders are distracted, which reduces firms’ credit 
creditworthiness. It also lend support to the idea that bondholders price the consequences 
of adverse managerial decisions in response to a temporary relaxation of the monitoring 
constraints due to shareholder distraction. 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, we explore how investor inattention in the equity market affects 
security prices in the bond market. Drawing on a newly constructed measure of institutional 
shareholder distraction, we examine the effect of exogenous changes in monitoring 
 
23  KMS find that firms with distracted shareholders are more likely to announce 
diversifying acquisitions. To mitigate the concern that diversifying acquisitions may 
benefit the bondholders, in unreported tests we exclude firm-quarter observations with 




intensity on the cost of debt. Using a large sample of publicly traded bonds, we find a 
strong positive and significant relation between institutional shareholder distraction and 
yield spreads. The effect of inattention on yield spreads continues to hold when we measure 
distraction using extreme positive and extreme negative industry returns, and is 
pronounced in both the non-investment-grade and the investment-grade bond samples. The 
inattention-cost of debt relation is also robust to controlling for retail investor inattention, 
advertising intensity, analyst coverage, and Big 4 auditors. Our results extend the prior 
findings that managers are more likely to engage in value-destroying activities when 
institutional shareholders are distracted. More importantly, we show that the effect of 
distraction is not limited to equity valuation—it also has a significant negative effect on 
bond pricing.  
 In additional analyses, we examine how firm-level heterogeneity affects the 
relation between distraction and the cost of debt. We find that the effect of distraction on 
bond yield spreads is stronger when the firm has a more powerful CEO, firms with greater 
information asymmetry, or those facing weak product market competition. We also find 
that bond covenants mitigate, but do not eliminate, the effect of distraction. In further tests 
we show that while the relation between distraction and the cost of debt is driven by 
distraction of institutional dual holders and non-dual holders, distracted dual holders have 
a greater economic impact when compared to distracted non-dual holders. In our final set 
of tests, we find that shareholder distraction is associated with an increase in firm-credit 
risk, consistent with creditors pricing the consequences of value-reducing corporate actions 




weakening of monitoring constraints by institutional investors has a distinct negative 
incremental effect on bondholders. 
  






Table 2.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Description Data Source(s) 
Yield Spread The difference between the weighted-average yield to maturity of the firm’s outstanding 
publicly traded debt and the yield to maturity on a duration-matched Treasury security. 
Weight is defined as the amount outstanding for each issue as a fraction of all 
outstanding traded debt for the firm. 
LBFI, TRACE 




Distraction (Positive) A measure of institutional shareholder distraction using positive distraction events. Estimated 
Distraction (Negative) A measure of institutional shareholder distraction using negative distraction events. Estimated 





Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets.  Compustat 
Leverage Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, deflated by total assets. Compustat 
Performance Operating income before depreciation, deflated by total assets. Compustat 
Sales Growth  Sales growth rate, defined as the ratio of the change in sales to lagged sales. Compustat 
Cash Flow Volatility Standard deviation of performance over the past 10 years (t-1 to t-10). Compustat 
Market-to-Book Market value of equity, computed as the number of common stocks outstanding 
multiplied by price divided by balance sheet book equity. 
Compustat 
Asset Intangibility Building on Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) and Almeida and Campello (2007), –
(1)×[(0.715× Receivables + 0.547×Inventory + 0.535×Capital) + Cash]/Assets, where 
Receivables is Compustat item 2, Inventory is item 3, Capital is item 8, Cash is the 








Credit Rating Average of Moody’s and S&P bond ratings, computed using a conversion process 
whereby AAA-rated bonds are assigned a value of 22, and D-rated bonds a value of 1. 
LBFI, TRACE 






Bond Maturity Bond issue maturity remaining in years. LBFI, TRACE 
Bond Age Number of years a bond has been outstanding. LBFI, TRACE 
High Yield Indicator variable that equals 1 when the weighted-average rating is below BBB. LBFI, TRACE 
Callability Indicator variable that equals 1 when the bond is callable. LBFI, TRACE 
Overall Covenant Index Summation of Payment, Asset, and Borrowing covenant indices for 14 covenants. FISD 





Summation of eight covenants related to Funded Debt, Subordinated Debt, Senior Debt, 
Secured Debt, Indebtedness, Leaseback, Liens, and Guarantee. 
FISD 




Institutional Ownership Ratio of shares owned by institutions divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Thomson 13-F 
Dual Holder Distraction A measure of institutional dual holder distraction. Estimated 
Commercial DH 
Distraction 
A measure of institutional commercial dual holder distraction.  Estimated 
Non-Com. DH 
Distraction 
A measure of institutional non-commercial dual holder distraction. Estimated 
Non-DH Distraction A measure of institutional non-dual holder distraction. Estimated 
Board Co-Option Fraction of independent directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. Coles et al. 
(2014) 
CEO Duality Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board in a given 
year. 
ISS 
CEO Pay Slice Fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top five executives captured by the CEO. ExecuComp 
CEO Tenure Number of years the CEO has been employed by the firm. ISS 
CEO Power Principal component of CEO pay slice, CEO tenure, CEO duality, and board co-option.  Computed 
CEO Age Natural logarithm of CEO age.  ISS 
CEO Pay Mix Top management pay mix, or the fraction of pay for the top five managers received in 
the form of stock option grants (SOG), divided by the sum of SOG, salary, and bonus 
compensation. 
ExecuComp 






EIndex Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index. It varies from 1 to 6 and is 
constructed by subtracting 1 point from each anti-takeover provision in place (classified 
boards, golden parachutes, limits to amend charter, limits to amend bylaws, 





Analyst Following Number of analysts following the firm in a given year. I/B/E/S 
Analyst Forecast 
Dispersion 
Dispersion in analysts’ quarterly earnings per share forecasts, deflated by stock price.  I/B/E/S 
HHI Sale Herfindahl–Hirschman index of market competition, computed by squaring each firm’s 
share of sales revenue and summing the resulting numbers in a given competitive 
market as defined by 3-digit SIC industry code. A higher index indicates a more 
concentrated (less competitive) market. 
Compustat 
C4 Sale Measure of market concentration computed by summing the share of sales revenue 
captured by the largest four firms in a given 3-digit SIC industry. 
Compustat 
Advertising Intensity Change in log advertising spending, as in Lou (2014). Compustat 
Big 4 Auditor Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise. Compustat 
Distance to Default Measure of market-based default risk estimated using Bharath and Shumway (2008) 








Notes: This table gives definitions for the variables used in the analysis, along with their data sources. LBFI is the Lehman Brothers 
Fixed Income database, TRACE is the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine database provided by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, FISD is the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, CRSP is the Center for Research in Security Prices database, 
SDC is the Securities Data Company’s financial transaction database (primarily for mergers and acquisitions), Compustat is the financial 
information database, ExecuComp is the executive compensation database, ISS is the Institutional Shareholder Services database, 13-F 
is the Thomson Reuters Institutional Shareholder database, LPC is the Loan Pricing Corporation database, and RiskMetrics is the 
IRRC/ISS database. 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Std.dev  Q1 Q3 
Yield Spread (in basis points) 289 192 304 107 359 
Distraction 0.156 0.141 0.080 0.095 0.215 
Retail Inattention 3.653 3.827 0.638 3.321 4.116 
Distraction (Positive) 0.085 0.065 0.060 0.035 0.139 
Distraction (Negative) 0.076 0.060 0.057 0.032 0.105 
 Firm-Specific Variables 
Total Assets ($Million) 11,006 4,410 18,067 1,970 11,352 
Leverage 0.331 0.300 0.167 0.214 0.411 
Performance 0.036 0.035 0.021 0.024 0.047 
Sales Growth  0.028 0.017 0.161 -0.040 0.082 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.043 0.031 0.039 0.020 0.051 
Market-to-Book 3.124 2.304 4.929 1.468 3.644 
Asset Intangibility -0.421 -0.434 0.121 -0.508 -0.344 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.043 0.031 0.039 0.020 0.051 
Organizational Complexity 2.463 2.000 1.481 1.000 3.000 
 Bond-Specific Variables 
Credit Rating BB+ BBB- A/B- B+ A– 
Bond Maturity 9.142 7.750 5.436 5.417 11.600 
Bond Age 3.396 2.888 2.455 1.583 4.564 
High Yield 0.422 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Callability 0.726 1.000 0.446 0.000 1.000 
Overall Covenant Index 3.505 3.000 2.058 2.400 4.068 
Asset Covenant Index  1.153 1.000 0.584 1.000 1.333 
Borrowing Covenant Index  1.894 2.000 0.988 1.496 2.285 
Payment Covenant Index  0.459 0.000 0.793 0.000 0.863 
 Governance and Other Variables 
Institutional Ownership 0.714 0.733 0.188 0.608 0.839 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion 0.005 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.005 
Board Co-Option 0.432 0.400 0.318 0.143 0.700 
CEO Pay Slice 0.407 0.412 0.108 0.342 0.470 
CEO Tenure (years) 7.179 5.000 7.332 1.000 10.000 
CEO Duality 0.724 1.000 0.447 0.000 1.000 
CEO Power 0.000 -0.031 1.249 -0.912 0.969 
CEO Age  57.543 58.000 6.382 53.000 61.000 
HHI Sale 0.243 0.193 0.195 0.106 0.301 
C4 Sale 0.716 0.736 0.184 0.570 0.852 
Distance to Default 5.516 5.274 3.249 3.205 7.685 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.019 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.022 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Panel A provides descriptive 
statistics for the key variables used in our analyses. The overall sample contains 21,403 
firm-quarter observations from 1,097 firms over the 1993–2015 period. 
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1 Consumer Non-Durables 2,066 9.65 9.65 
2 Consumer Durables 332 1.55 11.20 
3 Manufacturing 5,263 24.59 35.79 
4 Energy 1,381 6.45 42.25 
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 1,532 7.16 49.40 
6 Business Equipment 1,957 9.14 58.55 
7 Telecommunications 922 4.31 62.86 
8 Utilities 6 0.03 62.88 
9 Wholesale, retail and Services 3,232 15.10 77.98 
10 Healthcare 1,495 6.99 84.97 
11 Money and Finance 52 0.24 85.21 
12 Other 3,165 14.79 100.00 
Total  21,403 100  
     
 
Notes: Panel B reports descriptive statistics using Fama–French 12 industry classification 
codes. The overall sample contains 21,403 firm-quarter observations from 1,097 firms over 
the 1993–2015 period. Other industries include Mines, Construction, Building Material, 
Transportation, Hotels, Business Services, and Entertainment. 
 





Panel C: Selected Correlations 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Yield Spread 1.00                               
2. Distraction 0.05 1.00               
3. Firm Size -0.28 -0.04 1.00              
4. Leverage 0.29 0.05 -0.16 1.00             
5. Performance -0.28 0.00 0.02 -0.05 1.00            
6. Cash Flow Vol 0.20 -0.03 -0.12 0.13 -0.01 1.00           
7. Market-to-Book -0.13 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.07 1.00          
8. Credit Rating -0.60 0.05 0.38 -0.35 0.33 -0.35 0.07 1.00         
9. Bond Maturity -0.17 0.06 0.18 -0.11 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 0.24 1.00        
10. Bond Age -0.05 -0.01 0.19 -0.16 0.01 -0.13 0.03 0.19 0.12 1.00       
11. Inst Ownership 0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.23 -0.07 0.02 1.00      
12. CEO Power 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 1.00     
13. Intangibility -0.03 0.01 0.11 0.10 -0.04 -0.22 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 1.00    
14. Org Complexity -0.13 0.02 0.23 -0.16 -0.07 -0.19 -0.02 0.24 0.06 0.18 0.03 -0.01 0.21 1.00   
15. Analyst Disp. 0.16 0.00 -0.04 0.11 -0.12 0.10 -0.06 -0.16 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 1.00  
16. HHI Sale -0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.11 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.29 -0.03 1.00 
17. C4 Sale -0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.05 -0.17 -0.01 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.04 -0.05 0.11 0.31 -0.05 0.73 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Panel C provides data on the correlations between select variables. The dataset 
consists of 21,403 quarter-year observations from 1,097 firms over the 1993–2015 period. Correlation coefficients in bold indicate 
significance at the 1% level. 
 






















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distraction 0.257***   0.274*** 0.284** 
 
  (4.843)   (6.612) (2.369) 
 
Distraction (Positive)  0.159**     
  (2.318)     
Distraction (Negative)   0.249***    
   (2.593)    
Retail Inattention 
     
-0.001       
(-0.607) 
Firm Size -0.054** -0.053** -0.051* -0.114*** 0.078* 0.068 
 (-2.072) (-2.022) (-1.956) (-3.230) (1.847) (0.935) 
Leverage 0.523*** 0.519*** 0.519*** 0.247*** 0.474*** 0.666***  
(5.319) (5.272) (5.308) (2.895) (2.958) (2.672) 
Performance -3.185*** -3.229*** -3.198*** -3.006*** -2.914*** -1.268 
 (-7.329) (-7.396) (-7.248) (-6.137) (-4.344) (-0.897) 
Sales Growth 0.042* 0.041* 0.049** 0.039 0.022 -0.056 
 (1.852) (1.784) (2.108) (1.566) (0.563) (-0.606) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.306 0.284 0.375 -0.219 1.316 4.944** 
 (0.551) (0.508) (0.668) (-0.368) (1.466) (2.499) 
Market-to-Book -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.004* -0.001 
 (-2.614) (-2.651) (-2.797) (-2.208) (-1.796) (-0.496) 
Credit Rating -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.101*** -0.016 -0.006 
 (-3.458) (-3.416) (-3.463) (-10.741) (-1.360) (-0.214) 






Bond Maturity 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.017*** -0.015 0.016** 
 (3.260) (3.259) (3.335) (8.503) (-1.639) (2.500) 
Bond Age 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.053*** 
 (6.895) (6.943) (6.847) (5.796) (2.840) (3.771) 
High Yield 0.373*** 0.377*** 0.373***   0.382*** 
 (9.329) (9.430) (9.285)   (5.045) 
Callability 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.216*** 0.171 
 (4.436) (4.391) (4.399) (3.619) (2.985) (1.592) 
Institutional Ownership -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.382*** -0.141 -0.549*** -0.220 
 (-4.975) (-4.941) (-5.087) (-1.591) (-5.018) (-0.907) 
Industry × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,403 21,036 20,959 12,329 8,944 3,103 
Adjusted R-squared 0.743 0.742 0.745 0.783 0.487 0.740 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield 
spreads on inattention―distraction, distraction (positive shock), distraction (negative shock), and retail inattention―and various firm- 
and debt-specific controls. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are 
in parentheses. All specifications include firm and industry × quarter fixed effects. Industry dummies are based on Fama–French 12-
industry classification codes. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 






Table 2.4 Distraction, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Cost of Debt 


























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distraction 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (2.703) (4.975) (4.934) (3.749) (8.117) (7.743) 
CEO Power -0.004 0.013     
 (-0.399)      
Distraction × CEO Power 0.010**      
 (2.426)      
Asset Intangibility  0.013     
  (0.799)     
Distraction × Intangibility  0.010***      
 (2.596)     
Analyst Forecast Dispersion   0.024    
   (1.517)    
Distraction × Forecast Disp.   0.007**    
   (2.560)    
Organizational Complexity    0.026*   
    (1.752)   
Distraction × Complexity    0.007**   
    (2.045)   
HHI Sale     0.009  
     (0.433)  
Distraction × HHI Sale     0.006*  
     (1.961)  
C4 Sale      0.043** 






      (2.219) 
Distraction × C4 Sale      0.011*** 
      (3.205) 
Firm Size -0.021 -0.062** -0.052** -0.052* -0.038 -0.034 
 (-0.522) (-2.335) (-1.963) (-1.721) (-1.526) (-1.370) 
Leverage 0.575*** 0.511*** 0.510*** 0.524*** 0.556*** 0.556*** 
 (4.077) (5.086) (5.062) (4.824) (5.707) (5.607) 
Performance -3.155*** -3.134*** -3.046*** -3.017*** -3.253*** -3.143*** 
 (-5.397) (-7.063) (-6.959) (-6.029) (-7.308) (-6.913) 
Sales Growth 0.060* 0.047** 0.037 0.036 -0.017 -0.012 
 (1.879) (2.046) (1.601) (1.421) (-0.713) (-0.494) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.353 0.396 0.331 0.552 0.227 0.211 
 (0.410) (0.692) (0.590) (0.884) (0.428) (0.388) 
Market-to-Book -0.002 -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-1.323) (-2.425) (-2.820) (-2.640) (-3.301) (-3.258) 
Credit Rating  -0.022* -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.031*** 
 (-1.667) (-3.549) (-3.547) (-2.684) (-3.336) (-2.993) 
Bond Maturity 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (3.602) (3.377) (3.366) (3.130) (3.223) (3.230) 
Bond Age 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (4.617) (6.752) (6.972) (6.458) (7.379) (7.322) 
High Yield 0.396*** 0.367*** 0.371*** 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.385*** 
 (7.344) (9.140) (9.189) (8.464) (9.432) (9.203) 
Callability 0.087* 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.137*** 
 (1.767) (4.264) (4.331) (4.069) (4.895) (4.520) 
Institutional Ownership -0.043 -0.406*** -0.362*** -0.433*** -0.368*** -0.375*** 
 (-0.365) (-5.376) (-4.708) (-5.233) (-4.975) (-4.951) 
CEO Age -0.043*      
 (-1.789)      
Industry × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Quarter FE No No No No Yes Yes 






Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,071 20,804 20,928 18,596 21,403 20,426 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.716 0.746 0.742 0.737 0.718 0.713 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield 
spreads on shareholder distraction based on firm heterogeneity―CEO power, information asymmetry, and product market 
competition―and various control variables. Interaction terms are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
The data cover the 1993–2015 period. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
firm are in parentheses. Models 1–4 include firm and industry × quarter fixed effects. Models 5 and 6 include firm and quarter fixed 
effects. Industry dummies are based on Fama–French 12-industry classification codes. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distraction 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021***  
(5.261) (5.067) (5.301) (5.224) 
Covenant Index 0.026* 0.055*** 0.004 0.025*  
(1.650) (3.103) (0.292) (1.669) 
Distraction × Overall Index -0.012***    
 (-3.884)    
Distraction × Payment Index  -0.013***   
  (-4.839)   
Distraction × Borrowing Index   -0.006  
   (-1.631)  
Distraction × Asset Index    -0.015*** 
    (-4.974) 
Firm Size -0.052** -0.049** -0.056** -0.052** 
 (-2.096) (-1.971) (-2.246) (-2.081) 
Leverage 0.459*** 0.462*** 0.468*** 0.460*** 
 (4.756) (4.818) (4.808) (4.790) 
Performance -3.248*** -3.270*** -3.228*** -3.237*** 
 (-7.636) (-7.656) (-7.609) (-7.601) 
Sales Growth 0.046** 0.047** 0.045** 0.045** 
 (2.085) (2.126) (2.046) (2.036) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.577 0.647 0.536 0.568 
 (1.067) (1.201) (0.990) (1.051) 
Market-to-Book -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-2.458) (-2.446) (-2.457) (-2.505) 
Credit Rating -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (-5.210) (-5.216) (-5.080) (-5.098) 
Maturity 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (4.828) (4.953) (4.740) (4.595) 
Bond Age 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (6.961) (7.082) (6.850) (6.860) 
High Yield 0.337*** 0.318*** 0.348*** 0.336*** 
 (9.330) (8.952) (9.418) (9.274) 
Callability 0.134*** 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 
 (4.444) (3.980) (4.657) (4.611) 
Institutional Ownership -0.363*** -0.362*** -0.364*** -0.364*** 
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 (-5.210) (-5.202) (-5.177) (-5.211) 
Industry × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,640 20,640 20,640 20,640 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.763 0.764 0.763 0.763 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. This table provides coefficient 
estimates from regressing the log of yield spreads on institutional shareholder distraction 
based on interactions with bond covenant indexes―overall, payment, borrowing, and 
asset. Interaction terms are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Definitions for covenant indices are provided 
in Appendix H. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. All specifications include firm and 
industry × quarter fixed effects. Industry dummies are based on Fama–French 12-industry 
classification codes. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distracted DHs 2.560***    
  (2.740)    
Distracted Comm. DHs  2.949**   
  (2.358)   
Distracted Non-Comm. DHs   2.785  
   (1.274)  
Distracted Non- DHs    0.160*** 
    (2.790) 
Firm Size -0.059** -0.062** -0.038 -0.053**  
(-2.179) (-2.311) (-1.254) (-2.070) 
Leverage 0.618*** 0.616*** 0.700*** 0.524***  
(6.609) (6.476) (6.568) (5.333) 
Performance -3.378*** -3.387*** -3.287*** -3.186*** 
 (-8.431) (-8.375) (-6.682) (-7.331) 
Sales Growth 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.056** 0.043*  
(2.679) (2.726) (2.117) (1.889) 
Cash Flow Volatility -0.055 0.125 0.108 0.308  
(-0.114) (0.262) (0.195) (0.556) 
Market-to-Book -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.003*** 
 (-1.764) (-1.765) (-0.596) (-2.611) 
Credit Rating -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.046*** -0.034*** 
 (-3.762) (-3.686) (-4.442) (-3.471) 
Maturity 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
 (3.301) (3.527) (4.190) (3.259) 
Bond Age 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (6.684) (6.717) (6.602) (6.890) 
High Yield 0.344*** 0.345*** 0.324*** 0.373*** 
 (8.210) (8.123) (7.178) (9.335) 
Callability 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.086*** 0.135*** 
 (4.083) (4.394) (2.829) (4.438) 
Institutional Ownership -0.409*** -0.360*** -0.394*** -0.376*** 
 (-5.247) (-5.578) (-4.713) (-4.964) 
Industry × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,126 18,849 14,340 21,401 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.764 0.763 0.786 0.743 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. This table provides coefficient 
estimates from regressing the log of yield spreads on institutional shareholder distraction 
for dual holders, commercial dual holders, non-commercial dual holders, and non-dual 
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holders. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. All 
specifications include firm and industry × quarter fixed effects. Industry dummies are based 
on Fama–French 12-industry classification codes.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 2.7 Distraction and the Cost of Debt: Channels 
Panel A: Credit Ratings 
Distraction -0.335** 
 (-2.236) 






Sales Growth -0.713*** 
 (-6.817) 










Ind × Qrt FE Yes 

























Idio. Risk -53.126*** 
 (-14.541) 
Ind × Qrt FE Yes 



















Div Dum. -0.002*** 
 (-4.310) 






Ind × Qrt FE Yes 






Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. This table provides coefficient 
estimates from regressing credit ratings, distance-to-default (higher values indicate lower 
probability of default), and idiosyncratic risk on institutional shareholder distraction and 
several controls. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. t-statistics from White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in 
parentheses. All specifications include firm and industry × quarter fixed effects. Industry 
dummies are based on Fama–French 12-industry classification codes. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 




BOARDS DURING BAD TIMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE BOND MARKET 
“People often question whether corporate boards matter because their day-to-day 
impact is difficult to observe. But when things go wrong, they can become the center 
of attention.” 
- Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 A substantial body of research emphasizes the role that boards of directors play in 
monitoring the managerial decision-making.24 While this literature largely investigates 
how variations in different board structures affect corporate policies and mitigate 
managerial misconduct, little is known on how valuable directors’ monitoring is in bad 
times.25 In this study, I address this gap by examining whether and how cultural diversity 
stemming from directors’ ancestral origins affects firm performance during bad times. 
 Because there are greater variations in economic outcomes across firms and over 
time under increased uncertainty (e.g. Bloom 2009), there are good reasons to believe that 
 
24 See, for instance, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Klein (2002a, 2002b), Xie, 
Davidson, and DaDalt (2003), Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004), and Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, and LaFond (2006). 
25 In a similar manner as in Loh and Stulz (2018), I define bad times as periods of increased 
macroeconomic uncertainty. 
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the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms varies under different states of the 
economic environment (Loh and Stulz 2018). In particular, an effective board may 
influence firm performance during high-uncertainty periods through monitoring activities. 
 Heightened economy-wide uncertainty hinders the information environment (Kim, 
Pandit, and Wasley 2016; Nagar, Schoenfeld, and Wellman 2019) and presents 
opportunities for insiders to extract rents at the expense of other stakeholders (e.g. Johnson, 
Boone, Breach, and Friedman 2000; Lemmon and Lins 2003; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). To the extent that boards play an important role in 
monitoring and disciplining managerial decisions, corporations with preexisting board 
structures that allow managers to commit to a more transparent financial reporting amidst 
increased uncertainty may benefit from minimizing expected contracting costs (Armstrong, 
Guay, and Weber 2010). Firms with preexisting weaknesses, however, are more visible 
during economic downturns because the quality of their board structures may attract more 
market discipline (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman 2000; Francis, Hasan, and Wu 
2012). Therefore, focusing on board attributes that are under a firm’s control is valuable 
because by managing them, the firm can mitigate ex ante the adverse effects of increased 
uncertainty. 
 A priori, it is unclear whether cultural diversity contributes to more effective board 
monitoring during bad times. Although a vast literature emphasizes culture as a set of 
beliefs and values that guides individuals’ cognitive and psychological processes (e.g. 
Hofstede 2001; Schwartz 2012), cultural diversity is a unique dimension of board diversity 
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that has received little attention to date in the finance literature.26 A natural null hypothesis 
for the effect of cultural diversity on board monitoring is that cultural diversity does not 
matter. Cultural diversity may not affect board effectiveness since directors are rational and 
sophisticated professionals, and their decision-making is largely a cognitive process that is 
immune to social and psychological biases. However, behavioral biases have been found 
to significantly affect decision-making process (e.g. Shiller 1999; Hirshleifer, 2015), 
suggesting that cultural backgrounds of directors may influence the effectiveness of board 
monitoring. On one hand, board cultural diversity can adversely impact board monitoring 
effectiveness by disrupting the board’s decision-making process. Arrow (1951) has 
demonstrated that groups with a more diverse set of individual preferences and 
perspectives may have greater source of conflicts and misunderstandings, which pose 
obstacles in reaching consensus. Consequently, the decision-making process is difficult to 
predict and resulting outcomes are more erratic under a diverse group. This view suggests 
that board cultural diversity may obstruct the monitoring process. 
 On the other hand, cultural diversity may improve board monitoring by widening 
the scope of abilities and facilitating more rapid knowledge accumulation (e.g. Terjesen, 
Sealy, and Singh 2009; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Adams, Gray, and Nowland 2010). In 
particular, Ljungqvist and Raff (2020) analytically shows that greater diversity within the 
 
26 Although different forms and/or sources of diversity may share some aspects that yield 
similar outcomes in parallel (Van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007), not all sources of 
diversity affect group outcomes in the same way (Milliken and Martins 1996; Horwitz and 
Horwitz 2007; Rao and Tilt 2016; Giannetti and Zhao 2019). In particular, the effects of 
cultural diversity may be distinct and stronger than other sources of diversity because 
culture is a fundamental representation of group categorization and stereotyping that occurs 
below the surface of consciousness (Lane, Maznevski, DiStefano, and Dietz 2009; Stahl, 
Maznevski, Voigt, and Jonsen 2010). 
    
112 
 
boardroom may strengthen directors’ incentives to gather high-quality information, 
resulting in an increase in the equilibrium monitoring efforts and firm value. Boards with 
diverse opinions anticipate disagreement in the future, which makes deadlocks more likely 
(Donaldson, Malenko, and Piacentino 2020). However, because deadlock is costly, the 
threat of deadlock in a diverse board serves as a commitment device for directors to 
disregard their personal biases and converge on the firm’s optimal strategy by gathering 
and responding only to persuasive and precise information. Directors responding to high-
quality information collected through closer evaluation of alternatives translates into 
greater monitoring efforts. Increased ambiguity about the optimal course of action in 
heightened uncertainty periods may lead to higher threat of deadlock, which further 
motivates the diverse board to improve monitoring ex ante. This argument predicts an 
increase in monitoring incentives for a board with greater cultural diversity. 
 In sum, the relation between board cultural diversity and monitoring effectiveness 
is an open empirical question.27 Under increased information asymmetry during bad times, 
disagreements and possibilities of deadlocks in decision-making process are more likely, 
which suggests that both the costs and benefits of board cultural diversity may become 
particularly acute. In this paper, I test these competing hypotheses by examining the 
monitoring role of board cultural diversity during bad times. I focus on a class of 
stakeholders, namely creditors, based on the prior literature that finds monitoring intensity 
 
27 The effect of cultural diversity on a board’s advisory role is less clear. On one hand, 
cultural diversity may improve communication and facilitate information exchange within 
a board, leading to more effective advising. On the other hand, the frictions in 
communication in a diverse board may make advising less effective, and to the extent that 
monitoring and advising are complementary (Brickley and Zimmerman 2010), less 
monitoring may indicate less advising. 
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is most important to bondholders, because: (i) bonds have downside risk but no upside 
potential (e.g. Hong and Sraer 2013; Bai, Bali, and Wen 2019), (ii) monitoring by external 
actors (institutional investors, credit rating agencies, analysts, and Big 4 auditors) is also 
important and therefore any evidence from this research should be incremental, and (iii) 
bond prices are more precise than equity prices and are less subject to endogeneity 
(Fleming and Remolona 1997). From a creditor’s perspective, the benefits of board 
monitoring are more pertinent when there is a greater uncertainty about the likelihood of 
future default (Sengupta 1998). Thus, the disciplinary role of the board, as one of the most 
important factors influencing bond prices (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb 2004), should be 
more important during periods increased uncertainty. 
 My empirical strategy involves two steps. First, I validate my context of bad times 
by confirming the relation between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) 28 29 and the cost of 
debt. My main proxy for EPU is the widely used policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, 
and Davis (2016) (henceforth BBD) which focuses on the political and regulatory system 
as a source of aggregate uncertainty that potentially affects all economic actors. Using a 
sample of 33,225 firm-quarter observations of publicly traded bonds over the period 1993–
 
28 The benefits of board cultural diversity may depend on different episodes of policy 
uncertainty, which is an important source of macroeconomic uncertainty that creditors 
price. EPU refers broadly to uncertainty about government and policy actions that influence 
the general macroeconomic conditions. To the extent that investors cannot fully anticipate 
“who will make the policy decisions, what policy actions will be undertaken and when, 
and the economic effects of policy actions” (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016, p.1598), they 
face uncertainty over how regulatory decisions will affect their profitability. Kaviani, 
Kryzanowski, Maleki, and Savor (2020) show that policy uncertainty adversely affects the 
bond market by documenting a positive relation between EPU and corporate credit spreads.  
29 My main conclusions on the effect of cultural diversity remain qualitatively similar if I 
define bad times as periods of heightened macroeconomic uncertainty that relates to real 
activity, as measured by Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). 
    
114 
 
2015, I show that the relation between policy-induced economic uncertainty and yield 
spreads is positive and significant. Economically, a 1% increase in EPU increases yield 
spreads by 2.53% per annum with respect to the sample mean. Decomposing the overall 
EPU into its four constituent components, I find that the positive relation is largely 
supported across different EPU components. The results are robust to controlling for other 
micro- and macro-economic sources of uncertainty and the effect of elections, and 
controlling for the confounding effects of macroeconomic conditions, the level of capital 
investment, and securities issuance. This suggests that the evidence is not driven by other 
macroeconomic effects coinciding with EPU or decline in investment or financing 
activities under high EPU (Gulen and Ion 2016). The results are also robust to controlling 
for endogeneity using an instrumental variables approach and placebo test. 
 My main focus in this paper is on whether and how board cultural diversity affects 
performance during bad times. Thus, in a second step of my analysis, I investigate the role 
of board cultural diversity in moderating the adverse impact of EPU on yield spreads. My 
measure of the cultural diversity encompasses diversity arising within the board that 
incorporates differences in cultural backgrounds between all director pairs. I also examine 
whether the effect of diversity extends to the heterogeneity in the cultural values between 
the CEO and the board (hereafter board-CEO cultural distance).30 Consistent with the 
benefits of cultural diversity in facilitating monitoring, I find that boards with greater 
cultural diversity and greater cultural distance from the CEO have lower cost of debt during 
high policy uncertainty periods. In particular, the results suggest the effect of board cultural 
 
30 A CEO typically sits on a board. Here, I refer to CEOs as distinct from boards and define 
CEO-board cultural distance as the extent to which the cultural backgrounds of directors 
diverge from that of the CEO. 
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diversity is concentrated among independent directors, but diversity within inside directors 
does not have a significant role. These findings provide support that cultural diversity is 
associated with monitoring function and contributes to lower yield spreads during bad 
times. Similarly, I find that the effect of board-CEO cultural distance is concentrated among 
audit committee members. These results are robust to using alternative measures of culture 
and alternative sample countries in defining CEO and director ancestry.  
 In additional tests, I find that boards with greater proportion of independent 
directors, female participation, and director engagements, and less proportion of 
interlocking directors, moderate the adverse impact of policy uncertainty, which provides 
corroborative evidence of the role of board monitoring during bad times. More importantly, 
I find that the effects of board cultural diversity and board-CEO cultural distance extend 
above and beyond the presence of other information intermediaries including auditors, 
financial analysts, and institutional investors. 
 I supplement my analysis with placebo tests to mitigate the concern that potential 
endogeneity associated with board cultural diversity may spuriously drive the results. It is 
possible, for instance, that the effect I document might simply be driven by a false 
correlation that reflects the effectiveness of board diversity structures throughout different 
time periods that is not necessarily related to the fluctuations of policy uncertainty. To 
address this concern, I create a placebo EPU variable from 100 random samplings of EPU 
and rerun my analyses. I do not find any significant evidence that bond pricing experiences 
systematic change with the fluctuations in the placebo EPU variable. These results provide 
support for my findings that the effectiveness of board diversity upon different episodes of 
policy uncertainty drives the changes in debt financing costs.  
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 This paper makes several contributions. First, I add to the literature by providing 
evidence that the quality of board monitoring depends not only on the structure of the board 
captured by traditional attributes (e.g. size, independence, proportion of interlocking 
directors), but also on the interaction between directors. I find that board cultural diversity 
and board-CEO cultural distance, measured based on ancestral origins, are important 
attributes related to monitoring that extend beyond the effect of other information 
intermediaries. While a number of studies have focused on various aspects of board 
diversity such as gender, nationality, experience, education, tenure, and independence (e.g. 
Adams and Ferreira 2009; Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay, and Zhao 2011; Frijns, Dodd, and 
Cimerova 2016; Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker 2018), there is limited empirical evidence 
on how cultural diversity in directors’ ancestral origins affects the economic decisions of 
corporations. In addition, extant research examining the effect of cultural differences on 
corporate outcomes is largely limited in its ability to isolate culture from other institutional 
effects (Aggarwal, Faccio, Guedhami, and Kwok 2016). I extend the literature by focusing 
directly on the cultural diversity stemming from directors’ ancestral roots within the 
boardroom, which eliminates the confounding effect of other institutional factors. My 
findings complement the nascent literature exploring top management’s ancestral origins 
as an important dimension of corporate governance (e.g. Liu 2016; Giannetti and Zhao 
2019). 
 Second, I add to the literature on boards of directors by providing evidence on how 
board characteristics help moderate the adverse impact of policy uncertainty on the cost of 
debt. A vast literature has explored the role of board characteristics in reducing corporate 
credit spreads. While existing research has found that effective board structures provide 
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value to creditors by ensuring the reliability of financial reporting, they largely preclude 
the possibility of a differential impact of the board under different states of the economic 
environment. However, a board’s monitoring function that safeguards the assets of the firm 
and ensures that creditors’ interests are well enforced may be especially pertinent during a 
period of high uncertainty when firms’ governance structure is the most visible and needed. 
I show that board characteristics influence creditors’ assessment of a firm’s prospects 
during periods of high policy uncertainty. 
 Third, I contribute to the growing literature on the economic consequences of policy 
uncertainty by presenting an early attempt at examining how corporate characteristics can 
alleviate the adverse impact of policy uncertainty. My study is related to that of Loh and 
Stulz (2018), who provide evidence that analysts have greater stock price impact as policy 
uncertainty increases because they exert more effort and investors, in turn, rely more on 
analysts during bad times. While they focus on external governance as measured by 
analysts’ performance, however, I examine the internal governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics, specifically the board, that the firm can control and change. In particular, I 
highlight the monitoring role of the board and show that the effects of director cultural 
diversity and board-CEO cultural distance reach above and beyond the effect of other 
external information intermediaries. My study also complements the findings in Nagar, 
Schoenfeld, and Wellman (2019) who show that by improving disclosure, managers can 
moderate the increase in information asymmetry during periods of high policy uncertainty. 
I extend the existing research by evaluating a broader set of governance variables and 
providing evidence of the relevance of director monitoring from creditors’ perspective. 
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop my main 
hypotheses. In Section 3, I discuss the data and sample constructions, and present summary 
statistics. Empirical results are shown in Section 4. I conclude in Section 5. 
3.2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
EPU and cost of debt 
 Recent empirical evidence suggests that policy uncertainty is associated with 
significant reductions in investment (Gulen and Ion 2016) and distortion of the investment 
decisions (Drobetz, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Janzen 2018). The volatility of cashflow 
associated with an inefficient investment decision may lead to a higher risk of default 
(Durnev 2010; Pástor and Veronesi 2013). In addition, firms face higher default losses 
during times of macroeconomic shocks as multiple firms suffer bad performance at the 
same time and liquidating assets may become particularly costly (Chen 2010). Taken 
together, as policy uncertainty increases, the fluctuations in default likelihood and default 
losses may lead to an increase in the present value of expected default losses, which points 
to a positive relation between policy uncertainty and debt financing costs. Theories of 
tunneling also suggest that as policy uncertainty increases, the expected fall on investment 
returns may incentivize managers to extract rents and pursue private benefits (Johnson, 
Boone, Breach, and Friedman 2000; Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton 2003). Bondholders, 
anticipating this increased risk of expropriation, command a higher cost of debt. Formally, 
I state my hypothesis as follows: 
H1: EPU is positively related to the cost of debt. 
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The role of board monitoring 
 My investigation is motivated by prior works that show that the board is an 
important element in affecting the integrity of financial accounting reports. Bondholders 
find the monitoring role by the board highly relevant in pricing bond yields (e.g. Anderson, 
Mansi, and Reeb 2004; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003). From the creditors’ perspective, board 
monitoring may be especially valuable during periods of high EPU because the degree of 
expected default losses and the likelihood of managerial opportunism significantly 
increases (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman 2000; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). Corporations with effective board monitoring structure in place 
may be able to credibly commit to a higher reporting quality, the value of which is 
increasing under conditions of market uncertainty through allowing bondholders to more 
accurately assess default risk (Sengupta 1998). Thus, I posit that an increase in policy 
uncertainty motivates creditors to price reliable information signals provided by effective 
monitoring of the board. Below, I discuss board cultural diversity and board-CEO cultural 
distance as important dimensions influencing board monitoring. 
Board cultural diversity 
 In addition to the traditional observable structures of the board as documented in 
prior literature (e.g. size, independence, interlocking director proportion), the effectiveness 
of board monitoring depends on the interactions between directors in the decision-making 
processes (Giannetti and Zhao 2019). I focus on the heterogeneity in cultural values within 
the boardroom that stems from the ancestral representations of each director. I examine the 
cultural variation within the board based on the stream of research that emphasizes the 
differences in individuals’ cultural values as representative of the fundamental differences 
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between one group’s and others’ perceptions, and therefore shapes the collective economic 
behavior of the group (Hofstede 2001). 
 I focus on the monitoring effectiveness of a culturally diverse board, which may be 
dependent on the firm’s information environment under greater macroeconomic 
uncertainty. On one hand, the benefits of board cultural diversity may be more important 
during bad times when there is greater uncertainty about the quality of information and the 
firm’s future profitability (Nagar, Schoenfeld, and Wellman 2019). Ljungqvist and Raff 
(2020) show analytically that the threat of deadlock incentivizes directors on a diverse 
board to gather high-quality information, raising their ex ante monitoring efforts. A board 
with homogenous perspectives cannot commit to a high information standard in that 
directors may find it optimal to use all available information. In contrast, directors in a 
diverse board have different personal biases, which motivates them to collect and respond 
only to precise information, or otherwise be deadlocked. Because deadlock is costly, the 
threat of deadlock allows a diverse board to increase monitoring efforts and dominate a 
homogeneous board in terms of monitoring quality. They show that diversity is more 
desirable under poorer information environment because directors’ monitoring efforts are 
more sensitive to the threat of deadlock. To the extent that there is greater informational 
ambiguity about the optimal course of action during bad times (Kim, Pandit, and Wasley 
2016; Nagar, Schoenfeld, and Wellman 2019), and a diverse board increases its monitoring 
efforts under a poor information environment (Ljungqvist and Raff 2020), I expect greater 
cultural diversity contributes to higher-quality board monitoring during high-EPU periods, 
which benefits creditors. 
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 On the other hand, greater cultural diversity may also suggest more difficulties in 
coordination and communication breakdowns, which compromise the monitoring 
functions of the board (Arrow 1951). To the extent that information quality becomes more 
difficult to assess under increased uncertainty, coordination problems may become more 
severe in bad times and deteriorate monitoring effectiveness of a culturally diverse board. 
This argument is in line with the findings in Giannetti and Zhao (2019) which suggest that 
diversity may lead to more conflicts in the boardroom and greater inefficiencies in 
decision-making process. 
 I present my hypothesis in an alternative form and turn to data to find out which of 
the two effects dominates during heightened EPU periods. 
H2a: The effect of EPU on the cost of debt is influenced by cultural diversity. 
CEO-board cultural distance 
 In addition to cultural diversity within the board, I also examine whether the effect 
of cultural diversity extends to the relation between the CEO and the board by evaluating 
the role of cultural distance between the CEO and directors. Directors with greater cultural 
distance from the CEO may have greater divergence of personal biases from the CEO that 
can induce disagreements. Building on the previous argument that cultural diversity can 
improve board monitoring, a higher likelihood of disagreements may incentivize the 
director to collect and evaluate the quality of information more closely, which leads to 
higher monitoring effectiveness. This argument can be linked to the findings in the 
literature in the context of cross-border acquisitions, which suggests that the positive 
relation between post-acquisition performance and acquirer–target cultural distance can be 
explained by the expansion of business routines and learning advantages (e.g. Morosini, 
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Shane, and Singh 1998). To the extent that the ability to elaborate on existing information 
leads to greater monitoring effectiveness (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009), a larger 
cultural distance between the board and the CEO may facilitate board monitoring. 
 Alternatively, greater cultural distance may also induce communication frictions 
and conflicts. Consistent with this argument, in the context of cross-border acquisition, 
prior literature documents a dark side of cultural distance in increasing the costs of 
integration and introducing coordination frictions derived from a lack of understanding of 
the values and norms of the counterparty (e.g. Gomez-Mejia and Palich 1997; Jemison and 
Sitkin 1986). Similarly, greater cultural distance between the CEO and the board may 
compromise the monitoring function of the board by obstructing the information exchange 
between the CEO and the board, which is essential for the functioning of an effective board 
(Adams and Ferreira 2007; Harris and Raviv 2008). Additionally, to the extent that similar 
culture facilitates trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009), a lack of trust associated with 
greater cultural distance may introduce competitive behaviors and conflicts (Dirks and 
Ferrin 2001) which hinders communication between the CEO and directors and leads to 
inefficiencies in decision-making processes. 
 I present my hypothesis in an alternative form and turn to data to find out which of 
the two effects dominates during increased EPU periods: 
 H2b: The effect of EPU on the cost of debt is influenced by the cultural distance 
between the CEO and the board. 
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3.3. DATA, VARIABLES, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Data sources and sample construction 
 I obtain data on board characteristics from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
which contains director-level information including name, gender, age, tenure, 
independence, outside directorships, and membership to the audit committee. My board 
cultural diversity and distance data are constructed from combining the ISS, ExecuComp, 
and Ancestry.com31 datasets. I identify each directors’ family names to match across these 
datasets. 
 Information on bonds is collected from the LBFI and the TRACE fixed income 
databases. The LBFI provides month-end security-specific information on bonds for the 
years 1993–2006 based on firm size, liquidity, credit ratings, and trading frequency, and 
contains information such as bid price, issue date, coupon, yields, maturities, durations, 
and Moody’s and S&P credit ratings. The TRACE database covers the years 2007 and 
afterward. Because the TRACE database only contains pricing and yield information, I 
merge it with the FISD database to obtain the debt-specific information. Data on EPU come 
from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). 
 I first combine the three bond data sets, and merge with firm accounting data 
obtained from the Compustat Industrial quarterly database. I then merge the combined data 
with ISS, my board cultural diversity data, and Baker, Bloom, and Davis’s (2016) EPU 
index. For all variables, I take the earliest available data before the observation date of the 
bond pricing and yield information. Because various accounting rules and regulations 
 
31 Ancestry.com provides information on the country of origins of passengers of ships from 
foreign ports arriving to the port of New York between 1820 and 1957. 
    
124 
 
affect bond yields, I exclude heavily regulated and financial firms with SIC codes from 
4900 to 4999 and 6000 to 6999. I also omit observations if the data necessary for my 
baseline empirical model are missing. To reduce the impact of outliers, I winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1% level from both tails. My full sample consists of 33,225 
firm-quarter observations representing 1,410 unique firms over the 1993–2015 period.  
Measuring the cost of debt financing 
 My dependent variable, the log of the yield spread or the bond risk premium, is 
defined as the difference between the weighted-average yield to maturity on a corporate 
debt and the yield to maturity on a Treasury security with a corresponding duration. The 
yield on the corporate debt is the discount rate that equates the present value of all future 
cash flows to the price. As in Mansi, Maxwell, and Wald (2009), if a firm has multiple debt 
securities outstanding in a given time period, I give weights to each debt security equal to 
the amount outstanding for that particular security divided by the total amount outstanding 
for all available publicly traded bonds. In cases where there is no equivalent Treasury 
maturity, I calculate the Treasury yield spread using the Svensson (1994) interpolation 
exponential functional model. 
Measuring economic policy uncertainty  
 I employ the EPU index developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) to proxy 
for policy uncertainty, my key explanatory variable. BBD measure the monthly policy 
uncertainty index as the weighted sum of the four key components: news-based policy 
uncertainty index, the federal tax code provisions uncertainty index, the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) forecast dispersion index, and the federal, state, and local government 
expenditure forecasts dispersion index. The first component, the news-based EPU, is 
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constructed using a computer-automated search of ten major newspapers in the United 
States. The authors count the number of articles that contain the terms “uncertain” or 
“uncertainty,” “economic” or “economy,” and at least one policy-relevant term such as 
“Congress,” “deficit,” “Federal Reserve,” “legislation,” “regulation,” or “White House”. 
To account for the differences in the volume of articles, for each of the ten newspapers, the 
counts are scaled by the total number of articles and standardized to have unit standard 
deviation. The normalized values are summed over each month to have one representative 
multi-paper index, then renormalized to have an average of 100 from January 1985 to 
December 2009. 
 The other component indices capture uncertainty related to specific policy 
categories. The tax uncertainty measure is the weighted sum of tax provision revenues 
expiring in the next ten years. Higher weights are given to dollar amount of tax provisions 
expiring in the nearer future. The CPI forecast dispersion index and the government 
expenditure dispersion index are measured as the four-quarter-ahead interquartile ranges 
of CPI and the federal, state, and local government spending forecasts. BBD normalize 
each component and construct a composite EPU index (EPU Overall) that assigns a weight 
of 1/2 for the news-based component (EPU News) and weights of 1/6 for the other three 
components: EPU Tax, EPU Cpi, and EPU Fsl. 
 BBD show that the composite index captures uncertainty spikes around important 
policy-relevant events such as the financial crises and wars but does not necessarily 
correlate with all political events that have few economic ramifications. Given that the 
main component of the index is based on the news-based component, BBD conduct various 
validation tests to address the concern that the measure may be biased in terms of accuracy 
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and reliability. The validation exercises include human audits and testing for political 
slants, as well as comparison to other measures of economic uncertainty. BBD confirm that 
their index effectively captures the overall policy-related uncertainty without significant 
biases and is distinct in scope from other measures of macroeconomic uncertainty.  
 Following Gulen and Ion (2016), I define EPU as the natural logarithm of the 
arithmetic average of the BBD index over the three months of a given firm’s calendar 
quarter. For robustness, I also consider other specifications of EPU.  
Measuring board cultural diversity 
 Although culture is not directly observed, the systematic differences between one 
group’s beliefs and values and others’ affect financial decision-making and economic 
outcome (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006). These differences can be quantified to 
allow for comparison across different groups. Hofstede’s (2001) work was one of the 
earlier attempts to quantify cultural values into different dimension scores. His original 
surveys focus on the four dimensions of culture: individualism-collectivism, masculinity-
femininity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. I construct my diversity measure 
based on these initial four dimensions, as they have been used most extensively (Frijns, 
Dodd, and Cimerova 2016; Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson 2016). 32  The individualism 
dimension measures the degree to which members of a society value independent construal 
of self. The masculinity score indicates how much value societies’ members place on the 
traditional masculine values, such as achieving something visible and showing 
 
32 The fifth and sixth dimensions, namely long-term orientation and indulgence, were 
introduced ex-post using different samples of participant surveys. My main inference 
remains qualitatively similar if I include these additional dimensions to construct cultural 
diversity measure. 
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assertiveness. The power distance score reflects the way in which society deals with 
unequal distribution of power. Lastly, the uncertainty avoidance score captures the extent 
to which people in a society tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity. 
 To capture board cultural diversity, I proceed in three steps. I first collect the family 
names of directors from the ISS director database. Then, I identify the ancestral countries 
of origins of each director. After establishing each director’s family name with countries 
of origins, I associate each director with Hofstede’s culture dimensions based on director’s 
countries of origin.33 
 To identify directors’ ancestral countries of origin I follow the process used in Liu 
(2016), Pan, Siegel, and Wang (2017; 2019), and Giannetti and Zhao (2019). Specifically, 
I match directors’ family names with their ancestral countries of origin using data from 
Ancestry.com, which provides comprehensive information on the ethnicity and nationality 
of the passengers who arrived at the port of New York from foreign ports between 1820 
and 1957. I use the country associated with the passenger’s ethnicity to identify her country 
of origin, because ancestry has been shown to influence the culture of individuals even 
after several generations (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006). 
 When the same family name points to different countries of origin, I take the 
weighted average of the culture scores where the weights are given by the frequency of 
immigrants with the same last name.34 For example, the family name “Ferrari” appears 
9,304 times, which implies that a total of 9,304 passengers with the same family name 
 
33 I yield similar results on my main inference when I use alternative dimensions of culture 
derived from Schwartz (1994), Tang and Koveos (2008), and the GLOBE project. 
34 Using all countries of origin is likely to add noise. My results remain qualitatively similar 
if I use the three most frequent countries for each family name. 
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arrived at the port of New York between 1820 and 1957. Countries of origins can be 
identified for 7,567 passengers, with 6,724 (88.9%) from Italy, 251 (3.3%) from the U.S. 
(i.e., re-entering U.S. citizens), and 127 (1.7%) from the U.K. The remaining 465 are from 
32 other countries. I exclude any passengers for whom a country of origin cannot be 
identified. 
 After identifying the cultural background associated with the ancestry of directors, 
I construct the composite cultural diversity score of the board. I first follow Kogut and 
Singh (1988) and compute the cultural distance (CD𝑖𝑗) of the cultural dimension scores (𝑘) 
between all pairs of two directors (𝑖, 𝑗) on a board: 
CD𝑖𝑗 = √∑ {(𝐼𝑘𝑖 −
4
𝑘=1 𝐼𝑘𝑗)
2/𝑉𝑘}         ∀  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,   (1’) 
where 𝑉𝑘 is the sample variance of each cultural dimension scores. Based on this cultural 
distance measure, I construct the cultural diversity scores for each firm (𝑙) in year (𝑡), 
calculated as the average of cultural distances of all director pairs in a given board: 
Board Diversity𝑙𝑡 =  
∑ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗,𝑙𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑛(𝑛−1)/2
         ∀  𝑖 < 𝑗,   (2’) 
To allow for comparison across boards with different numbers of board members (n), as 
shown in the denominator, I scale by the number of board member pairs. By summing 
cultural distance across the four dimensions in equation (1’), Board Diversity𝑙𝑡 captures 
the composite cultural diversity on the board in a given firm-year.35 I also estimate cultural 
 
35 I also consider diversity scores with respect to individual cultural dimensions. 
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diversity separately for board subsets, which include independent directors, audit 
committee members, insiders, and female directors.  
Measuring CEO-board diversity distance 
 Cultural distance between the CEO and the board is computed based on the cultural 
distance (CD𝑖𝑗) measure defined above. I modify equation (1’) and fix director 𝑖 to equal 
to the CEO. Doing so allows me to calculate the cultural distance between the CEO and 
the directors instead of computing cultural distance between directors. To allow for 
comparability across firms with different board size, I scale the cultural distance by the 
number of director pairs on the board. As previously, I construct the composite cultural 
distance measure that comprehensively captures all four cultural dimensions, and 
individual cultural distance scores reflecting each dimension. My primary measure of 
cultural distance is the average cultural distance between the CEO and all directors. I 
employ as alternative specifications the cultural distance between the CEO and 
independent directors, audit committee members, insiders, and female directors. 
Control variables 
 To isolate the impact of policy uncertainty on the cost of debt, in the multivariate 
analysis I control for a comprehensive set of firm- and security-specific variables that are 
previously documented to affect yield spreads. Firm-specific measures include firm size, 
leverage, profitability, market-to-book, sales growth, and cash flow volatility. Given 
evidence that larger firms tend to have a smaller default risk and greater benefits from 
economies of scale, I include Firm Size, measured as the natural log of total assets. 
Leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total capital, is included because 
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higher leverage corresponds to higher default risk. I also control for Performance, 
computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total capital, and Sales Growth, measured as the 
firm’s annual growth in sales revenue. Market-to-Book proxies for growth opportunity and 
is defined as the market value of assets (equal to the sum of book value of debt and number 
of shares outstanding times share price) divided by the book value of assets. I additionally 
control for Cash Flow Volatility, measured as the standard deviation of performance over 
the past ten years. Finally, I control for shareholder monitoring using Institutional 
Ownership, computed as the percentage of common shares held by institutions scaled by 
the total number of common shares outstanding. 
 Bond-specific variables include credit rating, maturity, liquidity, callability, and a 
high-yield dummy. Credit ratings are used to control for firms’ differences in default risk. 
I calculate firm credit rating for a given date of the yield observation by averaging the 
Moody’s and S&P bond ratings. Bond ratings are numerically converted to have a value of 
22 to 1 for AAA- to D-rated bonds. The conversion process to numerical numbers is shown 
in the Appendix. Given that credit ratings may already incorporate the effect of policy 
uncertainty, my main variable of interest, I orthogonalize credit ratings to EPU and purge 
the rating information of the impact of policy uncertainty. Specifically, I label the error 
term from regressing the rating variable on EPU as Credit Ratings and use it as my primary 
measure of credit ratings in my baseline model. 
 At the individual security level, I control for the effect of term structure using 
Maturity, defined as the number of years remaining until the bond reaches maturity. Bond 
Age reflects liquidity of the bond and is defined as the number of years that a bond has 
been outstanding. Following the literature (e.g. Mansi, Maxwell, and Wald 2009), in case 
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the firm has multiple bonds at a given time, I construct the weighted-average maturity, 
bond age, and credit ratings by assigning weights to each security according to the amount 
outstanding for each debt divided by the total amount outstanding for publicly traded debt 
of the firm. I include as additional controls Callability, an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the issue is callable. Finally, to control for the non-linearity between yield spreads and 
credit ratings (e.g. Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller 2004), I employ High Yield, an indicator 
variable that equals 1 when the debt is high yield/non-investment grade. Table 3.1 provides 
definitions and data sources for all variables used in my analyses. 
Descriptive statistics 
 Panel A of Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for my key variables of interest. 
On average, the securities in my sample have a yield spread of 360 basis points, which 
deviates substantially from the median at 232 basis points. Because these numbers suggest 
that the yield spread is highly skewed, I take the natural logarithm of the yield spread in 
my regression results. 
 The mean and median firm size in my sample is $8.2 billion, with a standard 
deviation of $1.4 billion. Firms in my sample have a large portion of liabilities in their 
capital structure, as indicated by the median leverage ratio of 32% and the standard 
deviation of 19%. My sample firms have a mean profitability ratio of 3%, a market-to-book 
ratio of 2.8, and cash flow volatility of 5%. On average, institutional owners hold 69% of 
shares outstanding in my sample firms. The average Moody’s bond rating is BB and S&P’s 
is BB+, suggesting that, on average, firms in my sample have outstanding debt with high 
yield ratings. Turning to maturity, traded debt has a mean maturity of 8.7 years with a 
standard deviation of 5.2 years. On average, traded debt has a maturity of 8.7 years and a 
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standard deviation of 5.2 years. The sample is balanced between non-investment-grade 
debt, with 51%, and investment-grade debt with 49%. 
 In Panel B of Table 3.2 I provide the industry distribution of the sample using one-
digit SIC codes. Most of the firms in the overall sample are in manufacturing (53%). My 
sample firms are also distributed across wholesale and retail trade (13%), and services, 
including business and other (13%), mining and construction (10%), and transportation and 
communications (10%) sectors. I find the fewest sample companies in the public 
administration and agriculture and forestry industries. 
 Panel C of Table 3.2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients for the yield 
spread, policy uncertainty, and control variables in my baseline analysis. I find that yield 
spread is positively correlated with the policy uncertainty measure, firm leverage, cash 
flow volatility, and high yield dummy, and negatively correlated with firm size, 
institutional ownership, profitability, credit ratings, maturity, and bond age. The correlation 
analyses suggest that higher policy uncertainty is associated with a higher cost of debt 
financing. 
3.4. RESULTS 
EPU and the cost of debt 
 I start my analysis by confirming the positive relation between the log of yield 
spreads and EPU using a multivariate method that controls for other factors known to 
influence the cost of debt. To account for problems arising from potentially unobservable 
firm heterogeneity, in all specifications I include firm fixed effects as well as a set of 
calendar- and fiscal-quarter fixed effects that controls for seasonality. Following Gulen and 
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Ion (2016), I cluster standard errors at the firm and year-quarter level to correct for potential 
cross-sectional and serial correlation in the error term (Petersen 2009). My baseline 
regression model is as follows:  
Log(Spreadi,t) = αi + β1 Log(EPUi,t) + β2-7 Firm Controls + β8-12 Debt Controls 
   + QRTt + εi,t ,            (4’) 
where Log(Spreadi,t) stands for the natural logarithm of difference between the yield to 
maturity and the treasury bond rate with similar maturity. Index i represents the firm, index 
t represents the quarter, and β2-7 and β8-12 represent vectors of control variables. All control 
variables are lagged with respect to the yield spread. The αi’s are firm fixed effects and 
QRTt stands for a set of calendar- and fiscal-quarter dummy variables. For each firm i, 
Log(EPU) is the natural logarithm of the arithmetic average of the BBD index over the 
three months ending in the calendar month at which the yield spread is observed. Note that 
a positive and significant coefficient on EPU, β1, supports the hypothesis that an increase 
in policy uncertainty is value-decreasing for bondholders. I control for both firm- and 
security-level factors that are known to influence yield spread, including firm size, 
leverage, profitability, sales growth, credit ratings, bond age, and institutional ownership. 
 Table 3.3 reports the results from examining the effect of policy-induced economic 
uncertainty on the cost of debt. I present results for the news-based economic policy 
uncertainty (Log EPU News)) in Model 1. To accommodate the possibility that bond 
pricing may be more sensitive to more recent information, in additional tests (unreported) 
I also confirm the results from using the weighted-average policy uncertainty index, such 
that the more recent months get more weight. In Models 2 and 3, I reexamine my main 
    
134 
 
specifications separately for investment-grade debt (greater than or equal to credit ratings 
of BBB-) and non-investment-grade debt (below credit ratings of BBB-), respectively.  
 Table 3.3 results consistently provide evidence that an increase in policy 
uncertainty is associated with higher debt financing costs. Model 1 indicates that a 1% 
increase in the EPU News is associated with a 2.528% annual increase in yield spread with 
respect to the sample mean. Across Models 2 and 3, the coefficient varies from 0.640 for 
the investment-grade debt sample to 0.620 for the non-investment-grade subsample, which 
translates into an increase in yield spreads of about 2.560% to 2.480% annually as EPU 
News increases by 1%. In unreported tests, results indicate that increases in the separate 
components of EPU as well as the overall EPU contribute to the positive relation between 
policy uncertainty and cost of debt. Overall, the results suggest that uncertainty related to 
economic policy is detrimental to bondholders, as reflected in higher yield spreads. 
 Consistent with Gulen and Ion (2016), my baseline results reveal that much of the 
explanatory power of EPU is captured by the news-based component. This is expected 
because the news index, by design, includes uncertainty of all policy decisions without 
discriminating by specific policy topics. For this reason, and in the interest of brevity, I use 
the news-based component as the main variable throughout my analyses. My results remain 
qualitatively similar if I use the overall EPU index. 
 In Appendix I, I report the results of various robustness tests. First, I examine 
whether my results are sensitive to the inclusion of election years. Although election timing 
may be a good exogenous indicator of heightened policy uncertainty, analyses based on 
election indicator implicitly assume that policy uncertainty remains constant during non-
election years (Gulen and Ion 2016). In addition, using an indicator variable renders it 
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difficult to quantify how much effect election may have on bond pricing. Model 1 presents 
the results when I control for election years (ELECTION). As shown, the coefficient on the 
election indicator is positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero, while the 
coefficient on EPU remains positive and significant. This result suggests that my results 
are not driven by uncertainty during election years.  
 Next, to account for the possibility that different types of uncertainty may influence 
bond pricing, I include additional controls for firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic-level 
uncertainty in Models 2 to 5. To capture firm-level uncertainty, I use earnings volatility 
(Earnvol) and return volatility (Return Volatility) following Kim, Pandit, and Wasley 
(2016). As in Harford (2005), I measure industry-level uncertainty using the first principal 
component from the industry-year medians of seven industry-level economic shock 
variables (Industry Shock). Lastly, I follow Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion (2018) and measure 
the general macroeconomic uncertainty using the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
sales growth (CS sale) and the cross-sectional standard deviation of cumulative returns (CS 
Return) in the concurrent fiscal year. I use additional macroeconomic uncertainty 
measures, namely Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng’s (2015) overall macroeconomic uncertainty 
(JLN) and implied volatility of equity options (VIX). The results in Models 2 to 7 indicate 
that even after controlling for different types of uncertainty, whether individually or 
altogether, the effect of policy uncertainty on yield spread remains distinct and singular. 
 Lastly, to the extent that uncertainty is countercyclical (Bloom, Floetotto, 
Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry 2018), the relation between yield spread and policy 
uncertainty could be confounded by the effects of macroeconomic conditions. It may be 
the case, for instance, that the positive effect of policy uncertainty on yield spread may 
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spuriously reflect the decrease in investment opportunities and investors’ reluctance to 
provide financing when economic prospects are poor. To address this concern, in Model 8 
I control for several proxies for macroeconomic conditions that capture market 
participants’ expectations on economic outlooks: GDP growth rate (GDP growth), the 
consumer confidence index (CCI), composite leading indicators (CLI), and forecasted real 
GDP growth rate (RealGDP forecast). Additionally, to further mitigate the concern that 
the change in bond pricing may simply reflect lower investment, I include capital 
investment (Capinv) and research and development intensity (R&D), as well as an indicator 
for missing R&D (R&D Dummy) as additional controls. The results confirm that the effect 
of policy uncertainty on yield spread is distinct from the confounding effects of 
macroeconomic conditions and decreasing investment opportunities. 
 Although I test the sensitivity of my results to an extensive list of control variables 
and robustness tests, potential endogeneity could still drive my results. First, bias from 
reverse causality may arise where a significant increase in the cost of debt could create 
uncertainty among policymakers and regulators. Similarly, other sources of economic 
uncertainty unrelated to policy may drive both EPU and yield spread, creating potential 
bias problems arising from omitted explanatory variables. In addition, although Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2016) take extensive precautions to mitigate the measurement concerns 
of EPU, the index is still measured and could still be prone to unknown measurement 
errors. To address potential endogeneity problems remaining in my analysis, in Models 4 
to 8 of Table 3.3 I conduct an instrumental variable analysis approach as well as placebo 
tests. 
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 I first employ an instrumental variables approach. The variables include the U.S. 
Senate polarization index of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997) and the partisan 
conflict index of Azzimonti (2018). Prior research suggests that increased polarization can 
cause the politicians to enter a gridlock state, which leads to increased variation in policy 
(McCarty 2012). In addition, government dysfunction created by partisan conflict can 
induce policy uncertainty (Azzimonti 2018). These lines of research indicate that my 
instruments are strongly correlated with the policy uncertainty measure from both a 
theoretical and a statistical perspective (relevance restriction). However, it is unlikely that 
U.S. Senate polarization or the partisan conflict would have a direct relation to any of the 
firm-level or security-level variables (exclusion restriction) other than through its impact 
on policy uncertainty. 
 One concern in my analysis is that both the policy uncertainty variable and the 
instruments are constant for all firms within each time period. In this case, using the usual 
two-stage least squares methodology is problematic because the correlation between policy 
uncertainty and its instruments would be automatically inflated. As a remedy for this 
problem, I follow Gulen and Ion (2016) and run a time-series regression in the first stage 
and a panel regression in the second stage. The t-statistics are based on bootstrapped 
standard errors to mitigate the biases from using estimated regressors. In the first-stage 
regression model, I regress the monthly news-based EPU on the corresponding 
instrumental variables along with the collapsed mean of the control variables (z) by each 
time period. I also control for quarter fixed effects. Then, in the second-stage model, I 
regress the yield spread on the fitted value of the news-based EPU (𝐸𝑃𝑈 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠̃ ) from the 
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first stage. I include the same control variables as well as quarter fixed effects. My first- 
and second-stage models are as follows:  
   (First) 𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜗𝑧 + 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑡 + 𝑡           (5’) 
(Second) 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜋1𝐸𝑃𝑈 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠̃ 𝑡 + 𝜃𝑧 + 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑡., 
 The results are reported in Models 4–7 of Table 3.3. Consistent with expectations, 
the first-stage regressions in Models 4 and 5 show positive coefficients on Senate 
polarization (Polarization) and partisan conflict (PCI) indices, suggesting that the 
relevance condition of my instruments is satisfied. In the second-stage regressions, I use 
the fitted value from the first-stage regression to replace the original value of EPU and 
report the results in Models 6 and 7. I find that the coefficient estimates on 𝐸𝑃𝑈 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠̃  are 
positive and significant at the 1% level, which confirms the positive effect of policy 
uncertainty on yield spreads. These results help alleviate endogeneity concerns. 
 I attempt to further rule out the possibility of spurious correlation between the EPU 
index and yield spread by performing placebo tests in Model 8 of Table 3.3. I first create 
100 different random samples of the news-based EPU index that follows the sample 
distribution and denote the randomly sampled variable placebo EPU (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃ ). 
Then, I estimate the regression coefficients from replacing the true EPU values with 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  and report the average coefficient estimates in Model 5. If policy uncertainty 
is what causes yield spread to increase, then I should find that a random variable that simply 
mimics the sample distribution of EPU would have no impact on the cost of debt. 
Consistent with expectation, I find that 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  loads statistically insignificantly. 
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Overall, the positive relation between EPU and yield spreads is robust to controlling for 
potential endogeneity through the instrumental variables and placebo test approaches. 
The role of board monitoring 
 The results above indicate that increase in policy uncertainty poses an additional 
risk to bondholders as reflected in higher bond yield spreads. In this section, I examine 
whether board cultural diversity can influence this relation.  
 Board cultural diversity is associated with board effectiveness either because it 
facilitates  monitoring (the positive view) or because it induces less effective monitoring 
(the negative view). These two views have different implications for the effectiveness of 
the board and in turn on firm performance. I distinguish between these two views by 
examining the moderating effect of board cultural diversity on the cost of debt financing–
EPU relation. 
The role of board cultural diversity 
 To test the effect of board cultural diversity, I re-estimate my baseline model in 
Equation (4’) with cultural diversity, EPU, and an interaction between the two. To make 
interpreting the coefficient on the interaction term easier, I replace cultural diversity and 
EPU with standardized values that have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The results 
are presented in Table 3.4. In Models 1–5 I first report the results from using cultural 
diversity of all board members. In Models 6 and 7 I separately focus on the cultural 
diversity within independent directors and audit committee members. Models 8 and 9 
examine the cultural diversity of insiders and female directors. For brevity, I report both 
the composite and the individual cultural diversity scores when I consider all board 
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members but present only the results from employing composite diversity when examining 
subsets of board. 
 The negative and significant coefficient on interaction term between policy 
uncertainty and composite cultural diversity in Model 1 suggests that board cultural 
diversity can alleviate the adverse impact of policy uncertainty on bond yield spreads. 
Economically, moving cultural diversity from the first to the third quartile reduces the 
effect of a 1% increase in yield spreads by about 0.441% per annum with respect to the 
sample mean. This result is consistent with the argument that cultural diversity is associated 
with greater monitoring effectiveness, which may be highly important under increased 
uncertainty when managerial opportunism increases substantially. Higher monitoring 
quality of a diverse board mitigates the adverse impact of EPU, as reflected by lower yield 
spreads. Turning to the individual dimension scores, the results in Models 2–5 indicate that 
individualism and power distance dimensions are mainly responsible for the effect of board 
cultural diversity. 
 Importantly, I find that the effect of cultural diversity is driven by the diversity 
among independent directors, as shown by the negative and significant interaction in Model 
6. This finding adds support to the argument that cultural diversity is associated with 
greater board monitoring. Economically, moving cultural diversity among independent 
directors from the first to the third quartile reduces the effect of a 1% increase in yield 
spreads by about 0.355% annually. In Model 7, I find that diversity of directors classified 
as insiders does not affect the yield spread–policy uncertainty relation, which further 
suggests that cultural diversity is associated with the monitoring, rather than the advising, 
    
141 
 
function of the board. Overall, the evidence in Table 3.4 suggests that board cultural 
diversity can significantly insulate the effects of policy uncertainty on yield spreads. 
The role of CEO-board cultural distance 
 I also investigate whether board-CEO cultural distance affects the EPU–cost of debt 
relation by augmenting my baseline model in Equation (4’) with cultural distance, EPU, 
and an interaction between the two As previously, I separately test the effect of cultural 
distance of all board members, independent directors, audit committee members, insiders, 
and female directors, from the CEO. To make interpreting the coefficient on the interaction 
term easier, I replace board-CEO cultural distance and EPU with standardized values that 
have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. 
 The results are reported in Table 3.5. Model 1 suggests that a greater cultural 
distance between the CEO and the board mitigates the adverse effect of policy uncertainty 
on yield spreads. Economically, the effect of moving cultural distance from the first to the 
third quartile reduces the adverse effect of a 1% increase in EPU by 0.372% annually with 
respect to the sample mean. Results in Models 2–5 indicate that most of the benefit of 
cultural distance is concentrated in the individualism dimension. 
 In Model 7 I find that the effect of cultural distance is driven by the cultural distance 
between the CEO and audit committee members, which is consistent with the monitoring 
function of cultural distance. The results in Models 8 and 9 provide little evidence of the 
role of inside director-CEO and female director-CEO cultural distance. Overall, the results 
show that greater board-CEO cultural distance, especially between the audit committee 
members and the CEO, can mitigate the adverse consequences of EPU. 
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The role of other board structures 
 In additional analyses, I validate the role of the board monitoring during bad times 
by testing the effects of traditional observable board structures. These include board 
independence, busyness, female representation on the board, and average tenure and age 
of the board. Board Independence, a proxy for monitoring effectiveness of the board, is 
defined as the percentage of independent directors divided by the total number of directors 
in a given year. As in Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003), Board Business is 
computed as the percentage of directors on a board who hold three or more directorships. 
Female Board Representation is defined as the percentage of female directors on the board. 
Board average Tenure and Board average Age is the average of the tenure of service and 
age across the board members, respectively. To test the role of board monitoring during 
high-EPU periods, I augment my baseline model with the board characteristics and their 
interactions with EPU. To make interpreting the coefficient on the interaction terms easier, 
I replace all board variables and EPU with standardized values that have a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1. 
 Table 3.6 presents the findings. In Model 1 I report the results from using board 
independence. Models 2 and 3 show results from using board busyness and female 
representation as the variables of interest. In Model 1, I find a negative and significant 
interaction coefficient of Board Independence with EPU. The results imply that effective 
monitoring by the board can mitigate the adverse impact of policy uncertainty. Specifically, 
as policy uncertainty increases by 1%, moving board independence from the first to the 
third quarter results in a decrease in yield spread of 0.513% per annum. In Model 2, 
consistent with the prediction that having busier boards leads to less effective monitoring, 
    
143 
 
I find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between Board Busyness 
and EPU. This result indicates that serving on multiple boards overcommits an individual 
and the consequences during periods of policy uncertainty are detrimental to bondholders. 
In terms of magnitude, the estimated coefficients imply that moving board busyness from 
the first to the third quarter, the effect of a 1% increase in EPU increases the yield spread 
by 0.904% per annum with respect to the sample mean. Interestingly, the direct effect of 
busyness on yield spread is negative, which suggests that during normal times greater board 
busyness translates to directors using their expertise from serving on multiple boards to 
reduce the cost of debt. 
 Turning to Female Representation in Model 3, I find that higher female presence 
on the board is beneficial to the bondholders during periods of high policy uncertainty, as 
shown by the significant and negative coefficient of the interaction. Moving female 
representation from the first to the third quarter, the effect of a 1% increase in EPU on yield 
spread gives annual reductions of 0.645% in spreads with respect to the sample mean. In 
Models 4 and 5, I further find evidence consistent with the prediction that long-term 
director engagement and greater experience help mitigate the adverse impact of policy 
uncertainty. Moving from the first to the third quarter board average tenure and age, the 
effect of a 1% increase of EPU on yield spreads is associated with the annual reductions in 
spreads of 0.361% and 0.554% with respect to the sample mean, respectively. Overall, 
these findings provide corroborative evidence that effective board monitoring during 
periods of heightened EPU is valuable to creditors. 
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The role of other information intermediaries  
 In my final set of tests, I investigate whether the role of board cultural diversity and 
board-CEO cultural distance extends beyond the monitoring of other information 
intermediaries including auditors, financial analysts, and institutional investors. 
Accordingly, I include board cultural diversity and its interaction with EPU, as well as each 
of the other information intermediaries interacted with EPU in the same regression in Table 
3.7. I follow a similar approach to test the effect of board-CEO cultural distance in Table 
3.8. All variables used in the interaction terms are replaced with standardized values that 
have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. In Model 1 of Tables 8 and 9, Big 4 Auditor 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if one of the Big 4 accounting firms is the firm’s 
auditor. In Model 2, I replace auditor dummy with the number of analysts following, 
computed as the log of the number of analysts following the firm. In Model 3, I use 
institutional ownership and its interaction term with EPU. Throughout Models 1–3, the 
results show that although having effective external monitors partly mitigates the adverse 
impact of policy uncertainty, cultural diversity and board-CEO cultural distance have 
singular impact that goes above and beyond the monitoring role played by these 
information intermediaries. 
 In Models 4–8 I consider the monitoring and information quality effects associated 
with different investment horizons of institutional investors. Model 4 presents results from 
employing churn rate in association with EPU. Models 5 and 6 each use long-term and 
short-term institutional ownership, and Model 7 reports the results from including both in 
the same regression. Finally, in Model 8 I present the result using an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the long-term institutional ownership stake is greater than that of the short-term, 
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and 0 otherwise. The results in Models 4–8 of Tables 7 and 8 suggest the role of cultural 
diversity and distance from the CEO has a singular impact on the cost of debt–EPU relation 
that extends above and beyond the monitoring roles of institutional investors. Interestingly, 
most of the benefit during periods of high uncertainty comes from monitoring by long-term 
institutional investors. Although I find little evidence that short-term institutional investors 
affect the relation between EPU and yield spread, in Model 3 I find a positive and 
significant interaction coefficient between churn rate and policy uncertainty, suggesting 
that high turnover and shorter commitment by institutional investors exacerbates the impact 
of EPU. These results are largely consistent with the findings in prior literature that the 
stability and diversification of the long-term investors’ shareholdings make monitoring and 
governance commitments increasingly desirable (Hirschman 1970; Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos 2005). 
3.5. ENDOGENEITY OF BOARD 
 Board characteristics, like most observed outcomes in corporate finance, are 
endogenously determined over time. Although I include firm and time fixed effects to 
control for unobservable heterogeneity across firm and time, a major endogeneity concern 
still remains because the results may spuriously be driven by the effectiveness of board 
structures in reducing yield spreads that is unrelated to the difference in policy uncertainty 
episodes. 
 To alleviate the concern that my design fails to capture the effect of board cultural 
diversity during periods of high EPU and may merely reflect a false correlation over time 
of implementing effective governance policies unrelated to the policy uncertainty, I 
conduct a placebo (falsification) test. Specifically, I randomly assign a placebo EPU index 
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(𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃ ) that follows the sample distribution of the true EPU. Then I re-estimate all 
models in Tables 4–6 by replacing the policy uncertainty variable with (𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃ ). I 
repeat this process 100 times and report the average coefficient estimates. The results, 
presented in Table 3.9, show that the coefficients on the interaction term between 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  and the board characteristics are neither statistically nor economically 
insignificant. These results suggest that my findings are not driven by the spurious 
correlations. 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
 In light of the recent global economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
corporate governance has received renewed attention as one of the sources of resilience 
that enable firms to navigate through adverse conditions. While corporate boards are one 
of the most important internal corporate governance mechanisms that protects firm value, 
there is little understanding of what makes an effective board during bad times. In this 
paper, I use a novel approach to identify directors’ cultural backgrounds based on their 
ancestral origins and examine whether and how cultural diversity affects performance of 
firms during bad times. I provide evidence that greater cultural diversity within the board 
membership and cultural distance between the board and the CEO attenuate the adverse 
effect of economic policy uncertainty on yield spreads. Overall, the study shows that 
cultural diversity of the top management is an important determinant of performance 
during bad times. This finding echoes the growing focus of regulators in promoting 
diversity within the boardroom. 







Table 3.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Description Data Source(s) 
   
Yield Spread The difference between the weighted-average yield to maturity of the firm’s 
outstanding publicly traded debt and the yield to maturity on a duration-matched 
Treasury security. Weight is defined as the amount outstanding for each issue as a 
fraction of all outstanding traded debt for the firm.  
LBFI, TRACE 
EPU A measure of economic policy uncertainty.  Baker, Bloom, and 




Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets.  Compustat 
Firm Leverage Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, deflated by total assets.  
Firm Performance Operating income before depreciation, deflated by total assets.  
Sales Growth  Sales growth rate, defined as the ratio of the change in sales to lagged sales.  
Cash Flow Volatility Standard deviation of performance over the past ten years (t-1 to t-10).  
Market-to-Book Market value of equity, computed as the number of common stocks outstanding 





Credit Rating Average of Moody’s and S&P bond ratings, computed using a conversion process 
whereby AAA-rated bonds are assigned a value of 22, and D-rated bonds a value 
of 1. 
LBFI, TRACE 
Bond Maturity Bond issue maturity remaining in years.  
Bond Age Number of years a bond has been outstanding.  
High Yield Indicator variable that equals 1 when the weighted-average rating is below BBB.  
Callability Indicator variable that equals 1 when the bond is callable.  
 
Governance and Firm Variables 
 
Board Independence Fraction of independent directors divided by the total number of directors in a given 
year. 
ISS 
Board Busyness Percentage of directors who hold three or more directorships in a given year.  







Female % Fraction of female directors on the board in a given year.  
Board Avg Tenure Average of director tenure in a given year.  
Board Avg Age Average of director age in a given year.  
Board Diversity Composite cultural diversity score of the board in a given year, calculated as the 
average of cultural distances in all pairs of board members. Cultural distance is 
computed following the approach in Kogut and Singh (1988). I consider the initial 
four dimensions based on the original surveys conducted by Hofstede. 
ISS, Ancestry of 
Names, Hofstede 
(2001) 
PDI Diversity Diversity of board members with respect to Hofstede’s power distance dimension.  
IDV Diversity Diversity of board members with respect to Hofstede’s individualism dimension.  
MAS Diversity Diversity of board members with respect to Hofstede’s masculinity dimension.  
UAI Diversity Diversity of board members with respect to Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance 
dimension. 
 
Indep. Board Diversity Composite cultural diversity score of independent directors.  
AuditCom Diversity Composite cultural diversity score of audit committee members.  
Insider Diversity Composite cultural diversity score of insiders  
Insider Diversity Composite cultural diversity score of female directors.  
   
CEO-Board Distance Composite measure of cultural distance between the board and the CEO, calculated 
as the average of all director-CEO pair cultural distance in a given year. Cultural 
distance is computed following the approach in Kogut and Singh (1988) and focuses 
on the initial four dimensions based on the original surveys conducted by Hofstede. 
 
PDI Distance Distance of board members from the CEO with respect to Hofstede’s power distance 
dimension 
 
IDV Distance Distance of board members from the CEO with respect to Hofstede’s individualism 
dimension 
 
MAS Distance Distance of board members from the CEO with respect to Hofstede’s masculinity 
dimension 
 
UAI Distance Distance of board members from the CEO with respect to Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance dimension 
 
Indep. Board Distance Composite cultural distance score of independent directors.  
AuditCom Distance Composite cultural distance score of audit committee members.  







Insider Distance Composite cultural distance score of insiders.  
Female Distance Composite cultural distance score of female directors.  
   
Big 4 Auditor Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, and 0 
otherwise. 
Compustat 
Analysts Number of analysts following the firm in a given year I/B/E/S 
InstOwn Ratio of shares owned by institutions divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. 
Thomson 13-F 
Churn Rate Weighted sum of institutional investors’ turnover in firm i’s stock, where the weight 
is given by each institutional investors’ ownership of the firm’s stock. 
 
LT InstOwn Sum of ownership by investors that have average churn rates over the prior four 
quarters in the bottom tercile. 
 
ST InstOwn Sum of ownership by investors that have average churn rates over the prior four 
quarters in the top tercile. 
 
Dummy (LT>ST) Indicator variable that equals 1 if the ratio of shares owned by long-term institutional 
owners exceeds that of short-term institutional owners, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Notes: This table gives definitions for the variables used in the analysis, along with their data sources. LBFI is the Lehman Brothers 
Fixed Income database, TRACE is the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine database provided by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, FISD is the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database, CRSP is the Center for Research in Security Prices database, 
SDC is the Securities Data Company’s financial transaction database (primarily for mergers and acquisitions), Compustat is the financial 
information database, ExecuComp is the executive compensation database, Thomson 13-F is the Thomson Financial 13F database, and 
RiskMetrics is the IRRC/ISS database. 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Std.dev  Q1 Q3 
      
Yield Spread (in basis points) 360 232 415 117 433 
EPU Overall 95 84 38 65 120 
EPU News 113 104 39 83 144 
EPU FSL 85 82 32 58 105 
EPU CPI 93 84 25 75 109 
EPU Tax 409 224 499 19 621 
 Firm-Specific Variables 
Total Assets ($Million) 8,223 8,152 1,390 7,231 9,161 
Firm Leverage 0.36 0.32 0.19 0.23 0.46 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Sales Growth  0.03 0.02 0.17 -0.04 0.08 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 
Market-to-Book 2.83 2.13 4.96 1.29 3.46 
 Bond-Specific Variables 
Credit Rating BB BB+ A-/CCC+ B BBB+ 
Bond Maturity 8.69 7.42 5.21 5.17 10.60 
Bond Age 3.23 2.74 2.38 1.46 4.38 
High Yield 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Callability 0.76 1.00 0.43 1.00 1.00 
 Governance and Other Variables 
Board Independence 0.75 0.80 0.16 0.67 0.88 
Board Busyness 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 
Female Director % 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.20 
Board Avg Tenure 8.15 7.86 3.19 6.00 10.00 
Board Avg Age 61.69 61.82 3.69 59.38 64.14 
      
Board Diversity 2.20 2.16 0.73 1.70 2.67 
Independent Diversity 2.21 2.16 0.82 1.67 2.75 
AuditCom Diversity 2.20 2.12 1.10 1.49 2.92 
Insider Diversity 1.96 1.85 1.27 1.02 2.66 
Female Diversity 2.10 1.99 1.53 0.75 3.03 
Board-CEO Distance 0.47 0.41 0.25 0.29 0.57 
Independent Distance 0.83 0.64 0.62 0.45 0.98 
AuditCom Distance 1.82 1.42 1.36 0.93 2.26 
Insider Distance 1.43 0.99 1.24 0.52 2.04 
Female Distance 3.63 3.16 2.43 1.70 5.09 
Big 4 Auditor 0.97 1.00 0.17 1.00 1.00 
Analyst Following 12 11 8 6 17 
Institutional Ownership 0.69 0.73 0.23 0.57 0.85 
LT InstOwn 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.24 
ST InstOwn 0.29 0.28 0.14 0.19 0.38 
Churn Rate 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.07 
      
 
Notes: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the key variables used in my analyses. 
The overall sample contains 33,225 firm-quarter observations from 1,410 firms over the 
1993–2015 period. Variable definitions and sources are in Table 3.1.  
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0 Agriculture and Forestry 136 0.41 0.41 
1 Mining and Construction 3,462 10.42 10.83 
2 Light Manufacturing 8,108 24.4 35.23 
3 Heavy Manufacturing 9,591 28.87 64.10 
4 Communications and Electronics 3,290 9.90 74.00 
5 Wholesale and Retail Trade 4,350 13.09 87.09 
7 Business Service 3,074 9.25 96.35 
8 Other Service 1,138 3.43 99.77 
9 Public Administration 76 0.23 100 
Total  33,225 100  
     
 
Notes: Panel B reports descriptive statistics using one-digit SIC industry classification 
codes. The overall sample contains 33,252 firm-quarter observations from 1,410 firms over 
the 1993–2015 period. Variable definitions and sources are in Table 3.1.  
 
 







Panel C. Pearson Correlation 
  1. 2. 3.  4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
1. Spread                
2. Rating -0.51               
3. EPU 0.20 -0.08              
4. InstOwn  -0.12 -0.04 0.12             
5. Size -0.33 0.61 0.08 0.15            
6. Leverage 0.32 -0.41 -0.04 -0.28 -0.41           
7. Perform -0.29 0.37 -0.06 0.02 0.13 -0.12          
8. Sale Gr -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.22         
9. CF Vol 0.21 -0.38 0.04 -0.03 -0.25 0.16 -0.13 0.04        
10. MTB -0.12 0.12 -0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.08 0.14 0.02 0.02       
11. Maturity -0.20 0.26 -0.06 -0.02 0.26 -0.15 0.06 -0.00 -0.12 0.02      
12. Age -0.04 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.29 -0.18 0.03 -0.05 -0.13 0.03 0.11     
13. HighYield 0.47 -0.81 0.03 -0.03 -0.57 0.44 -0.28 0.04 0.26 -0.13 -0.29 -0.22    
14. Call 0.13 -0.17 0.05 0.05 -0.00 0.15 -0.05 -0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.27   
15. Diversity 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04  
16. Distance 0.11 -0.20 0.04 0.12 -0.15 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.14 0.04 0.34 
 
Notes: Panel C provides Pearson correlation for the key variables used in my analyses. The overall sample contains 33,225 firm-
quarter observations from 1,410 firms over the 1993–2015 period. Variable definitions and sources are in Table 3.1. Correlation 
coefficients in bold indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 















Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Placebo 
Test 
 First Stage Second Stage 
 Polariz. PCI Polariz. PCI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EPU 0.632a 0.640a 0.620a      
 (7.025) (5.883) (7.631)      
Instrument    1.020b 0.307a    
    (2.08) (3.00)    
𝐸𝑃?̃?      0.647a 0.433a  
      (4.51) (3.02)  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃         -0.009 
        (-0.087) 
Institutional 
Ownership -0.271a -0.041 -0.410a -0.956 -0.304a -0.348 -0.306a -0.317a 
 (-3.680) (-0.369) (-4.628) (-1.60) (-4.98) (-0.60) (-5.07) (-43.649) 
Firm Size -0.015 -0.072b 0.054c 0.377a -0.017 0.348a 0.016 0.067a 
 (-0.562) (-2.023) (1.785) (3.49) (-0.76) (3.14) (0.74) (22.90) 
Firm Leverage 0.812a 0.470a 0.863a -2.014c 0.858a -1.392 0.895a 0.931a 
 (8.098) (2.789) (7.528) (-1.88) (17.88) (-1.33) (16.71) (112.34) 
Firm Performance -4.284a -3.473a -4.211a -13.069b -4.738a -12.474b -4.792a -4.785a 
 (-9.575) (-4.727) (-7.889) (-2.09) (-13.40) (-2.03) (-13.06) (-131.385) 
Sales Growth 0.002 -0.017 -0.011 -0.117 -0.028 -0.191 -0.041 -0.047a 
 (0.044) (-0.254) (-0.291) (-0.24) (-0.55) (-0.39) (-0.77) (-12.35) 
Cash Flow Volatility 1.095b 1.738b 1.270b 11.486a 1.155a 11.480a 1.124a 1.202a 
 (2.146) (2.412) (2.179) (3.33) (4.80) (3.37) (4.65) (55.62) 
Market-to-Book -0.006a -0.005b -0.007a -0.060c -0.007a -0.050 -0.007a -0.007a 
 (-4.579) (-2.314) (-4.606) (-1.81) (-7.19) (-1.53) (-7.32) (-59.71) 
Credit Rating  -0.039a -0.112a -0.028a 0.243a -0.035a 0.241a -0.035a -0.033a 
 (-4.156) (-10.024) (-3.236) (3.14) (-6.89) (3.22) (-6.75) (-62.62) 







Bond Maturity 0.006 0.019a -0.022b -0.037 0.007a -0.039 0.007a 0.005a 
 (1.624) (6.719) (-2.252) (-1.55) (2.89) (-1.60) (2.67) (39.84) 
Bond Age 0.045a 0.039a 0.032a -0.028 0.047a -0.005 0.050a 0.055a 
 (8.130) (6.469) (2.776) (-0.54) (14.48) (-0.11) (15.30) (159.89) 
High Yield 0.361a   0.210 0.411a 0.033 0.413a 0.424a 
 (8.366)   (0.61) (19.60) (0.10) (19.31) (186.162) 
Callability 0.126b 0.099 0.174b -0.293c 0.085c -0.274b 0.090c 0.095a 
 (2.485) (1.623) (2.582) (-1.85) (1.81) (-2.00) (1.82) (18.43) 
         
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,225 16,247 16,960      
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.688 0.555 0.474      
F-Statistic    4.87 5.70  
 
Notes: Variable definitions are in Table 3.1. This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield spreads 
on economic policy uncertainty and various control variables. Models 1–3 provide regression results for my main, investment grade, 
and non-investment grade debt specifications. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Quarter and firm fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and calendar quarters 
are in parentheses. I also provide results of regressions addressing endogeneity of policy uncertainty using instrumental variable analysis. 
Models 4 and 5 report results of the first-stage regression using Polarization and Partisan Conflict indices as instruments. Specifically, 
I regress monthly news-based EPU on each instrumental variables with the collapsed means of all control variables by each time period, 
controlling for quarter fixed effects. Models 6 and 7 report results of the second-stage regression, which uses the predicted estimates 
from the first-stage regressions. Model 8 shows the results from placebo test where I replace the true EPU values with Placebo EPU 
and report the average coefficient estimates. The notations *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  







Table 3.4 EPU, Board Cultural Diversity, and Cost of Debt 
 Dependent Variable = Log (Yield Spread) 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPU 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.164*** 0.213*** 0.196*** 
 (6.331) (6.311) (6.311) (6.328) (6.328) (6.305) (3.584) (7.371) (5.253) 
Diversity -0.018     -0.015 -0.026 -0.013 -0.002 
 (-1.225)     (-1.105) (-1.058) (-0.636) (-0.080) 
EPU × Diversity -0.018**     -0.014** -0.013 0.005 -0.006 
 (-2.626)     (-2.142) (-1.327) (0.487) (-0.717) 
IDV Diversity  -0.002        
  (-0.133)        
EPU × IDV Div.  -0.023***        
  (-3.194)        
UAI Diversity   -0.004       
   (-0.283)       
EPU × UAI Div.   -0.005       
   (-0.824)       
PDI Diversity    -0.017      
    (-1.121)      
EPU × PDI Div.    -0.019**      
    (-2.521)      
MAS Diversity     -0.027**     
     (-2.098)     
EPU × MAS Div.     -0.007     
     (-1.144)     
InstOwn. -0.129 -0.128 -0.128 -0.130 -0.126 -0.120 0.121 -0.092 -0.109 
 (-1.276) (-1.258) (-1.266) (-1.292) (-1.239) (-1.186) (1.041) (-0.624) (-0.826) 







Firm Size -0.057 -0.058 -0.057 -0.055 -0.057 -0.058 -0.368*** 0.053 -0.199*** 
 (-1.533) (-1.575) (-1.534) (-1.501) (-1.534) (-1.563) (-4.162) (1.066) (-3.429) 
Leverage 0.908*** 0.896*** 0.899*** 0.906*** 0.900*** 0.912*** 0.584** 1.015*** 0.846*** 
 (6.741) (6.675) (6.668) (6.761) (6.663) (6.670) (2.357) (5.742) (4.057) 
Performance -4.034*** -4.039*** -4.049*** -4.041*** -4.037*** -4.013*** -3.140*** -3.197*** -4.146*** 
 (-7.191) (-7.204) (-7.204) (-7.188) (-7.185) (-7.050) (-3.634) (-4.944) (-4.614) 
Sales Gr -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.036 -0.039 0.034 
 (-0.104) (-0.088) (-0.119) (-0.106) (-0.126) (-0.105) (-0.403) (-0.983) (0.539) 
CF Vol 1.361* 1.380* 1.415* 1.399* 1.380* 1.404* 1.831* -0.486 2.667** 
 (1.856) (1.867) (1.905) (1.893) (1.865) (1.908) (1.745) (-0.461) (2.005) 
MTB -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.004 -0.005** 
 (-2.883) (-2.859) (-2.849) (-2.878) (-2.879) (-2.827) (-2.051) (-1.575) (-2.388) 
Rating  -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 0.011 -0.086*** -0.055*** 
 (-3.132) (-3.103) (-3.104) (-3.117) (-3.176) (-3.102) (0.728) (-4.723) (-2.870) 
Maturity 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.009 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (2.529) (2.533) (2.532) (2.545) (2.560) (2.552) (1.096) (3.168) (3.778) 
Bond Age 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (6.694) (6.665) (6.671) (6.667) (6.751) (6.806) (3.647) (3.105) (3.522) 
High Yield 0.361*** 0.364*** 0.363*** 0.361*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.370*** 0.283*** 0.225*** 
 (7.261) (7.292) (7.294) (7.290) (7.195) (7.205) (4.970) (3.436) (2.804) 
Callability 0.119** 0.118** 0.116** 0.120** 0.118** 0.116** 0.038 0.102 0.147** 
 (2.083) (2.067) (2.038) (2.096) (2.064) (2.022) (0.271) (1.452) (2.111) 
          
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,447 11,001 7,706 7,760 
Adj. R2 0.649 0.650 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.648 0.582 0.756 0.667 
 
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield spreads on economic policy uncertainty. 
Column 1 examines the interaction of economic policy uncertainty with composite cultural diversity within the board. Columns 2–5 
present the results from interacting economic policy uncertainty with board diversity regarding each of the cultural dimensions. Columns 







6 and 7 report the results from using the interaction of diversity within the independent board members and audit committee members. 
Columns 8 and 9 report the results from using the interaction of diversity with respect to insider directors and female directors. I replace 
all diversity variables and EPU with standardized values that have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to make interpreting the 
coefficient on the interaction term easier. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Variable definitions are in Table 3.1. t-statistics from 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. All specifications are run using 
firm and seasonal fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 







Table 3.5 EPU, CEO-Board Cultural Distance, and Cost of Debt 
 Dependent Variable = Log (Yield Spread) 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPU 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.161*** 0.216*** 0.195*** 
 (6.315) (6.302) (6.325) (6.315) (6.321) (6.333) (3.551) (7.102) (5.268) 
Cultural Distance -0.009     -0.006 -0.029 -0.001 0.010 
 (-0.617)     (-0.410) (-1.267) (-0.058) (0.445) 
EPU × CD -0.018**     -0.002 -0.041*** 0.001 0.014 
 (-2.214)     (-0.198) (-3.390) (0.061) (1.520) 
IDV CD  -0.003        
  (-0.186)        
EPU × IDV CD  -0.018**        
  (-2.214)        
UAI CD   -0.021       
   (-1.336)       
EPU × UAI CD   -0.011       
   (-1.565)       
PDI CD    -0.016      
    (-1.060)      
EPU × PDI CD    -0.016**      
    (-2.012)      
MAS CD     -0.007     
     (-0.621)     
EPU × MAS CD     -0.011     
     (-1.447)     
InstOwn. -0.130 -0.129 -0.126 -0.128 -0.130 -0.128 0.110 -0.075 -0.117 
 (-1.293) (-1.269) (-1.242) (-1.272) (-1.288) (-1.242) (0.941) (-0.619) (-0.873) 







Firm Size -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 -0.057 -0.058 -0.060 -0.370*** 0.002 -0.200*** 
 (-1.576) (-1.585) (-1.598) (-1.545) (-1.555) (-1.610) (-4.172) (0.046) (-3.489) 
Leverage 0.895*** 0.897*** 0.893*** 0.896*** 0.895*** 0.907*** 0.552** 0.920*** 0.844*** 
 (6.625) (6.654) (6.630) (6.662) (6.618) (6.621) (2.253) (5.571) (3.999) 
Performance -4.037*** -4.047*** -4.037*** -4.030*** -4.040*** -4.009*** -3.113*** -4.245*** -4.104*** 
 (-7.190) (-7.182) (-7.208) (-7.180) (-7.189) (-7.078) (-3.569) (-6.988) (-4.600) 
Sales Gr -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.036 0.018 0.034 
 (-0.124) (-0.112) (-0.118) (-0.128) (-0.128) (-0.110) (-0.405) (0.441) (0.528) 
CF Vol 1.409* 1.425* 1.439* 1.437* 1.402* 1.455* 1.824* 0.259 2.712** 
 (1.930) (1.921) (1.953) (1.946) (1.920) (1.951) (1.792) (0.283) (2.071) 
MTB -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.004* -0.005** 
 (-2.888) (-2.898) (-2.934) (-2.877) (-2.843) (-2.776) (-2.078) (-1.790) (-2.374) 
Rating  -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.012 -0.050*** -0.055*** 
 (-3.107) (-3.101) (-3.106) (-3.106) (-3.113) (-3.049) (0.809) (-3.422) (-2.913) 
Maturity 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.009 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (2.547) (2.559) (2.524) (2.527) (2.558) (2.539) (1.111) (3.968) (3.875) 
Bond Age 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.034*** 
 (6.621) (6.654) (6.629) (6.596) (6.662) (6.798) (3.650) (4.622) (3.586) 
High Yield 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.362*** 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.365*** 0.378*** 0.339*** 0.219*** 
 (7.305) (7.295) (7.261) (7.310) (7.281) (7.300) (5.093) (5.479) (2.819) 
Callability 0.117** 0.117** 0.118** 0.118** 0.117** 0.114* 0.019 0.109* 0.148** 
 (2.052) (2.053) (2.067) (2.061) (2.046) (1.988) (0.134) (1.723) (2.096) 
          
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,444 10,963 13,219 7,741 
Adj. R2 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.647 0.584 0.694 0.668 
 
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield spreads on economic policy uncertainty. 
Column 1 examines the interaction of economic policy uncertainty with composite cultural distance between the CEO and the board 
members. Columns 2–5 present the results from interacting economic policy uncertainty with CEO-board distance regarding each of the 







cultural dimensions. Columns 6 and 7 report the results from using the interaction of distance between the CEO and independent board 
members, and CEO and audit committee members. Columns 8 and 9 report the results from using the interaction of distance with respect 
to insider directors and female directors. I replace all distance variables and EPU with standardized values that have a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1 to make interpreting the coefficient on the interaction term easier. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Variable 
definitions are in Table 3.1. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in 
parentheses. All specifications are run using firm and seasonal fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
     
161 
Table 3.6 EPU, Board Characteristics, and Cost of Debt 
 
 Dependent Variable = Log (Yield Spread) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EPU 0.204*** 0.190*** 0.202*** 0.182*** 0.204*** 
 (6.422) (6.065) (6.317) (5.541) (6.394) 
Board Independence -0.012     
 (-0.775)     
EPU × Independence -0.022*     
 (-1.846)     
Board Busyness  -0.064***    
  (-4.161)    
EPU × Busyness  0.027***    
  (3.221)    
Female Director %   0.021   
   (1.223)   
EPU × Female %   -0.027***   
   (-2.991)   
Board Avg Tenure    -0.031*  
    (-1.757)  
EPU × Avg Tenure    -0.014**  
    (-2.177)  
Board Avg Age     -0.044** 
     (-2.210) 
EPU × Avg Age     -0.022* 
     (-1.729) 
InstOwn. -0.133 -0.175 -0.149 -0.217* -0.135 
 (-1.299) (-1.612) (-1.444) (-1.924) (-1.350) 
Firm Size -0.058 -0.114*** -0.073** -0.121*** -0.044 
 (-1.602) (-3.120) (-2.054) (-3.127) (-1.229) 
Leverage 0.878*** 0.887*** 0.868*** 0.866*** 0.874*** 
 (6.547) (6.557) (6.481) (6.194) (6.504) 
Performance -3.985*** -4.132*** -3.945*** -3.794*** -4.025*** 
 (-7.087) (-6.816) (-7.049) (-6.521) (-7.182) 
Sales Gr -0.012 -0.016 -0.007 -0.033 -0.012 
 (-0.211) (-0.247) (-0.126) (-0.537) (-0.213) 
CF Vol 1.416* 1.259* 1.447* 1.534** 1.433* 
 (1.920) (1.747) (1.936) (2.114) (1.947) 
MTB -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (-2.826) (-2.742) (-2.964) (-3.025) (-2.764) 
Rating  -0.034*** -0.026** -0.033*** -0.021* -0.034*** 
 (-3.042) (-2.239) (-2.959) (-1.866) (-3.077) 
Maturity 0.012** 0.010** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (2.601) (2.143) (2.627) (2.412) (2.606) 
Bond Age 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 
 (6.804) (5.443) (6.561) (6.256) (6.935) 
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High Yield 0.367*** 0.363*** 0.371*** 0.373*** 0.369*** 
 (7.327) (7.147) (7.354) (7.513) (7.362) 
Callability 0.123** 0.107* 0.115** 0.109* 0.132** 
 (2.195) (1.794) (2.008) (1.792) (2.290) 
      
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,218 19,271 22,218 20,543 22,218 
Adj. R2 0.645 0.646 0.645 0.632 0.646 
 
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield 
spreads on economic policy uncertainty. Column 1 examines the interaction of economic 
policy uncertainty with board busyness. Column 2 presents the results from interacting 
economic policy uncertainty and board independence. Column 3 provides the interaction 
of economic policy uncertainty with the proportion of female directors on the board, and 
columns 4–5 examines the interactions of economic policy uncertainty and director 
experience as proxied by average age and tenure. I replace all board variables and EPU 
with standardized values that have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to make 
interpreting the coefficient on the interaction term easier. The data cover the 1993–2015 
period. Variable definitions are in Table 3.1. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. All 
specifications are run using firm and seasonal fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 







Table 3.7 Board Diversity and Other Information Intermediaries 
 
 Dependent Variable = Log (Yield Spread)   
 Auditor Analysts 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Churn Rate LT IO ST IO LT&ST IO 
Dummy 
(LT > ST) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EPU 0.204*** 0.195*** 0.204*** 0.190*** 0.207*** 0.204*** 0.207*** 0.223*** 
 (6.334) (6.241) (6.348) (8.089) (6.691) (6.413) (6.723) (7.052) 
Diversity -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 -0.009 -0.015 -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 
 (-1.258) (-0.827) (-1.212) (-0.657) (-1.056) (-1.229) (-1.057) (-1.200) 
EPU × Diversity -0.018** -0.018** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018** 
 (-2.592) (-2.584) (-2.546) (-2.574) (-2.606) (-2.651) (-2.672) (-2.637) 
Auditor 0.015        
 (0.640)        
EPU × Auditor -0.005        
 (-0.521)        
Analysts  -0.122***       
  (-4.581)       
EPU × Analysts  -0.033***       
  (-3.366)       
Inst.Own   -0.024      
   (-1.205)      
EPU × InstOwn   -0.012      
   (-1.038)      
Churn Rate    0.154***     
    (7.251)     
EPU × Churn Rate    0.043***     
    (3.132)     
LT IO     -0.044**  -0.046**  
     (-2.075)  (-2.203)  
EPU × LT IO     -0.047***  -0.046***  







     (-3.123)  (-3.075)  
ST IO      -0.000 -0.186  
      (-0.016) (-1.357)  
EPU × ST IO      0.017* 0.039  
      (1.689) (1.358)  
Dummy (LT > ST)        -0.063** 
        (-2.030) 
EPU × Dum.(LT > ST)        -0.063** 
        (-2.604) 
InstOwn. -0.127 -0.098  -0.180*     
 (-1.265) (-0.806)  (-1.799)     
Firm Size -0.057 0.021 -0.059 0.036 -0.045 -0.063* -0.045 -0.055 
 (-1.545) (0.522) (-1.596) (1.101) (-1.290) (-1.781) (-1.307) (-1.581) 
Leverage 0.909*** 1.057*** 0.906*** 1.015*** 0.924*** 0.916*** 0.922*** 0.940*** 
 (6.738) (6.636) (6.724) (7.839) (6.895) (6.910) (6.999) (7.031) 
Performance -4.046*** -3.823*** -4.029*** -4.061*** -4.017*** -4.063*** -4.012*** -4.052*** 
 (-7.227) (-6.089) (-7.187) (-8.149) (-7.245) (-7.395) (-7.367) (-7.324) 
Sales Gr -0.007 -0.024 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.005 -0.011 -0.008 
 (-0.116) (-0.388) (-0.114) (-0.155) (-0.203) (-0.081) (-0.190) (-0.146) 
CF Vol 1.343* 1.108 1.362* 0.792 1.246* 1.387* 1.235* 1.322* 
 (1.819) (1.365) (1.866) (1.128) (1.748) (1.890) (1.717) (1.832) 
MTB -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-2.877) (-2.951) (-2.899) (-1.982) (-2.779) (-2.911) (-2.752) (-2.839) 
Rating  -0.035*** -0.033** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (-3.102) (-2.503) (-3.131) (-2.703) (-3.057) (-3.053) (-3.048) (-3.071) 
Maturity 0.011** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.010** 0.011** 0.012** 0.011** 0.012** 
 (2.555) (2.772) (2.540) (2.278) (2.523) (2.571) (2.537) (2.563) 
Bond Age 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (6.748) (6.575) (6.692) (7.586) (6.771) (6.581) (6.778) (6.696) 
High Yield 0.362*** 0.338*** 0.362*** 0.371*** 0.366*** 0.361*** 0.365*** 0.363*** 
 (7.263) (6.250) (7.325) (7.475) (7.363) (7.255) (7.335) (7.278) 







Callability 0.119** 0.116** 0.119** 0.114** 0.129** 0.115** 0.131** 0.119** 
 (2.094) (2.010) (2.075) (2.318) (2.197) (1.994) (2.257) (2.053) 
         
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,625 17,818 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 
Adj. R2 0.649 0.657 0.650 0.670 0.653 0.649 0.653 0.651 
 
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield spreads on economic policy uncertainty. 
Columns 1–8 examine the interaction of economic policy uncertainty with alternative information intermediaries. I replace all variables 
used in the interaction terms with standardized values that have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to make interpreting the 
coefficient on the interaction term easier. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Variable definitions are in Table 3.1. t-statistics from 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. All specifications are run using 
firm and seasonal fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 







Table 3.8 CEO-Board Distance and Other Information Intermediaries 
 Dependent Variable = Log (Yield Spread) 
 Auditor Analysts 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Churn Rate LT IO ST IO LT & ST IO 
Dummy 
(LT > ST) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EPU 0.203*** 0.195*** 0.203*** 0.189*** 0.207*** 0.204*** 0.207*** 0.223*** 
 (6.317) (6.238) (6.335) (8.084) (6.678) (6.397) (6.708) (7.043) 
Cultural Distance -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 
 (-0.603) (-0.672) (-0.613) (0.070) (-0.450) (-0.617) (-0.435) (-0.548) 
EPU × Distance -0.018** -0.016** -0.017** -0.020** -0.017** -0.020** -0.018** -0.019** 
 (-2.223) (-2.028) (-2.068) (-2.400) (-2.133) (-2.413) (-2.361) (-2.335) 
Auditor 0.015        
 (0.637)        
EPU × Auditor -0.005        
 (-0.569)        
Analysts  -0.121***       
  (-4.572)       
EPU × Analysts  -0.035***       
  (-3.494)       
Inst.Own   -0.024      
   (-1.226)      
EPU × InstOwn   -0.011      
   (-0.966)      
Churn Rate    0.153***     
    (7.249)     
EPU × Churn Rate    0.044***     
    (3.230)     
LT IO     -0.044**  -0.045**  
     (-2.061)  (-2.192)  







EPU × LT IO     -0.048***  -0.046***  
     (-3.159)  (-3.106)  
ST IO      -0.001 -0.204  
      (-0.025) (-1.508)  
EPU × ST IO      0.018* 0.043  
      (1.836) (1.507)  
Dummy (LT > ST)        -0.062** 
        (-2.022) 
EPU × Dum.(LT > ST)        -0.065*** 
        (-2.679) 
InstOwn. -0.129 -0.099  -0.182*     
 (-1.283) (-0.811)  (-1.818)     
Firm Size -0.059 0.019 -0.060 0.034 -0.047 -0.065* -0.047 -0.058 
 (-1.588) (0.468) (-1.632) (1.064) (-1.341) (-1.833) (-1.361) (-1.633) 
Leverage 0.897*** 1.043*** 0.894*** 1.007*** 0.913*** 0.904*** 0.911*** 0.928*** 
 (6.622) (6.517) (6.612) (7.739) (6.792) (6.792) (6.896) (6.918) 
Performance -4.049*** -3.825*** -4.032*** -4.067*** -4.021*** -4.066*** -4.017*** -4.055*** 
 (-7.226) (-6.086) (-7.186) (-8.163) (-7.250) (-7.402) (-7.380) (-7.328) 
Sales Gr -0.008 -0.025 -0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.006 -0.012 -0.009 
 (-0.137) (-0.398) (-0.133) (-0.173) (-0.221) (-0.100) (-0.207) (-0.165) 
CF Vol 1.392* 1.164 1.410* 0.827 1.292* 1.435* 1.280* 1.369* 
 (1.894) (1.441) (1.938) (1.185) (1.819) (1.966) (1.788) (1.909) 
MTB -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-2.883) (-2.979) (-2.900) (-2.017) (-2.794) (-2.920) (-2.769) (-2.857) 
Rating  -0.035*** -0.032** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.035*** 
 (-3.076) (-2.497) (-3.108) (-2.678) (-3.033) (-3.026) (-3.023) (-3.043) 
Maturity 0.011** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.010** 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (2.574) (2.773) (2.557) (2.307) (2.544) (2.594) (2.561) (2.584) 
Bond Age 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (6.674) (6.498) (6.622) (7.546) (6.712) (6.504) (6.716) (6.623) 
High Yield 0.365*** 0.339*** 0.365*** 0.374*** 0.369*** 0.364*** 0.367*** 0.366*** 







 (7.306) (6.267) (7.362) (7.503) (7.398) (7.300) (7.373) (7.319) 
Callability 0.118** 0.115* 0.117** 0.113** 0.127** 0.114* 0.129** 0.118** 
 (2.063) (1.988) (2.045) (2.288) (2.168) (1.965) (2.230) (2.023) 
         
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,625 17,818 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 20,646 
Adj. R2 0.649 0.657 0.649 0.670 0.653 0.649 0.653 0.651 
 
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of corporate yield spreads on economic policy uncertainty. 
Columns 1–8 examine the interaction of economic policy uncertainty with alternative information intermediaries. I replace all variables 
used in the interaction terms with standardized values that have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to make interpreting the 
coefficient on the interaction term easier. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Variable definitions are in Table 3.1. t-statistics from 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. All specifications are run using 
firm and seasonal fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.9 Placebo Tests 









Dependent Variable = Log (Yield Spread) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 
 (-0.062) (-0.050) (-0.087) (-0.065) 
Board Characteristic -0.008 -0.002 -0.010 -0.036 
 (-0.128) (-0.034) (-0.037) (-0.381) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  × Board  0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.063) (0.036) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,646 20,447 20,646 10,963 
 











Dependent Variable = Log (Yield Spread) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.007 





Board Characteristic 0.287 -1.248 0.533 -0.006 -0.003 





𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 𝐸𝑃𝑈̃  × Board  -0.009 0.001 -0.012 -0.000 -0.000 







       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,218 19,271 22,218 20,543 22,218 
 
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates from implementing placebo tests for all the 
board characteristic variables used in Tables 4–6. Average coefficients from a hundred 
estimations of coefficients from replacing EPU with Placebo EPU are reported. The data 
cover the 1993–2015 period. Variable definitions are in Table 3.1. t-statistics from White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in 
parentheses. All specifications are run using firm and seasonal fixed effects. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 





 This dissertation investigates the role of corporate governance in ensuring the 
reliability of financial reporting, from equity investors’ as well as creditors’ perspectives. 
In particular, I employ a cross-country setting and cultural components to reveal that 
monitoring and governance by various actors contribute to higher reporting quality. The 
robust findings of three essays add to the literature of corporate governance, financial 
transparency, and international finance. 
 Extant research identifies significant improvements in reporting quality resulting 
from monitoring constraints by governance mechanisms. However, there is limited 
empirical evidence on how industry- and economy-wide factors influence financial 
reporting quality, and what role governance mechanisms play in this relation. In Chapter 
1, I fill this gap in the literature by examining the relation between policy-induced 
economic uncertainty and accounting quality in a cross-country setting. In response to an 
increase in policy-induced economic uncertainty, investors may increase their attention to 
and acquisition of firm-specific information. Facing greater investor attention and 
tightened monitoring of corporate actions, managers should reduce earnings management 
and report more informative earnings. To empirically test the relation between policy 
uncertainty and accounting quality, we employ a large sample of firms from 19 countries 
over the 1990–2015 period and find strong evidence that accounting quality is positively 
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related to policy uncertainty. Moreover, we find that the increased attention to firm-specific 
information and increased demand for transparency during periods of high policy 
uncertainty, driven by the presence of short-term institutional investors, induces managers 
to improve accounting quality. We further find evidence that high accounting quality can 
mitigate the negative effects of policy uncertainty on corporate investment and valuation. 
Moreover, we find that the relation between policy uncertainty and earnings transparency 
is more pronounced under stronger legal institutions and financial reporting environment, 
and when firms are more subject to external financing needs. This study is important 
because it provides new evidence on the economic outcomes of policy uncertainty and 
offers new insights into undertaking a comprehensive analysis of accounting quality. 
 Chapter 2 explores the topic of shareholder inattention and shows that investor 
inattention in the equity market adversely affects security prices in the bond market. 
Because bondholders have limited upside potential but bear downside risk in their 
investment, bond yields are determined by the inability of firms to meet their debt 
obligations and are sensitive to institutional monitoring. In line with this observation, we 
find that the effect of institutional investor inattention on the cost of debt is stronger under 
firm characteristics more conducive to managerial opportunism. In addition, we find that 
while institutional dual holders and bond covenants attenuate the effect of distraction, they 
do not eliminate it. Taken together, these findings provide evidence that a temporary 
loosening of monitoring constraints by institutional investors has a distinct, negative 
incremental effect on bondholders. While a large strand of the literature has explored the 
effect of investor inattention on stock prices and corporate outcomes, no prior research has 
examined the effects of limited shareholder attention at the retail and institutional levels on 
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bond pricing. This paper extends the literature by showing that shareholder inattention 
contains information beyond the previously identified determinants of debt pricing.  
 Chapter 3 examines whether director characteristics mitigate the adverse effect of 
policy-induced uncertainty on the cost of debt financing. Boards of directors serve the 
interests of different stakeholders and are consequential to the integrity of the financial 
accounting process. However, while the existing research investigates how boards of 
directors respond to managerial misconduct at the firm level, it overlooks the question of 
how valuable directors’ monitoring is in bad times, and especially in periods of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Using periods of high policy uncertainty as a setting, I extend 
the literature and find novel evidence that more culturally diverse boards and boards with 
larger cultural distance from the CEO can alleviate the adverse impact of policy uncertainty 
on debt financing costs. Using my hand-collected measures of board cultural diversity and 
distance from tracing cultural backgrounds and ancestral roots at the director level, I 
broaden our understanding of how board diversity affects firms’ performance.
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CHAPTER 1 ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY INDEX 
Measuring economic uncertainty induced by regulatory and political systems is a 
challenge for two primary reasons. First, it is not clear which events should be classified 
as causing policy-induced uncertainty, or how to measure the degree an event may cause. 
Second, it is difficult to disentangle policy-induced uncertainty from general 
macroeconomic uncertainty. To overcome these challenges, we employ BBD’s (2016) 
index of aggregate policy uncertainty.36 
Using a computer-automated search of newspapers, BBD (2016) measure policy 
uncertainty by counting the number of articles in a country’s major newspapers that contain 
the terms “uncertain” or “uncertainty” and “economic” or “economy,” as well as at least 
one policy-relevant term, such as “Congress,” “deficit,” “Federal Reserve,” “legislation,” 
“regulation,” or “White House” in the newspaper’s native language. Differences in the 
supervising agency’s name (e.g., “Bank of Japan” for Japan), as well as terms specific to a 
nation (e.g., “customs duties” for India) are accounted for, as well as abbreviations and 
term variants such as “uncertainties” and “regulatory.”  
After obtaining raw monthly counts by newspaper, BBD (2016) scale the counts by 
the total number of articles in each newspaper-month to control for differences in volume
 
36 We focus on the news-based aggregate BBD (2016) index as our measure of policy-
induced economic uncertainty because other index components related to policy categories 
(e.g., monetary, fiscal) are not available for the international sample. 
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over time and across newspapers. Then they standardize each newspaper’s monthly scaled 
series of counts to a unit standard deviation and take the average of the numbers across 
newspapers, so each country has one representative monthly series. Each country’s series 
is normalized to have a mean of 100. BBD (2016) show that the resulting index captures 
clear spikes around important policy-relevant events, such as the Gulf Wars and the debt 
ceiling dispute in the summer of 2011. The index is not necessarily correlated with political 
events that have mild economic consequences. 
Given concerns that their measure could be associated with potential biases in terms 
of accuracy and reliability, BBD (2016) conduct various validation tests, and show that 
their index captures the overall level of policy-induced uncertainty. First, they use human 
audits of newspapers under close supervision and training, and verify that their computer-
automated search is strongly correlated with the results of a human-generated index. 
Second, they ensure that a newspaper’s political slant does not significantly affect index 
reliability. Using the media slant index of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), they divide 
newspapers based on inclination toward a left or right viewpoint, and compare the “left” 
and “right” versions of the index. Regardless of newspapers’ political slant, BBD (2016) 
find that their index does not distort variations in policy uncertainty over time. Third, they 
compare their index to other reasonable measures of economic uncertainty, such as the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, and indicators based on an analysis of 
the Beige Book and 10-K filings. They confirm that their index is distinct in scope from 
other indicators, and that it contains information about policy-related economic uncertainty, 
as opposed to general financial uncertainty and stock market events. 
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Commercial data providers such as Bloomberg, Haver Analytics, and Reuters carry 
the BBD index, which highlights its relevance. Following Gulen and Ion (2016), we define 
policy-induced economic uncertainty, or economic policy uncertainty (EPU), as the natural 
logarithm of the average BBD (2016) index over the 12 months of a firm’s fiscal year. 
  







CHAPTER 1 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 




2) Accounting quality estimated from Nikolaev’s (2018) model. Authors’ calculation based 
on the Nikolaev (2018) 





2)) Proportion of the variance of accruals explained by the managed error 







2)) Proportion of the variance of accruals explained by the managed error 
component of accruals, estimated from the earnings management model in 
Nikolaev (2018). 
As above 
EPU Natural logarithm of the average of the monthly policy uncertainty index 
over the 12 months ending in the month of the fiscal year-end. 
Authors’ calculation based 
on BBD (2016) 
EPU_DURATION For each firm, the number of consecutive months during the fiscal year in 
which the country’s EPU index is above the 80th percentile for the country.  
As above 
Government Dependence  Industry-level share of production that is consumed by the government. 2005 OECD Structural 
Analysis Input-Output tables 
   






Total Accruals Negative sum of the decrease in accounts receivable, decrease in inventory, 
increase in accounts payable and accrued liabilities, net change in other 
assets and liabilities, and increase in accrued income taxes, scaled by total 
assets. 
Authors’ calculation based 
on data from Compustat 
AbsDA Absolute value of abnormal accruals, estimated based on the modified Jones 
model adjusted for performance as in Kothari et al. (2005). 
As above 
GDP_GR Real GDP growth rate for the year. WDI 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Authors’ calculation based 
on data from Compustat 
OPT_CYCLE Natural logarithm of the sum of days in receivable and days in inventory. As above 
CF_VOL 5-year standard deviation of cash flow to total assets. As above 
SALES_VOL 5-year standard deviation of sales to total assets. As above 
SG_VOL 5-year standard deviation of annual sales growth rate. As above 
LEV Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. As above 
SALES_GR Annual sales growth rate. As above 
DAY_PAYABLE 360 divided by the ratio of average accounts payable to cost of goods sold. As above 
LOSS Indicator equal to 1 if a firm reports a loss, and 0 otherwise. As above 
ROA Ratio of operating income to total assets. As above 
ELECTION Election indicator equal to 1 if national elections take place during the fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. We only include national elections associated with the 
selection of the chief executive for which the timing of elections is 
exogenously specified by electoral law. 
DPI 






WUI Measure of economic uncertainty constructed based on the frequency count 
of the word “uncertainty” and its variants in quarterly Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) country reports. 
Ahir et al. (2018) 
REPORTING_FREQ Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports at a quarterly frequency, and 
0 otherwise. 
Authors’ calculation based 
on data from Compustat 
EARN_VOL 5-year standard deviation of a firm’s annual earnings. As above 
RET_VOL Standard deviation of the past 12 monthly stock returns for each firm-year. As above 
INDUSTRY_SHOCK First principal component from seven economic shock variables 
(profitability, asset turnover, R&D, capital expenditures, employee growth, 
ROA, and sales growth) calculated for each industry-year. For each year, we 
take the industry median of the absolute change in each variable. 
As above 
SD_SALES_GR Cross-sectional standard deviation of sales growth, calculated for each 
country-year, using the entire Compustat universe. 
As above 
SD_RET Cross-sectional standard deviation of cumulative returns over the past 12 
months, calculated for each country. 
As above 
IFRS_DUMMY Indicator equal to 1 for post-IFRS adoption years, and 0 otherwise. www.ifrs.org 
R_GDP_F Real GDP growth rate forecast based on an assessment of the economic 
climate in individual countries and the world economy using a combination 
of model-based analyses and expert judgment. It is measured as a year-over-
year growth rate. 
OECD 
CCI Consumer confidence index based on households’ plans for major purchases 
and economic situation, both currently and in the immediate future. Opinions 
compared to a “normal” state are collected, with the difference between 
positive and negative answers providing a qualitative index on economic 
conditions. 
As above 






CLI Composite leading indicator of turning points in business cycles showing a 
fluctuation in economic activity around its long-term potential level. The 
index summarizes short-term economic movements in qualitative rather than 
quantitative terms. 
As above 
CAPITAL_INV Capital expenditures scaled by lagged sales. Authors’ calculation based 
on data from Compustat 
R&D Research and development expenditures scaled by lagged sales. We replace 
missing R&D values with 0. 
As above 
R&D_DUMMY Indicator equal to 1 if research and development expenditures is missing (and 
set to 0), and 0 otherwise. 
As above 
SECURITIES_ISSUE Indicator equal to 1 if the sum of firm-level equity and debt issuance scaled 
by lagged total assets is greater than 1%, and 0 otherwise. 
As above 
IPOs Number of primary common share issues on main markets for each country-
year. 
Hanselaar, Stulz, and van 
Dijk (2019) 
Political Fractionalization The Fractionalization index gives the probability that two deputies picked 
from the legislature at random will be of different parties. 
DPI 
Veto Player Drop % Percentage of veto players who drop from the government in any given year. As above 
Income Smoothing Negative value of the correlation between changes in discretionary accruals 
and pre-discretionary income over the current year and the past four years 
for each firm, based on Tucker and Zarowin (2006). 
Authors’ calculation based 
on data from Compustat 
Earnings Predictability Negative value of the square root of variance from an auto-regressive model 
of order 1 (AR1) for annual ROA, using rolling ten-year windows, based on 
Lipe (1990). 
As above 






Earnings Persistence Slope coefficient estimate from an auto-regressive model of order 1 (AR1) 
for annual ROA, using rolling ten-year windows, based on previous research 
(e.g., Ali and Zarowin 1992; Francis et al. 2004). 
As above 
AQ Accruals quality estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) over 
five years. 
As above 
AbsAbnCFO Absolute value of abnormal cash flows from operations estimated following 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
As above 
Political Risk Share of the quarterly earnings conference calls of individual firms devoted 
to political risks 
Hassan et al. (2019) 
STIO Short-term institutional ownership, where short-term institutional 
investors are those who have average churn rates in the top tercile of all 
institutional investors. 
As above 
LTIO Long-term institutional ownership, where long-term institutional 
investors are those who have average churn rates in the bottom tercile of 




Measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders. The index is calculated as the sum of 
(1) the vote by mail index, (2) the shares not blocked or deposited index, 
(3) the cumulative voting index, (4) the oppressed minority index, (5) the 
pre-emptive rights index, and (6) the capital index. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
Legal Enforcement Measure of quality of the judicial system in enforcing the legal standards, 
as in Leuz et al. (2003), calculated as the arithmetic mean of the efficiency 
of the judicial system index, the assessment of rule of law index, and the 
corruption index of La Porta et al. (1998). 
Leuz et al. (2003) 






Ownership Concentration The median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Opacity Index measuring the degree to which there is a lack of clear, accurate, 
easily discernible, and widely accepted practices governing the 
relationships among businesses, investors, and governments. 
Kurtzman et al. (2004) 
Accounting Standards Accounting standards index of La Porta et al. (1998), rating firms’ 1990 
annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Litigation Risk Index of auditor-specific litigation risk for each country. Wingate (1997) 
MTB Market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Compustat 
External Finance 
Dependence 
Capital expenditures less funds from operations, divided by capital 
expenditures. When funds from operations is missing, it is defined as the 
sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, 
deferred taxes, equity in net loss/earnings, sale of property, plant, and 
equipment, investment gain/loss, and other funds from operations, as in 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
As above 
 
Notes: This appendix contains variable definitions used in Chapter 1. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails 
of the distribution.







CHAPTER 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
























































































Australia 7,615 0.27 4.55 2.92 4.35 0.21 0.23 0.27 1.96 0.12 0.28 1.93 0.33 -0.06 
Brazil 2,602 0.15 4.85 2.81 6.43 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.48 0.19 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.06 
Canada 9,189 0.22 4.71 2.36 5.38 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.83 0.17 0.17 0.61 0.23 -0.02 
Chile 1,838 0.13 4.57 3.88 5.85 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.34 0.17 0.09 0.32 0.05 0.06 
China 25,561 0.18 4.83 9.17 5.87 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.47 0.06 0.20 0.65 0.11 0.04 
France 5,317 0.15 5.03 1.03 6.07 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.38 0.14 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.04 
Germany 5,916 0.19 4.80 1.29 5.73 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.40 0.13 0.09 0.25 0.13 0.03 
India 25,374 0.22 4.57 7.62 3.82 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.73 0.17 0.17 1.27 0.11 0.07 
Ireland 371 0.15 4.73 2.68 6.59 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.51 0.20 0.11 0.30 0.13 0.04 
Italy 1,917 0.13 4.65 -0.35 6.48 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.44 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.03 
Japan 40,338 0.16 4.59 0.76 6.16 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 
Korea 7,449 0.16 4.74 3.74 6.04 0.01 0.08 0.17 0.34 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.04 
Netherlands 1,098 0.17 4.55 1.11 6.88 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.34 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Russia 1,518 0.17 4.91 2.24 6.95 0.03 0.11 0.25 0.75 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.07 
Singapore 5,472 0.16 4.65 5.66 4.74 0.05 0.13 0.23 0.62 0.08 0.14 0.34 0.19 0.02 






Spain 1,084 0.15 4.57 0.71 7.17 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 
Sweden 3,723 0.19 4.49 2.13 4.74 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.79 0.13 0.16 1.38 0.24 -0.02 
U.K. 8,439 0.19 5.00 1.37 5.32 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.71 0.13 0.12 0.84 0.17 0.02 
U.S. 88,733 0.17 4.64 2.60 5.28 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.52 0.20 0.13 0.53 0.20 -0.00 
All countries 243,554 0.18 4.67 3.47 5.40 0.06 0.11 0.20 0.54 0.15 0.13 0.50 0.15 0.02 
 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample used in the analysis of discretionary accruals. We report the mean values of 
the key variables by country. The sample comprises 243,554 firm-year observations from 19 countries over the 1990–2015 period. We 
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. 
 
 







CHAPTER 1 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, FREEDOM ON THE INTERNET, AND PRESS CIRCULATION 
 Press Freedom Internet Freedom Internet Users Newspaper Circulation 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Dependent variable = AbsDA         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EPU -0.019** -0.063*** 0.014 -0.076*** -0.000 -0.059*** -0.002 -0.061*** 
 (-2.57) (-7.12) (1.31) (-4.03) (-0.00) (-7.38) (-0.18) (-8.02) 
         
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 98,494 133,299 29,053 28,107 98,219 100,213 105,363 85,367 
Adjusted R2 16.8% 18.2% 17.9% 24.3% 17.2% 21.4% 22.4% 15.4% 
         
Difference in the 
coefficients on EPU 
-0.044*** -0.090*** -0.059*** -0.060*** 
(High – Low) (-3.81) (-4.16) (-4.94) (-4.88) 
 
Notes: This table reports regression results of subsample analyses based on freedom of the press, freedom on the Internet, and media 
circulation. We divide the sample into high and low subsamples using country-level median values of each index (Press Freedom, Internet 
Freedom, Internet Users, and Newspaper Circulation) and examine the relation between earnings management and policy uncertainty in 
each subsample. Press Freedom is an index of country-level print, broadcast, and digital media independence, obtained from Freedom 
House. This index evaluates the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors that 
affect access to news and information. Net Freedom is an index of country-level online freedom, obtained from Freedom House. This index 






evaluates the obstacles to access to the Internet, limits on content, and violations of user rights online. Internet Users is defined as a 
percentage of individuals using the Internet divided by population, obtained from WDI. Newspaper Circulation is measured as circulation 
of daily newspapers divided by population, from Dyck and Zingales (2004). In columns (1), (3), (5), and (7), we report results using firm-
year observations belonging to countries with low press freedom, internet freedom, internet users, and newspaper circulation, respectively. 
Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report results using firm-year observations belonging to countries with high press freedom, internet freedom, 
internet users, and newspaper circulation, respectively. The difference in the coefficients on EPU between the high and low subsamples is 
provided in the last row of the table. The dependent variable is accrual-based earnings management, AbsDA, calculated from the 
performance-augmented modified Jones model as in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). EPU is the natural logarithm of the average BBD 
policy uncertainty index over the 12-month period ending in the month of the firm’s fiscal year-end. We winsorize all continuous variables 
at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. t-statistics from robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 







CHAPTER 1 THE ROLE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL REPORTING TRANSPARENCY, 
AND EXTERNAL FINANCING NEEDS 
Panel A. Legal Institutions 
 Revised Anti-Director Legal Enforcement 
Revised Anti-Director 
× Legal Enforcement 
Ownership Concentration 
  Weak Strong  Weak Strong  Weak Strong  High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EPU -0.005 -0.039*** -0.022*** -0.037*** -0.002 -0.048*** -0.031*** -0.055*** 
 (-0.47) (-6.38) (-3.44) (-3.84) (-0.26) (-6.47) (-4.69) (-5.90) 
         
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 106,704 111,289 106,117 110,358 126,409 90,066 78,965 137,510 
Adjusted R2 22.2% 16.0% 15.6% 22.2% 21.2% 15.9% 17.1% 19.7% 
         
Difference in the 
coefficients on EPU 
-0.035*** -0.015 -0.045*** -0.024** 
(Strong – Weak) (-2.94) (-1.30) (-3.85) (-2.10) 
     
     
     






Panel B. Financial Reporting Environment 
 Opacity Accounting Standards Litigation Risk 
 High Low Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Dependent variable = AbsDA       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EPU -0.019*** -0.039*** 0.001 -0.039*** -0.006 -0.040*** 
 (-2.88) (-4.56) (0.11) (-4.44) (-0.90) (-4.09) 
 
    
  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 119,285 124,269 92,933 123,171 102,499 113,976 
Adjusted R2 16.2% 21.5% 16.0% 21.6% 15.9% 21.9% 
       
Difference in the 
coefficient on EPU 
-0.020* -0.040*** -0.034*** 
(Low–High / Strong–Weak) (-1.86) (-3.59) (-2.95) 
 




 Low High Low High 
Dependent variable = AbsDA     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPU -0.000 -0.085*** -0.009 -0.064*** 
 (-0.13) (-10.44) (-1.45) (-7.43) 
 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 92,933 150,621 129,855 113,699 
Adjusted R2 26.6% 16.4% 18.9% 22.1% 






     
Difference in the coefficient 
on EPU -0.084*** -0.056*** 
(High – Low) (-9.72) (-5.26) 
Notes: This table reports regression results of subsample analyses based on the legal institutions, financial reporting environment, and 
growth opportunities and external finance dependence. We divide the sample into weak and strong subsamples using the median values 
for each variable and examine the relation between earnings management and policy uncertainty in each subsample. Differences in the 
coefficients on EPU between the strong and weak subsamples are provided in the last row of the table. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. t-statistics from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.











   
23 Aaa+ AAA+ 
22 Aaa AAA 
21 Aa1 AA+ 
20 Aa2 AA 
19 Aa3 AA– 
18 A1 A+ 
17 A2 A 
16 A3 A– 
15 Baa1 BBB+ 
14 Baa2 BBB 
13 Baa3 BBB– 
12 Ba1 BB+ 
11 Ba2 BB 
10 Ba3 BB– 
9 B1 B+ 
8 B2 B 
7 B3 B– 
6 Caa1 CCC+ 
5 Caa2 CCC 
4 Caa3 CCC– 
3 Ca CC 
2 C C 
1 D D 
    
Notes: This table provides bond rating numerical conversions for Moody’s and S&P 
ratings. 








CHAPTER 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ROBUSTNESS 






Advertising Intensity 1.841 1.988 2.099 0.588 3.261 
Analyst Following 13.154 12.000 7.556 7.000 18.000 
Big 4 Auditor 0.984 1.000 0.126 1.000 1.000 
EIndex 3.959 4.000 1.126 3.000 5.000 
CEO Pay Mix 0.572 0.625 0.234 0.418 0.760 
 
Notes: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in Panel B below. The overall sample contains 21,403 firm-quarter 
observations from 1,097 firms over the 1993–2015 period. 
 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distraction 0.257*** 0.285*** 0.255*** 0.281*** 0.277*** 0.270*** 
 (4.847) (5.323) (4.791) (3.507) (4.836) (4.676) 
Advertising Intensity -0.004      
 (-0.378)      







Analyst Following  -0.034*     
  (-1.730)     
Big 4 Auditor   0.046    
   (0.827)    
EIndex    0.020   
    (1.230)   
CEO Pay Mix     0.014  
     (0.393)  
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
HP Industry × Quarter FE  No No No No No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,403 18,659 21,377 8,711 16,929 21,008 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.743 0.762 0.743 0.664 0.756 0.745 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of bond yield 
spreads on shareholder distraction and various alternative specifications. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Year and two-digit SIC 
code dummies are included in all regressions. HP Industry × Quarter FE is computed based on the Hoberg and Phillips industry 
classifications. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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APPENDIX H 
CHAPTER 2 COVENANT DEFINITIONS 
The Overall Covenant Index comprises three sub-indices related to the bondholder-
shareholder conflict (i.e., dividend payout, claim dilution, risk shifting, and 
underinvestment): (1) Payment Index, (2) Asset Index, and (3) Borrowing Index. Below is 
a detailed explanation of each sub-index and the covenants (dummy variables) associated 
with each index. Definitions follow Mansi et al. (2018) using bond covenant data from 
FISD.  
1. Payment Index 
a. Dividend Payment 
i. Dividends Related Payments: Flag indicating that payments made 
to shareholders or other entities may be limited to a certain 
percentage of net income or other ratio, OR 
ii. Subsidiary Dividends Related Payments: Limits the subsidiaries’ 
payment of dividends to a certain percentage of net income or 
other ratio. For captive finance subsidiaries, this provision limits 
the amount of dividends that can be paid to the parent. This 
provision protects the debtholder against a parent draining assets 
from its subsidiaries. 
b. Other Payment 
i. Restricted Payments: Restricts issuer’s freedom to make payment 
(other than dividend related payments) to shareholders and others. 
 
2. Asset Index:  
a. Transaction 
i. Transaction Affiliates: Restricts issuer in certain business dealings 
with its subsidiaries. 
b. Investment 
i. Investments: Restricts issuer’s investment policy to prevent risky 
investments, OR 
ii. Subsidiary Investments Unrestricted: Restricts subsidiaries' 
investment. 
c. Asset Sales 
i. Asset Sale Clause: Covenant requiring the issuer to use net 
proceeds from the sale of certain assets to redeem bonds at par or 
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ii. at a premium. This covenant does not limit the issuers’ right to sell 
assets, OR 
iii. Sale Assets: Restriction on the ability of an issuer to sell assets or 
restrictions on the issuer's use of the proceeds from the sale of 
assets. Such restrictions may require the issuer to apply some or all 
of the sales proceeds to the repurchase of debt through a tender 
offer or call. 
d. Asset Transfer 
i. Subsidiary Sale Assets Unrestricted: Issuer must use proceeds from 
sale of subsidiaries' assets (either certain asset sales or all asset 
sales over some threshold) to reduce debt. 
 
3. Borrowing Index 
a. Funded Debt 
i.  Subsidiary Funded Debt: Restricts issuer’s subsidiaries from 
issuing additional funded debt (debt with an initial maturity of 
longer than one year), OR 
ii. Funded Debt: Restricts issuer from issuing additional funded debt. 
Funded debt is a liability with an initial maturity of one year or 
longer. 
b. Subordinated Debt 
i. Subordinated Debt Issuance: Restricts issuance of junior or 
subordinated debt. 
c. Senior Debt 
i. Senior Debt Issuance: Restricts issuer to the amount of senior debt 
that can be issued in the future. 
d. Secured Debt 
i. Negative Pledge: The issuer cannot issue secured debt unless it 
secures the current issue on a pari passu (equal amount) basis. 
e. Indebtedness 
i. Indebtedness: Restricts user from incurring additional debt with 
limits on absolute dollar amount of debt outstanding or percentage 
total capital, OR 
ii. Subsidiary Indebtedness: Restricts total indebtedness of the 
subsidiaries, OR 
iii. Leverage Test: Restricts total indebtedness of the issuer, OR 
iv. Subsidiary Leverage Test: Limits subsidiaries' leverage. 
f. Leaseback 
i. Sales Leaseback: Restricts issuer to the type or amount of property 
used in a sale leaseback transaction (a method of raising capital in 
which an organization sells some specific assets to an entity that 
simultaneously leases the asset back to the organization for a fixed 
term and agreed-upon rate), and may restrict its use of the proceeds 
of the sale, OR 
ii. Subsidiary Sales Leaseback: Restricts subsidiaries from selling 
then leasing back assets that provide security for debtholder. This 
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provision usually requires that assets or cash equal to the property 
sold and leased back be applied to the retirement of debt in 
question or used to acquire another property to increase the 
debtholders’ security. 
g. Liens 
i. Liens: In the case of default, the debtholders have the legal right to 
sell mortgaged property to satisfy their unpaid obligations, OR 
ii. Subsidiary Liens: Restricts subsidiaries from acquiring liens on 
their property. 
h. Guarantee 
i. Subsidiary Guarantee: Restricts subsidiary from issuing guarantees 
for the payment of interest and/or principal of certain debt 
obligations. 
     
 






CHAPTER 3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 





Macro-level Altogether JLN VIX 
Other 
controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (EPU_News) 0.615*** 0.562*** 0.626*** 0.650*** 0.573*** 0.476*** 0.357*** 0.459*** 
 (7.543) (6.447) (7.976) (7.417) (7.691) (8.958) (6.030) (5.609) 
Election dummy 0.072        
 (0.909)        
Earnvol  0.000**   0.000    
  (2.156)   (0.845)    
Return volatility  2.026***   1.728***    
  (5.756)   (5.860)    
Industry Shock   0.110***  0.092***    
   (7.927)  (7.066)    
CS sale    0.000 0.000    
    (0.887) (0.891)    
CS Return    0.022 -0.079    
    (0.261) (-1.013)    
JLN      2.329***   
      (10.217)   
VIX       0.024***  
     
 





       (8.187)  
GDP growth        -0.149*** 
        (-2.673) 
CCI         0.058** 
        (2.260) 
CLI        -0.014 
        (-0.506) 
RealGDP forecast        0.014 
        (0.248) 
Capital Investment        -0.035 
        (-1.191) 
R&D        -0.159 
        (-0.543) 
R&D Dummy        0.019 
        (0.805) 
Institutional Ownership -0.272*** -0.172** -0.243*** -0.275*** -0.190*** -0.394*** -0.284*** -0.384*** 
 (-3.812) (-2.443) (-3.577) (-3.921) (-2.981) (-6.228) (-4.246) (-5.716) 
Firm Size -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.017 -0.002 -0.017 0.011 -0.039 
 (-0.366) (-0.270) (-0.299) (-0.648) (-0.085) (-0.769) (0.449) (-1.446) 
Firm Leverage 0.818*** 0.711*** 0.769*** 0.804*** 0.689*** 0.856*** 0.800*** 0.755*** 
 (8.104) (7.421) (7.509) (8.146) (7.124) (9.360) (8.495) (8.174) 
Firm Performance -4.255*** -3.939*** -3.254*** -4.284*** -3.132*** -3.613*** -4.169*** -3.841*** 
 (-9.699) (-9.397) (-7.174) (-9.562) (-7.077) (-9.082) (-9.965) (-10.034) 
Sales Growth 0.008 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.053*** 0.024 0.057*** 
 (0.206) (-0.068) (-0.037) (0.034) (0.106) (2.718) (1.092) (2.704) 
Cash Flow Volatility 1.099** 0.746 1.018** 1.066** 0.786 0.430 0.671 0.761 
 (2.160) (1.494) (2.002) (2.115) (1.585) (0.876) (1.364) (1.526) 
Market-to-Book -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.581) (-4.598) (-4.516) (-4.538) (-4.589) (-3.283) (-4.829) (-4.361) 
Credit Rating  -0.039*** -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.023** -0.037*** -0.030*** 
 (-4.138) (-3.346) (-4.006) (-4.212) (-3.320) (-2.376) (-3.637) (-2.852) 
     
 





Bond Maturity 0.006 0.008** 0.006 0.006 0.007* 0.006 0.004 0.005 
 (1.605) (2.061) (1.505) (1.594) (1.860) (1.500) (0.887) (1.296) 
Bond Age 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 
 (8.236) (8.157) (8.261) (8.054) (8.131) (8.519) (8.694) (7.470) 
High Yield 0.363*** 0.351*** 0.375*** 0.361*** 0.364*** 0.388*** 0.366*** 0.375*** 
 (8.333) (8.429) (8.333) (8.464) (8.382) (9.660) (9.074) (9.260) 
Callability 0.121** 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.093** 0.173*** 0.096*** 
 (2.415) (2.998) (2.911) (3.119) (3.229) (2.324) (4.256) (2.747) 
         
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,225 32,934 32,265 33,121 32,081 33,225 33,225 32,920 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.689 0.697 0.699 0.688 0.705 0.729 0.719 0.719 
 
Notes: This table provides coefficient estimates from regressing the log of bond yield spreads on economic policy uncertainty and 
various alternative specifications. The data cover the 1993–2015 period. Variable definitions are in Table 3.1. Year and two-digit SIC 
code dummies are included in all regressions. t-statistics from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering 
by firm are in parentheses. All specifications are run using firm and seasonal fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
